In June 2012, the world narrowly escaped a catastrophe. On a global scale, communication systems would have been damaged, possibly resulting in blackouts, disruptions to supply chains and break-down of basic services. The warning time would have been a few hours at most, the recovery could have taken years and could have cost up to trillions of dollars. What sounds like a terrible hacker attack or act of sabotage would have had a natural cause: one of the largest solar storms ever recorded, which missed the Earth only by a small margin.

What is space weather?

Our solar system can be a rough place. The sun is continuously emiting a wide variety of high-energy radiation. Usually, we are protected from this radiation by the earth’s magnetic field and our atmosphere. However, extreme solar activities such as solar flares and coronal mass ejections can severely disturb our daily life. When the radiation penetrates our shielding atmosphere, high electro-magnetic fields can directly damage electrical infrastructure such as telecommunication, power grids and transport networks. Satellite infrastructure is even more vulnerable. The result of extreme solar activities can range from economical losses to supply shortages up to a global scale. Since society relies more and more on sophisticated technology, its vulnerability to the so-called space weather increased.

Influence on the finance sector

In the finance industry, for example, the space weather can impact precise time measurements. For all financial transactions, trading and risk management, precise time stamps are needed. Normally, accurate timing is provided by the Global Navigation Satellite System. In case of an extreme space weather event, satellite systems are not reliable anymore. Then, emergency systems need to maintain timing such as land-based connections to atomic clocks (e.g. provided by the national metrology institutes) or the usage of holdover oscillators. If such alternative technologies are not available or used, financial transactions and trading need to complety halt for the time being. A historic example is the March 1989 geomagnetic storm where Toronto‘s stock exchange had to stop any activities due to a solar storm.

Fig. 1: Current forecasts of near-Earth solar wind from the ESA Space Weather Service Network, © ESA

Risks in interconnected infrastructure

The financial system is just one part of our complex modern-day society. Understanding the influence of space weather events on single components such as satellites is rather straight-forward. However, due to the high interconnection of technology, damages can cascade through different layers of infrastructure. So far, these interactions are not fully understood. The timing loss in financial systems can affect the electricity market and thus, the power grid which effects almost all industries and supply chains. Therefore, critical services can even be indirectly vulnerable due to their dependencies on other infrastructures.

Mitigation

Possible mitigation strategies include building early-warning systems and decreasing dependencies from other infrastructure. The weather forecasting and national risk-assessment programmes in the US and some European countries already consider the impact of space weather. National institutions such as the UK Met Office offer alert systems and technical guidance while both NASA and ESA operate space weather services. Nonetheless, forecasting precision and warning times are still limited. Thus, both governments and businesses need to further strengthen their resilience to extreme space weather events and coordinate their actions on an international level. Close cooperation between regulatory bodies, industry and research is key for gaining sufficient data and developing suitable solutions for the whole society. In the last years, significant efforts have been made to protect critical infrastructure but even today, geomagnetic storms can cause significant damages.

Literature

J. Wattles (2022): SpaceX will lose up to 40 satellites it just launched due to a solar storm. CNN Business

E. Krausmann et al. (2014): Space Weather and Financial Systems: Findings and Outlook. JRC Science and Policy Reports

T. Phillips (2014): Near Miss: The Solar Superstorm of July 2012. NASA Science

R. Sanders (2014): Fierce solar magnetic storm barely missed Earth in 2012. Berkley News

C. M. Ngwira et al. (2013): Simulation of the 23 July 2012 extreme space weather event: What if this extremely rare CME was Earth directed? Space Weather Vol. 11 Issue 12

D. N. Baker et al. (2012): A major solar eruptive event in July 2012: Defining extreme space weather scenarios. Space Weather Vol. 10 Issue 11

L. Dayton (1989): Solar storms halt stock market as computers crash. New Scientist

Auch neben der Ausrichtung der WM versucht Katar zunehmend international Einfluss zu nehmen, so sollen 2019 44,78 Milliarden Dollar Direktinvestitionen in über 80 Länder geflossen sein. Dabei wird einerseits in den Sport investiert, so ist Qatar Sports Investments beispielsweise der Eigentümer des vielfachen französischen Meisters Paris Saint-Germain FC. Daneben wurde jüngst Interesse am englischen Schwergewicht Manchester United FC bekundet. Andererseits diversifiziert Katar aktiv sein Aktienportfolio bei europäischen Unternehmen: In Deutschland hält Katar beispielsweise 12% der Anteile an Hapag-Lloyd, 9% an RWE und 11% an VW, in Großbritannien gehören den Kataris unter anderem 20% der Anteile am Flughafen Heathrow, 15% an der Supermarktkette Sainsbury’s sowie 8% an der Londoner Börse. In anderen europäischen Ländern fällt die Statistik vergleichbar aus.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber ist seit 2015 Professor für Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens an der FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg und unter anderem auch Vorstandsmitglied der Deutschen Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient (DAVO). Im Interview spricht Prof. Demmelhuber über die jüngsten Entwicklungen in Katar sowie die politischen Ambitionen des Landes.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber, welche geopolitischen Interessen verfolgt Katar, bis vor kurzem noch ein vergleichsweise armer Wüstenstaat, nach außen?

“Sportpolitische Investments sehe ich erstens als Vehikel, um politische und ökonomische Gestaltungsmacht zu zeigen und sich als internationaler Austragungsort von sportlichen Großveranstaltungen zu inszenieren und damit ein positives Bild des Landes auszusenden. Zweitens dient es als Legitimitätsressource gegenüber den eigenen Staatsbürger*innen und drittens sind Investments beispielsweise in zahlreiche DaxKonzerne durch den katarischen Staatsfonds als langfristige Strategie zu verstehen, die Wirtschaft für das Post-Öl-Zeitalter zu diversifizieren.”

Inwiefern unterscheiden sich die Interessen und die Entwicklung Katars von denen anderer Golfstaaten? 

