It is currently difficult to get hold of reliable information regarding the situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. For the past 20 months fighting between the Ethiopian federal government and Tigray’s regional forces has caught civilians in crossfire and sparked further military confrontation in neighboring Amhara and Oromia. Overall, the humanitarian crisis has left about 5 million people cut off from communications and with minimal access to food for almost 2 years. It raises major concern if even Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, a senior political figure from Tigray and director of the World Health Organization has been unable to send money to his family in the past months. Meanwhile in Europe, politicians and citizens were quickly concerned about Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine but are now rather occupied with their own cost of living crisis closely linked to the Ukraine war, the pandemic and climate change.

Echoing observations in blogs, commentaries and social media posts, solidarity must depart from hurriedly waving flags as soon news of crisis reach us and people suffer. This reflex is a demonstration of disposable solidarity that has also seeped into public discussion of the Ukraine crisis. Similarly, Tigray’s situation had briefly captured news headlines in late 2020 but was not able to keep momentum for long. Departing from a tentatively hopeful humanitarian truce from March 2022, Ethiopian federal forces recently started to bombard Tigray’s regional capital of Mekelle as of September 2022. Millions of people in Ethiopia continue to be cut off from communication access and are in dire need of food aid. Contrary to Ukraine’s situation where public attention and political de-escalation efforts were initially quickly mobilized, the Tigrayan crisis has remained in relative darkness with little hope for de-escalation at the negotiation table. Yet, even declining media coverage and public fatigue regarding Ukraine are a poignant illustrations of how quickly attention fades if it only remains nurtured by initial horror instead of deeper-rooted international solidarity.

Surely, rising cost of living and repercussions for Western economies are relevant for millions of Europeans at the moment, yet it is crucial to maintain perspective in light of crises and conflicts outside of Europe’s immediate gaze. Unfortunately, the story of an imperalist leader invading territory and inflicting harm on civilians to restore a mythical community sounds quite suitable for both the Ukraine war and the Tigray crisis. Non-Western imperialism is on the rise globally and it has become more important than ever to call out this concerning development.

Consequently, historical junctures as with the Ukraine war can be seized as opportunities to draw parallels and forge synergies against neo-imperialism and for internationalism in solidarity. Internationalism in solidarity must surely account for the tremendous danger of nuclear and economic escalation with grave consequences for the entire globe if Russia chooses this route in its aggression against Ukraine. Nonetheless, internationalism in solidarity must also be able to see commonalities in human hardship and abolish the idea of a marginal periphery in international politics. So this very moment can be leveraged as historical juncture inviting us to ask where our solidarity ends. I would like to believe that it is unfaltering and universal.

Challenges ahead

Limited knowledge on what constitutes gender-based violence has resulted in the ingrained conformity of sexual violence as a “new normal”. The regularity of gender-based violence has made it ascribed to sociocultural practice currently e.g. rampant in refugee camps. A correlation thus exists between cultural norms and violence as manifested in the issue of child marriage which remains an acceptable practice in parts of the fragile state. Beliefs on gender roles and female servitude consequently influence customary practices like dowry payment encouraging child marriage.

Although the Child Act emphasises child protection from abuse, marriage and other negative and harmful cultural and social practices as articulated in section 22 and 23 (Ministry of Legal Affairs & Constitutional Development, 2009), child marriage is often regarded as a means of improving the family’s status in society. Material possession attached to the girl child is rooted in traditional customs of wealth transfer related to dowry payment. However, despite existing regulations, cases of young girls being preyed on have escalated. The gang-rape of a girl eight years of age who was dragged out from her house as the mother was held at gunpoint in Juba’s Gudele area is just an example of what some girls encounter regularly (Mary, 2020).

Juba’s legal system prioritizes formal law in determining criminal proceedings but the weak and ineffective justice system has paved way for customary courts. With 64 ethnic groups in South Sudan, each group has its own customary law system. Despite various systematic differences, the great commonality is exhibited especially regarding how women are viewed. Some features of customary law are normally at odds with women’s rights and thus the clash of women’s rights in customary law and international human rights law. Apart from dictating a woman’s access to resources and personal security, customary law also upholds harmful practices that degrade a woman’s status. As set forth in the the2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement) and Interim Constitution, customary law is legally binding. The proclamation has a significant influence on decisions made by SGBV survivors who opt to suffer in silence and consider this as the best option since the system fails to recognize women’s issues and rights.

Although customary law is a major setback on women’s rights due to its undermining nature, it is extensively utilized at the local level. Customarily old men who have no formal legal grounding act as traditional authorities who oversee the customary courts. With this power at hand, they botch the concept of fair play by upholding patriarchal views and pronouncing biased judgements favouring one gender. Nonetheless, formal and traditional justice systems consider gender-based violence specifically child marriages and intimate partner violence (IPV) a social