“Bis vor wenigen Jahren begriff man die Golfstaaten, allesamt Mitglied des Golfkooperationsrat, als epistemische Gemeinschaft, quasi eine durch monarchische Solidarität verbundene Schicksalsgemeinschaft. Dieses Argument hat in den letzten Jahren massiv an Erklärungskraft verloren. Sicherlich ist der Golfkooperationsrat – im Vergleich z.B. zur Arabischen Liga – ein sehr effektiver regionaler Kooperationsmechanismus. Das darf aber nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass wir es mit einem lebhaften intra-regionalen Wettbewerb zu tun haben, bei dem Saudi- Arabien für sich selbst die Führungsrolle beansprucht.“

Die Führungsrolle Saudi-Arabiens kam ja auch bei der Blockade von Katar zwischen 2017 und 2021 zum Vorschein. Mittlerweile hat sich das Verhältnis weitgehend normalisiert, ein Team aus Saudi-Arabien ist letztlich zur WM angereist, der saudi- arabische Kronprinz war ebenso anwesend. Doch damals wurden die Grenzen geschlossen, viele diplomatische Beziehungen zu anderen arabischen Staaten ausgesetzt. Begründet wurde dieser Schritt vor allem mit der angeblichen katarischen Unterstützung von islamischem Terrorismus.

Welche Gründe hatten schließlich zur Aufhebung der Blockade geführt?

„Die vollständige Blockade des Landes durch das sogenannte Quartett (angeführt von SaudiArabien, gefolgt von Bahrain, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) und Ägypten) scheiterte kläglich an seiner (von Beginn an) unrealistischen Zielsetzung. Katar konnte sich dem Würgegriff seiner Nachbarn erfolgreich entziehen und dem Handelsembargo trotzen. Nach vier Jahren erkannten die Anrainer Katars, dass der regionalpolitische Kollateralschaden einer dauerhaften Blockade höher ist, als der einer Verständigung. Dennoch, ich wage zu behaupten, die Nationalmannschaft von Saudi-Arabien wäre auch während eines Boykotts angetreten und zwar analog zu Katar 2019 bei den asiatischen Fußballmeisterschaften in den VAE. Katar schmiss die Gastgeber im Halbfinale mit 4:0 aus dem Turnier. Am Ende schreibt der Fußball die besten Geschichten.“

Dabei war diese Fußballmeisterschaft auch im Westen stark umstritten und vielen ein Dorn im Auge. Zum einen sollen tausende Gastarbeiter, die in prekären Verhältnissen auf den Baustellen für die WM gearbeitet haben, gestorben sein. Von drei- bis fünfzehntausend Toten ist Schätzungen zufolge die Rede. Zum anderen die schwerwiegenden Eingriffe in LGBTQIA+-Rechte: Nach Artikel 201 des Strafgesetzbuchs aus dem Jahr 1971 werden gleichgeschlechtliche sexuelle Handlungen mit bis zu fünf Jahren Freiheitsstrafe, mitunter sogar der Todesstrafe, bestraft. In Erinnerung blieb lebhaft die Skandalaussage des katarischen WM- Botschafters, „Schwulsein sei ein geistiger Schaden”. Schließlich ist das Land auch mit Blick auf die Frauenrechtslage weit von der Gleichberechtigung entfernt. So bedürfen Frauen beispielsweise einer Erlaubnis des männlichen Vormunds, wenn sie heiraten oder in einem öffentlichen Job arbeiten wollen. Sie sind damit abhängig von ihren männlichen Familienmitgliedern. Nach dem Kritikhagel an der Menschenrechtslage, kündigte Katar einige Änderungen im Vorfeld der WM an.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber, gibt es jetzt, einige Monate später, spürbare nachhaltige Verbesserungen oder waren diese Änderungen nur ein Trugbild, wie zuvor vielerorts befürchtet?

„Im Vorfeld der WM wurden Menschenrechte massiv verletzt. Katar ist dabei kein Einzelfall, sondern reiht sich ein in eine lange Liste an autokratisch regierten Ländern, in denen aktuell 70 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung leben. Dennoch hat die kritische Debatte über Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Katar in den vergangenen Jahren Veränderungen mit sich gebracht und dem Regime ein gewisses Maß an Reformbereitschaft abgerungen, die zu einigen graduellen Verbesserungen führte (z.B. Abschaffung des Kafala-Systems**). Gleichzeitig müssen wir jedoch auch ehrlich anerkennen, wo Kritik und politischer Aktivismus leider nicht zu positiven Ergebnissen geführt haben. Die europäischen Solidaritätsbekundungen mit den LGBTQIA+ Communities im Nahen Osten sind wichtig, jedoch schlussfolgern Aktivist*innen aus der Region, dass sie sich nicht als konstruktiv erwiesen haben. Im Gegenteil führten sie zu einer Exponierung der vormals unter dem Radar laufenden LGBTQIA+-Räume, sodass sich die Situation für die Community und ihre Mitstreiter*innen zusätzlich verschlechtert hat. Es gibt viel Raum für konstruktive Debatten, aber wir dürfen diese nicht ohne die lokalen Aktivist*innen führen.“

Die Kritik bleibt bestehen, trotzdem unterhält Katar weiter die traditionell guten Beziehungen zu Europa und USA. Auf der einen Seite steht das im November 2022 geschlossene Gaslieferungsabkommen mit Deutschland, auf der anderen die Kritik an dem WM-Standort seitens mehrerer deutschen Bundesminister. Auf der einen Seite der US-amerikanische Militärstützpunkt in Katar, auf der anderen der Unterschlupf der Taliban nur wenige Kilometer weiter, den Katar ihnen jahrelang gewährt. Und das trotz ihres seit Dekaden andauernden Ringens mit den Amerikanern um die Vorherrschaft in Afghanistan.

Inwiefern passt das zusammen?

„Ich sehe da keinen großen Widerspruch. Katar inszeniert sich seit den 1990er Jahren in einer regionalpolitischen Vermittlerrolle und hat in zahlreichen Konflikten der Region mit unterschiedlichem Erfolg vermittelt. Allerdings bekam das Bild des neutralen Vermittlers im Nachgang zu den arabischen Umbrüchen ab 2011 tiefe Kratzer, da die Außenpolitik mitsamt dem Medienkonglomerat von al-Jazeera sehr klar Partei ergriff und unter anderem die Präsidentschaft Mursi in Ägypten aus dem Lager der Muslimbruderschaft politisch und finanziell unterstützte.“

Letzteres war wohl auch mitursächlich für die Beziehungskrise mit Saudi-Arabien, das die Muslimbruderschaft 2014 auch als terroristische Organisation eingestuft hatte. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die katarische Herrscherdynastie Al-Thani, seit 1822 an der Macht, durch geschickte Außenpolitik und dem versierten Einsatz von sogenannter Soft Power, ihre Machtstellung in der Region deutlich verbessern konnte. Das geopolitische Kalkül könnte darauf ausgelegt sein, sich unentbehrlich zu machen, womöglich auch als Schutz vor dem erheblich größeren Nachbarn Saudi-Arabien, das als Regionalmacht die Führungsrolle für sich beansprucht. Historisch gesehen wäre auch die Angst vor einem Einmarsch jedenfalls nicht gänzlich unbegründet, wie der irakische Überfall auf Kuwait 1990 zeigt.

Um Katar auf der Weltbühne besser zu positionieren, wird der natürliche Ressourcenreichtum des Landes (drittgrößte Erdgas- und neuntgrößte Erdöl- Vorkommen der Welt) aktiv für milliardenschwere Investitionen rund um den Globus verwendet, außerdem werden außenpolitische Partnerschaften ausgebaut. Die luxuriöse Ausrichtung der WM in Doha reiht sich dabei nahtlos als ein weiterer Baustein dieser Soft Power-Strategie ein. Und wie das neue Gaslieferungsabkommen mit Deutschland zeigt, ist die Aufmerksamkeit des Westens für die Probleme der Menschen in Katar nur von kurzlebiger Natur. Am Ende stehen die eigenen politische Interessen im Vordergrund.

Bester Dank gilt Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber für die ausführliche Beantwortung der Fragen und damit die interessante Beleuchtung dieses Themas!

*Anm. der Redaktion: Das Motto wird Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937), dem Initiator der Olympischen Spiele der Neuzeit, zugeschrieben.

**Anm. der Redaktion: Nach dem Kafala-System wurden den vielen Arbeiter*innen vorwiegend asiatischer Herkunft ihre Reisepässe als Bedingung für die  Einreise einbezogen. Damit wurden ihre Ausreise und potenzielle Jobwechsel erschwert. Offiziell wurde das System 2015 abgeschafft.

Quellen: Die Nachweise katarischer Anteile bei den aufgelisteten Unternehmen sind einsehbar auf den entsprechenden Websites (zuletzt abgerufen am 11.04.2023), im Einzelnen unter:

www.volkswagenag.com/de/InvestorRelations/shares/shareholder-structure.html

www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/company/ir/share/shareholder-structure.html

www.rwe.com/en/investor-relations/rwe-share/share-at-a-glance/shareholder-structure/

www.heathrow.com/company/about-heathrow

www.about.sainsburys.co.uk/investors/major-shareholders

www.lseg.com/en/investor-relations/significant-shareholders

It is currently difficult to get hold of reliable information regarding the situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. For the past 20 months fighting between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray’s regional forces has caught civilians in crossfire and sparked further military confrontation in neighboring Amhara and Oromia. Overall, the humanitarian crisis has left about 5 million people cut off from communications and with minimal access to food for almost 2 years. It raises major concern if even Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, a senior political figure from Tigray and director of the World Health Organization has been unable to send money to his family in the past months. Meanwhile in Europe, politicians and citizens were quickly concerned about Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine but are now rather occupied with their own cost of living crisis closely linked to the Ukraine war, the pandemic and climate change.

Echoing observations in blogs, commentaries and social media posts, solidarity must depart from hurriedly waving flags as soon news of crisis reach us and people suffer. This reflex is a demonstration of disposable solidarity that has also seeped into public discussion of the Ukraine crisis. Similarly, Tigray’s situation had briefly captured news headlines in late 2020 but was not able to keep momentum for long. Departing from a tentatively hopeful humanitarian truce from March 2022, Ethiopian federal forces recently started to bombard Tigray’s regional capital of Mekelle as of September 2022. Millions of people in Ethiopia continue to be cut off from communication access and are in dire need of food aid. Contrary to Ukraine’s situation where public attention and political de-escalation efforts were initially quickly mobilized, the Tigrayan crisis has remained in relative darkness with little hope for de-escalation at the negotiation table. Yet, even declining media coverage and public fatigue regarding Ukraine are a poignant illustrations of how quickly attention fades if it only remains nurtured by initial horror instead of deeper-rooted international solidarity.

Surely, rising cost of living and repercussions for Western economies are relevant for millions of Europeans at the moment, yet it is crucial to maintain perspective in light of crises and conflicts outside of Europe’s immediate gaze. Unfortunately, the story of an imperalist leader invading territory and inflicting harm on civilians to restore a mythical community sounds quite suitable for both the Ukraine war and the Tigray crisis. Non-Western imperialism is on the rise globally and it has become more important than ever to call out this concerning development.

Consequently, historical junctures as with the Ukraine war can be seized as opportunities to draw parallels and forge synergies against neo-imperialism and for internationalism in solidarity. Internationalism in solidarity must surely account for the tremendous danger of nuclear and economic escalation with grave consequences for the entire globe if Russia chooses this route in its aggression against Ukraine. Nonetheless, internationalism in solidarity must also be able to see commonalities in human hardship and abolish the idea of a marginal periphery in international politics. So this very moment can be leveraged as historical juncture inviting us to ask where our solidarity ends. I would like to believe that it is unfaltering and universal.

The first reason why the lithium triangle does not produce battery components on an industrial scale is a lack of consensus and motives among political leaders and the economic elite. On the one hand, there is no political consensus that local industrialization is a desirable goal for South America (Zicari, 2015, p.106). On the other hand, large interests benefit from the current raw material export model and defend it.

The second reason is the unrealistic view that some politicians had of their country´s position in the lithium market. Media and politics repeatedly compared lithium with “white gold” or “21st century oil” and thus created illusion and false hopes (López, et. al., 2019, p.138). In particular, the Bolivian government did not realistically assess its own position, the power of the transnational companies dominating the lithium market and the difficulty of establishing a new industrial sector in an economy without basic industry (Ströbele-Gregor, 2015, p.39). Moreover, there might be a limited time window to exploit lithium, as for the period after 2030, perhaps lithium will be largely replaced by battery recycling or by new battery technologies without lithium (Abergel, et. al, 2020, p. 25; Ali, Hancock & Ralph, 2018, p.558).

In addition, different management errors and poorly designed strategies have complicated local industrialization. There were disputes between the responsible actors, resistance from local populations, a lack of linkages between different teams of researchers and a lack of cooperation between the scientific system and the private sector (Reveco, Slipak, 2019, p.116; Fornillo, Gamba, 2019, p.143). Different attempts to form partnerships aiming at industrialization were announced, but failed without exception (Ali, Hancock & Ralph, 2018, p.554). The most famous failure was the partnership between the German company ACISA and the Bolivian state-owned firm YLB (Grupo de Estudios en Geopolítica y Bienes Comunes, 2019, p.33).

Furthermore, in Argentinia the legal framework does not favor industrialization, resulting in inter-local competition between the different regions with lithium deposits and in the fact that most of the surface area of the salt flats is already awardedto private companies (Reveco, Slipak, 2019, p.88). Additionally, competition instead of regional cooperation emerged between the three countries, Argentina, Bolivia and Chile. The political instability, various government changes and the very different responses of the three countries to the lithium question made regional cooperation extremely difficult. Due to the instability and the frequent changes of those responsible for lithium projects, the countries of the lithium triangle did not follow a clear strategy and every government change led to a new lithium policy (Argento, Puente & Slipak, 2017, p.406).

While regional integration of the lithium triangle is a distant vision, collaboration between the dominant companies is a fact. Bolivia had to admit that it does not have the technical-technological-human capacities and needs external help, but different attempts of technology transfer failed (Fornillo, 2016, p.81). Lithium technology is controlled and patented by transnational, listed companies, which are interlinked and cooperate with each other. The dominant companies are only interested in the raw material, oppose local industrialization, and, in general, refuse to process lithium in the lithium triangle. They are often vertically integrated with lithium demanders and make great efforts to hold their market shares. In this oligopolistic market there is a concentration within each link of the lithium value chain due to mergers and acquisitions, which complicates the entry of new players into the market (López, et. al, 2019, p.78).

Dominant companies and developed countries devote huge resources to battery development and manufacturing, so the lithium triangle cannot compete due to a lack of capital. The state strategies of the global north and the technological and commercial power of the dominant companies complicate the industrialization in the lithium triangle. A competition over lithium batteries and electromobility emerged between East Asia, Western Europe, and North America. The lithium triangle is not able to compete in this geo-economic battle and is forced to take the position of raw material supplier (Fornillo, Zicari, 2017, p.4).

One of the reasons for this is that the possession of lithium reserves is not the decisive criterion to produce batteries. The cost of energy is higher in the lithium triangle than in China, and since the production of lithium batteries is energy-intensive, the cost plays an important role. Lithium is not scarce, and batteries also require other materials that are not found in the lithium triangle (López, et. al, 2019, p.122). Many inputs such as cobalt, nickel, iron, phosphorus, bauxite, or graphite are missing. The main input of the lithium triangle for battery production would be lithium carbonate, plus Chilean copper, and Argentinean aluminum. This problem would only be solved by cooperating with Brazil, which possesses all the required battery materials that are missing in the lithium triangle, except cobalt (Australian Trade and Investment Commission, 2018, p. 20-27). However, this regional collaboration is not realistic, as not even the lithium triangle or at least the different Argentinian regions are cooperating. In addition, geography does not favor local industrialization. The long distance to Asia increases the cost of transporting batteries on cargo ships. Thus, the big suppliers of battery components follow a strategy of locating production close to the final demand, e.g. battery and electric vehicle factories (Ströbele-Gregor, 2015, p.4).

Concluding, the lithium triangle is facing the typical problems of (neo-) extractivism such as price volatility, dependence on demand from the global north, the dominance of developed countries in the value chain, lithium´s capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive character and South America´s asymmetric trade with Asia, Europe and the US. Other typical characteristics of extractivism that the lithium boom repeats include social conflicts, extraction in sensitive ecosystems, extractive territories isolated from the rest of the economy, the failure of regional cooperation and, finally, transnational corporations pushing the provinces and countries of the lithium triangle to compete with each other (Svampa, 2019, p.12/16/47/70/76). We saw that several challenges such as a lack of political consensus, unrealistic assumptions, management errors, political instability and missing regional cooperation complicated the local industrialization. Furthermore, the multinational corporations that dominate the lithium market opposed every single attempt to produce lithium batteries in South America. As a result, the lithium triangle exports lithium exclusively as a raw material and there is no local production of cathodes or batteries on an industrial scale. In the future, the new Chilean government of Gabriel Boric might address this unfavorable focus on commodity exports and push for a new Chilean lithium policy.

Bibliography

Abergel, T., et. al (2020) Global EV Outlook 2020. Entering the decade of electric drive?, Energy Technology Policy Division of the Directorate of Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks of the International Energy Agency, Paris.

Ali, S., Hancock, L. & Ralph, N. (2018) Bolivia´s lithium frontier: Can public private partnerships deliver a minerals boom for sustainable development?, Journal of Cleaner Production 178, Tennessee.

Argento, M., Puente, F. & Slipak, A. (2017) “Qué debates esconde la explotación del litio en el noroeste argentino? Perspectivas y proyecciones sobre la dinámica empresa-estadocomunidad”, in Alimonda, H., Martín, F. & Pérez, C. Ecología política latinoamericana. Pensamiento crítico, diferencia latinoamericana y rearticulación epistémica, CLACSO, Argentina.

Australian Trade and Investment Commission (2018) The lithium-ion battery value chain: new economy opportunities for Australia, Australia.

Fornillo, B. (2016) Sudamérica Futuro: China global, transición energética y posdesarrollo, El Colectivo, CLACSO, Argentina.

Fornillo, B., Gamba, M. (2019) “Política, ciencia y energía en el triángulo del litio”, in Fornillo, B. Litio en Sudamérica. Geopolítica, energía y territorios, El Colectivo, CLACSO, Argentina.

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Reveco, S., Slipak, A. (2019) “Historias de la extracción, dinámicas jurídico-tributarias y el litio en los modelos de desarrollo de Argentina, Bolivia y Chile”, in Fornillo, B. Litio en Sudamérica. Geopolítica, energía y territorios, El Colectivo, CLACSO, Argentina.

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Zicari, J. (2015) “La producción minera de litio en América Latina y el ascenso económico de China y de Asia Oriental”, in Latorre, S., Martínez, A. Extractivismo y conflictividad. Nuevos actores y nuevos contextos en América Latina, Revista Economía, vol.67, nr.105, Ecuador.

The Peruvian human rights organization CooperAcción has been creating local development alternatives to the depletion of natural resources in small communities in Amazon, Andes, and coastal regions for 25 years. In 2021, I managed CooperAcción’s project funding applications for international aid and will hereby use its institutional model to draw five lessons.

1. CooperAcción has deep local roots. Field offices in the communities are run by local employees. Thereby, any agency is perceived as native and familiar by the communities who are motivated to participate in the projects. Given the absence of state institutions, community members actively approach CooperAcción to implement local development innovations. The “horticuy”, for instance, reduces child malnutrition through integrated breeding of guinea pigs and vegetables in a greenhouse environment in Andean highlands.
2. The NGO balances its efforts to maintain local ties while keeping up with international standards. Imagine an Andean community which identifies domestic violence as a problem to be overcome. CooperAcción connects this local demand to the global sustainable development discourse, specifically to SDG 5 on gender equality. Due to this link the project qualifies to receive project funding from an international feminist foundation.
3. Financial sustainability is guaranteed through diversification. The staff’s diverse backgrounds and abilities allow for lawyers to secure funds for the legal defense of activists, geographers for mapping conflicts and communication specialists for health campaigns in indigenous languages. CooperAcción actively broadens the spectrum of donors being governments, foundations, or multilateral organizations. Arab and East Asian donors are approached for distinct sources of income such as awards. A mixed portfolio ensures that short-term funding is available for immediate crises, long-term grants for sustainable change, core contributions for salaries and project-type contributions for field work.
4. CooperAcción has built a strong network of support and makes use of the power of an organized civil society to set the public agenda. As member and founder of dozens of national and international groups, CooperAcción’s projects have high leverage. Human rights violations by Chinese companies in mines in the central highlands in Peru were brought forward to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and campaigns on climate change have reached hundreds of thousands of citizens.
5. CooperAcción strives for independence from political parties and the Peruvian state and thereby remained stable through economic crises and times of political instability. Accordingly, if a staff member assumes a political office their contract at CooperAcción remains dormant. In the publication format “CooperAcción Opina” authors voice criticism of any party or ideology.

Instead of belittling development initiatives, constructive models of cooperation should be shifted into public awareness. The case of CooperAcción demonstrates how international development aid can bring positive change on the ground. To be equally successful, implementing organizations should ensure deep local roots, a balance of local and international efforts, financial sustainability, a strong support network, and political independence.

For information on CooperAcción, see: cooperaccion.org.pe

Challenges ahead

Limited knowledge on what constitutes gender-based violence has resulted in the ingrained conformity of sexual violence as a “new normal”. The regularity of gender-based violence has made it ascribed to sociocultural practice currently e.g. rampant in refugee camps. A correlation thus exists between cultural norms and violence as manifested in the issue of child marriage which remains an acceptable practice in parts of the fragile state. Beliefs on gender roles and female servitude consequently influence customary practices like dowry payment encouraging child marriage.

Although the Child Act emphasises child protection from abuse, marriage and other negative and harmful cultural and social practices as articulated in section 22 and 23 (Ministry of Legal Affairs & Constitutional Development, 2009), child marriage is often regarded as a means of improving the family’s status in society. Material possession attached to the girl child is rooted in traditional customs of wealth transfer related to dowry payment. However, despite existing regulations, cases of young girls being preyed on have escalated. The gang-rape of a girl eight years of age who was dragged out from her house as the mother was held at gunpoint in Juba’s Gudele area is just an example of what some girls encounter regularly (Mary, 2020).

Juba’s legal system prioritizes formal law in determining criminal proceedings but the weak and ineffective justice system has paved way for customary courts. With 64 ethnic groups in South Sudan, each group has its own customary law system. Despite various systematic differences, the great commonality is exhibited especially regarding how women are viewed. Some features of customary law are normally at odds with women’s rights and thus the clash of women’s rights in customary law and international human rights law. Apart from dictating a woman’s access to resources and personal security, customary law also upholds harmful practices that degrade a woman’s status. As set forth in the the2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement) and Interim Constitution, customary law is legally binding. The proclamation has a significant influence on decisions made by SGBV survivors who opt to suffer in silence and consider this as the best option since the system fails to recognize women’s issues and rights.

Although customary law is a major setback on women’s rights due to its undermining nature, it is extensively utilized at the local level. Customarily old men who have no formal legal grounding act as traditional authorities who oversee the customary courts. With this power at hand, they botch the concept of fair play by upholding patriarchal views and pronouncing biased judgements favouring one gender. Nonetheless, formal and traditional justice systems consider gender-based violence specifically child marriages and intimate partner violence (IPV) a social problem resolvable at the family or community level and thus not regarded as a violation of a woman’s or girl’s right to security (IOM, 2019).

Tasked with the implementation of law enforcement, the National Police Service remains short-staffed, underfunded, tinted by impunity and lacking proper training on the know-how of handling gender-related cases. Not only are they not conversant with women’s rights, but they also occasionally arrest rape survivors for adultery or detain them as a form of security measure until the culprit is apprehend (IOM, 2019).

Societal reaction mirrors the prevalent shame and blame culture surrounding gender violence in South Sudan and one that suppresses SGBV survivors from coming forward to get assistance. Entrenched social norms act as barriers to survivors due to limitations brought forth on women’s peer support initiatives. Survivors are also not spared from being judged and blamed for initiating the endured abuse. In addition to this blame game, the type of violence experienced determines the sort of shame and stigma directed towards the victim. For instance, sexual violence on an unmarried woman affects the family’s social status in the community and breeds fear that stepping out of the family circle in search of assistance will damage the woman’s chances of securing a husband. This will in turn interfere with the anticipated economic assets brought about by dowry payment hence the reluctance in speaking out. Women also fear that reporting sexual violence will result in them forcefully getting married to their rapists as agreed upon by the traditional authority and family unit.

In terms of responsibilities, men (especially married men as per the traditional sense) engage in the public sphere whereas women focus on domestic activities despite the history of female elders and spiritual and political leaders in the community (CSRF, n.d.). To date, this traditional division of labor is still entrenched in society. Young men are expected to display their masculinity by protecting their families, communities and livestock which at times corresponds to structured violence. Men are therefore considered to be the engine of economic, livelihood, and security matters while women are restricted to domestic labor. Thus, success in the protection and also in warfare elevate the social status of male youth (CSRF).

Women whose husbands get entangled in conflict often become heads of the household and main breadwinners. This amplifies the decision-making power of women but still holds them captive to their traditional obligation of time-intensive domestic activities. The dynamics of women’s roles tend to cause tension especially during the past civil war where some male refugees and IDPs who were unable to secure employment battled to grapple that their wives had become the principal breadwinners and this accounted for the escalation in GBV (CSRF)⁠.

The Covid-19 pandemic has aggravated existing sexual exploitation with increasing harassment and rape cases. Implementation of sanitary restrictions has worsened the situation since young girls have fallen victim to prostitution and early pregnancies with at least 1,535 girls in the Equatoria region going through child marriage, forced prostitution or pregnancies (HRW, 2021). Pandemic-associated risks have also escalated gender-related abuse fuelled by the loss of livelihood, food insecurity, displacement, and heightened levels of insecurity. Food scarcity has exposed women and girls making them easy prey since they travel outside their safety parameters in quest of firewood, food, and water thereby increasing their susceptibility to GBV.

As further sanitary restrictions and lockdowns seem inevitable, an upsurge in SGBV is likely weakening women’s opportunities to seek safe spaces as they are isolated alongside their abusers and any available support system is halted. Further marginalization and tighter budgets will induce donor fatigue so that resources will be diverted to sustain Covid-19 programmes. As a consequence, women’s marginalization in South Sudan is at its peak and pursuit for redemption lies in limbo.

Conclusion

South Sudan’s soaring levels of gender-based violence against women clearly indicate that their rights are botched concepts in need of defense. The traditionally patriarchal element manifested in the South Sudanese society has a significant effect on gender relations as it diminishes the influence of women in shaping decisions since men are enshrined as the household heads and main decision-makers whereas women are expected to be submissive. Additionally, women, especially those living in remote areas, who have limited or no formal education continue experiencing unequal gender relations since formal legislative requirements are not necessarily practiced as the customary law continues being a source of gender inequality.

Sociocultural beliefs that pay homage to bridal wealth and child marriage are the root cause of violence and thus a clarion call to stakeholders to address these setbacks. Last but not least, designing local-level policy interventions while trying to include traditional structures, rather than imposing Western assumptions should also be taken into consideration.

References

CSRF South Sudan. Gender CSRF Gender in South Sudan Research Repository Guide.

El-Bushra, J., & Gardner, J. (2016). The impact of war on Somali men: feminist analysis of masculinities and gender relations in a fragile context. Gender and Development, 24(3), 443–458.

Devon, C. (2019). Still in Danger: Women and girls face sexual violence in South Sudan despite peace deal. Refugees International.

Human Rights Watch. (2021). South Sudan Events of 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan. 

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2019). Gender-based violence knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in South Sudan.  International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/south-sudan-gender-based-kap.pdf . 

Mary, R. (2020, May 10). Child gang-raped, found unconscious in Juba. Eye Radio. https://eyeradio.org/child-gang-raped-found-unconscious-in-juba/

Ministry Legal Affairs and Constitutional (2009, February 10). The Child Act, 2008 Southern Sudan Gazette No. 1 Volume. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/83470/92194/F822057232/SDN83470.pdf. 

Saferworld. (2020, July 20). “It is like another war”: confronting gender-based violence amid COVID-19 in South Sudan. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/887-ait-is-like-another-wara-confronting-gender-based-violence-amid-covid-19-in-south-sudan. 

When Nigeria gained independence from the British colonial government in 1960, joy in the faces of Nigerians witnessing the celebration had no bound as there were great expectations heralding the event. But alas! More than 60 years later, the country’s sickening situation has cast a shadow for its future. Moving further, we have two options as we seek to address the challenges bedeviling this blessed country. On one hand, it is managing a condition where corruption, insecurity, poverty, and injustice are the order of the day. On the other end, a new course for a new Nigeria where justice, peace, progress, national development become the order of the day is needed. This can only be championed by energetic, passionate youth who are hungry for improvement and progress.

According to the UN, the global youth population(between the ages 15 and 24 years) is estimated at 1.8 Billion which is  19% of the world population¹. Africa’s population of young people is the highest share across the globe with Nigeria as the highest on the continent. Of utmost importance to building a better and new Nigeria is the need for young people to explore the political space of the country. Young people have innovative ideas that are useful assets to national development and as such, there is a need for them to get involved in the political process.

The National Youth Service Corps is an initiative that best explains how Nigerians have played significant roles in community development. Established during the Gowon administration in 1973 with the aim of fostering national unity and integration, the scheme requires university graduates to serve a period of one year where they are posted to various communities to play significant roles in community development. In addition, they are exposed to various career opportunities for that period. The scheme has strongly created an avenue for Nigerian youth to demonstrate their productiveness in various dimensions such as community service, election processes, youth advocacy, entrepreneurial development and poverty alleviation.  49 years after its creation, the scorecard of Nigerian youth under the scheme has proven their productivity and innovative ideas towards nation-building.

The recent #Endsars protests that broke out in October 2020 were a historic juncture led by the Nigerian Youth to resist police brutality, harassment, and extortion. The protest was a movement that soon took over social media with the hashtag #EndSARS with up to 28 Million posts on Twitter by prominent actors from across the globe who showed solidarity with the protest against the status quo. Consequently, Nigerian authorities were forced to disband the police unit Furthermore SARS was accused of various degrees of atrocities against the affected victims after the initial protest started. A year on, the Nigerian government has started to embrace initiatives to compensate the families of the victims affected. Additionally, the state governments across the country’s 36 states started to collect detailed information on the atrocities committed by the police forces to assure the masses of their determination to seek justice.

This is a strong illustration that the young people can be a strong agent of national development in the emergence of a new and better Nigeria provided that they are ready to play an active role in developing the country.

Young people also have a key responsibility to play in building a peaceful and safe Nigeria because the young people across the globe are key stakeholders in peacebuilding. According to a recent study carried out by Mercy Corps, many active members of terrorist groups, most especially in the West African region, willfully joined or were forcefully conscripted from the large pool of unemployed youth². The Nigerian youth must thus seek to contribute to building a peaceful nation by embracing peaceful coexistence across divides.

In addition, the young people must learn to deploy their knowledge in addressing the challenges bedeviling the nation through effective means such as national dialogue. Dialogue remains a key tool in peacebuilding and as such, there is a need for the voices of the young people to be heard from the local to national levels by giving them the chance to express their grievances.

Going further, without any doubt, young people across the globe have an extensive network within their various communities, and the fluency with which they use social media to disseminate their messages are unique assets to the promotion of love, tolerance, national development across the globe. Social media, if properly deployed, can be used to help spread peace, encourage dialogue, sensitize young people across all divides, religions, ethnic groups, political affiliations. The Nigerian youth must collectively deploy social media to promote values that can strengthen national unity.

In conclusion, young people represent not only the key stakeholders in national development but also a key risk factor if they are not properly harnessed. Hence, to build a new Nigeria, young people are the key pillars that the country depends on. Young people must also learn to use national dialogue in resolving issues and differences when the need arises. The Nigerian youth cannot afford to disappoint.

The National Youths Development Policy asserts that:

“Youths are the foundation of a society. Their energies, inventiveness, character, and orientation define the pace of development and security of a nation. Through their creative talents and labor power, a nation makes giant strides in economic development and socio-political attainments. In their dreams and hopes, a nation founds her motivation; on their energies, she builds her vitality and purpose. And because of their dreams and aspirations, the future of a nation is assured.”⁴

References

1. United Nations, UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). 2019. https://www.un.org/en/Africa/peace/.youth.shtml.
2. Mercy Corps. 2016. “Motivation and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth.” https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/boko-haram-nigerian
3. The African Union. 2020. “A Study on the Roles and Contribution of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa.” https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/a-study-on-the-roles-and-contributions-of-youth-to-peace-and-security-in-africa
4. Second National Youth Policy Document of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2009. https://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Nigeria_2009_National_Youth_Policy.pdf

In an initial step, Bhutan developed GNH as a state philosophy that criticizes the narrow framing of development based on economic growth. GNH was supposed to illustrate what an alternative to likely over-consumption, social inequality, and resource depletion could look like. GNH is supposed to serve as a lens for guiding national development that makes sustainability, well-being, and happiness its key priorities. It does so through the GNH index that – in a second step – developed GNH from a philosophy to a tool for policy making. The index is based on surveys relying on the operationalization of well-being and happiness to make them measurable variables. GNH became a key component of Bhutanese politics when then King Jigme Singye Wangchuck declared that GNH was more important than gross domestic product (GDP) in 1972. It remains debatable whether GNH actually leads to the desired impact.

GNH is an important component of policy and decision making in Bhutan and is now codified as a central political principle in article 9 of the new constitution from 2008. It distinguishes four policy areas: (I) sustainable and equitable socioeconomic development, (II) preservation of the environment, (III) preservation and promotion of culture, and (IV) promotion of good governance. These four fields are central aspects of the surveys for the GNH index, which are created by the Center for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research. The surveys were first carried out in 2008 and have since then been conducted nationwide among 8,000 randomly selected households every five years. The GNH Index is divided into nine core areas: questions on health, education, and living standards are complemented with questions on time use, public administration and governance, environmental and cultural diversity and resilience, and psychological well-being and societal vitality. These areas each include two to four indicators – a total of 33 indicators are incorporated into the GNH index. This process is intended to provide an evaluation of the acceptance of government policies over time and to assess current societal problems, which is hoped to result in greater
policy coherence.

The Bhutanese government has taken a number of measures in recognition of Gross National Happiness. According to environmental protection laws of the constitution, at least 60% of the territory must be permanently forested – currently, the share is about 70%. Deforestation is only allowed if new trees are planted correspondingly. Slash and burn is punishable by law. Unprocessed wood from trees logged in Bhutan must not be exported. Industry businesses are subject to mandatory environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, all of Bhutan’s energy consumption comes from renewable sources generated by hydroelectric and solar power plants – the surplus of which is exported, now being the country’s largest export, accounting for more than one-third of all public revenues. This makes Bhutan the only country in the world whose largest export is energy from renewable sources. Overall, Bhutan can rightfully be considered to be one of the most environmentally friendly countries on earth – it is not only carbon neutral, but carbon negative, meaning it absorbs more carbon than it emits. Bhutan also stands out in questions of social issues. Although access to schools and medical facilities remains difficult in remote areas of Bhutan, education and medical care are free of charge, The average age of the population is approximately 29 years while life expectancy amounts to about 72 years, due to a high birth rate and rapid improvements in medical care and a consequent rise of life expectancy over the past two decades. The illiteracy rate in Bhutan amounts to about 36%, while it is in the low single digits for youths. The corruption rate remains very low. Bhutan ranks 23rd on the Corruption Perception Index, just below nations such as France (22nd), surpasses countries such as the United States (24th), and shows a steady upward trend.

Despite such initiatives and substantial achievements, Bhutan ranked only 97th in the UN’s World Happiness Report, although the index was created on the initiative of Bhutan at the 2012 meeting on „Wellbeing and Happiness: Defining a New Economic Paradigm“. The 2015 GNH surveys found that only 8% were “deeply happy” and 35% were “extensively happy.” 47.9% registered as “narrowly happy”. Existing social problems are diverse. The GNH significantly restricts economic development, for instance, the accession to the World Trade Organization was rejected by the Bhutanese government in 2017, referencing GNH. Bhutan remains one of the least developed countries in the world – most of the population is engaged in subsistence farming. Poverty is particularly prevalent in remote areas of the country that are poorly arable. Youth unemployment amounted to around 10% in 2019. Also, increasing income inequality is emerging as the economy grows. Moreover, coercion of cultural assimilation in minority communities persist. Most notably, Bhutanese people of Nepali descent were victims of assimilation measures, exclusion in citizenship laws and of forced repatriations to Nepal in the late 1980s.

The concept of Gross National Happiness understands general well-being of the population as the central priority of policy making. In light of GNH, the Kingdom of Bhutan has introduced a variety of policies that have been critical in protecting the environment, shaping social development in issues such as education and health, and building a sustainable economy. Although there are significant limitations to the successful implementation of aspects of GNH into policy in Bhutan, GNH nonetheless provides valuable approaches for more sustainable and coherent policy making.

This article was published in the January issue of the “Diplomatisches Magazin”, 2022. Find it here.

• How is the LAC region influenced by international politics and how does it shape them? How are LAC countries for example acting in international organizations such as the United Nations?
• What goals do they envision for the sustainable development of our planet and what is their role in international development cooperation? What are their partners or traditional rivals?
• What political or economic cooperation and agreements do you consider useful or rather destructive for the region or certain countries? How could for example the BRICS or international trade agreements like the envisioned EU-Mercosur agreement boost economic development or harm domestic production and product sovereignty? What could be their cultural implications?

If these questions or any other topic dealing with the international relations of the LAC region is of interest to you, we offer you the opportunity to publish your article on the CISS think tank.

Your article can touch on the whole LAC region but also deal with a specific country, an organization or certain societies and should critically engage with one specific research question. It should be about 1.500 words (analysis) or 500 words (opinion) long and be handed in in Microsoft Word format to CISS’s regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean Carlotta Schilling carlotta.schilling@ciss.eu. Articles are accepted on a rolling basis until January 31st. For the CISS guidelines see this flyer. Please also do not hesitate to contact us in case you have any further questions.

Despite cultural ties that go back centuries (Rey M., 2021), and notwithstanding recently growing cooperation, India has had a tumultuous and fickle diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan. The primary reason for this is the constant fluctuations (Thier A. & Woodern S., 2017) in Afghanistan’s Indo-Pakistani policy which stems from unstable political dynamics of the country. Historically, Taliban rule in Afghanistan has led to a tilt towards Pakistan in diplomatic relationships and has had a negative impact on Indo-Afghan cooperation. (Subramanian N., 2021) Additionally, the Taliban have received clandestine support from Islamabad for years. (NSA, 2007)

However, Afghanistan is an essential transit hub between South Asia and Central Asia, and thus has the potential to play a pivotal role in the development and economic prosperity of the region. (Akhlaqi S., 2017) India has been involved in several projects as well as aid and reconstruction programs to exploit this potential. Yet, most of these assistance programs have taken place during the reign of non-fundamentalist, mostly democratically elected governments. In a massive policy change, India has only recently taken initiative to establish diplomatic relationships with the Taliban.

This time around, the Taliban have proven to be more strategically organized, yet, the immediate impact of the establishment of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” is far from positive. Even though the Taliban have declared interests in establishing cordial relations with New Delhi, new Indo-Afghan relations under Taliban rule are unlikely. The induction of the Haqqani group into the Taliban government has already made matters worse to the Indian government and maintains strong ties with Pakistan’s ISI (Miller M., 2017) and, in the past, was involved in several attacks on Indian assets in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Taliban have begun to contradict several of the promises made publicly, which it seems, were only made for the projection of a positive image of the group. No significant steps have been taken by the newly inducted government to make good of its declaration of “cordiality”. Furthermore, the takeover of Taliban increases the risk of indoctrination and violence in the unstable regions of Kashmir. (Wani A., 2021) Despite promises to the contrary, Taliban led Afghanistan could quickly become a breeding ground for other terrorist groups.

When it comes to India’s assets in Afghanistan, the effect on them would depend on the quality of the relations established between the governments of the two countries. On the face of it, the chance of establishing a sustainable cooperative relationship seems bleak due to the inherent nature of Taliban as well as its closeness to Pakistan. It must also be kept in mind that the Chinese government, despite the ideological differences, has been quick to offer assistance to the Taliban. Moreover, it is backing the Taliban’s demand from the U.S. to unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets. India should not overlook these growing trilateral relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China which would definitely pose a problem for India in the long-run. While Pakistan and China are already “all-weather” allies (Sattat H., 2015), the addition of the Taliban led Afghanistan to this partnership would result in increased trade as well as border related insecurities to India.

It is evident that, when it comes to Afghanistan, India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy is failing. The country’s bid to strengthen Indo-Afghan relations and bring stability to the region through investing in Afghanistan has been distressed due to the sudden and rapid takeover by the Taliban. However, India cannot afford to lose Afghanistan as a strategic ally. At the same time, it cannot ignore the human rights violations occurring in Afghanistan. It remains be seen whether India undertakes humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan. On the other hand, keeping in mind the rapid changes occurring in Afghanistan, the Indian government needs to take swift action. Engaging in a bilateral dialogue to negotiate a common ground is what will best serve the needs of the hour. The Indian government needs to keep an eye on the trajectory of Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan and China while proactively reconfiguring its own. It must be remembered that while Taliban leaders have said that the group wants to maintain its ties with India, eventually, Sino-Pakistani influence will definitely bring changes to this position. Hence, the Indian government will need to work towards restrictions of anti-Indian sentiments in Afghanistan that could very well have a detrimental effect on domestic political sovereignty (Lee M., 2018). Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot survive on Sino-Pakistan support alone and at one point or another, the Taliban will even more on India’s support to maintain legitimacy of their rule.

Youssef N. and Lubold G (2021). Last U.S. Troops Leave Afghanistan After Nearly 20 Years, Wall Street Journal. Accessed 13 September 2021.

British Broadcasting Corporation (2021). Afghanistan: Don’t recognise Taliban regime, resistance urges, Accessed: 13 September 2021.

Embassy of India, Kabul. Indo-Afghan Relations. Accessed 13 September 2021.

Rey M. (2021). Afghanistan’s history and its connections with India, The Daily Guardian. Accessed 15 September 2021.

Khalil A. (2016). The Tangled History of the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Triangle, The Diplomat. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Thier A. and Wodern S. (2017). Special Report 408, United States Institute of Peace. Accessed: 16 September 2021

Subramanian N. (2021). Explained: A look at Pakistan’s long relationship with the Taliban, The Indian Express. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

The National Security Archive (2007). Pakistan: “The Taliban’s Godfather”?, 14 August 2017.

Akhlaqi S. (2017). Afghanistan: Transit hub for the region, The Economic Times, Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Iwanek K. (2019). 36 Things India Has Done for Afghanistan, The Diplomat, Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Vaid D. (2021). India announces first diplomatic contact with the Taliban, Deutsche Welle. Accessed: 19 September 2021.

Miller M. (2021). Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban: What to Know, Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed 19 September 2021.

Mohanty K. (2021). Explained: Al-Qaeda Ties, Attack On Indian Assets. Why Haqqani Network In Taliban Is Driving Worries, News18. Accessed: 17 September 2021.

Dawn (2021). Taliban pardon rivals, vow to honour women, 18 August 2021. Accessed: 17 September 2021.

Farge E. (2021). Taliban breaking promises including over women, says U.N., Reuters. Accessed: 18 September 2021

Wani A. (2021). Resurgent Taliban and its implications on Kashmir, Observer Research Foundation. Accessed: 20 September 2021.

Chaturvedi A. (2021). ‘Pakistan our second home, there is peace in Afghanistan’: Taliban spokesperson, Hindustan Times. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

British Broadcasting Corporation (2021), China offers $31m in emergency aid to Afghanistan, 9 September 2021. Accessed 16 September 2021.

Business Standard (2021). China backs Taliban’s demand to US to unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets, 15 September 2021. Accessed: 20 September 2021.

Sattar H. (2015). China and Pakistan’s All-Weather Friendship, The Diplomat. Accessed: 14 September 2021.

Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 31st Special Session of the Human Rights Council The serious human rights concerns and situation in Afghanistan, 24 August 2021. Accessed: 19 September 2021.

Lee, M. (2018). The International Politics of Incomplete Sovereignty: How Hostile Neighbors Weaken the State, International Organization, Vol. 72 No. 2, pp. 283-315. Accessed: 20 September 2021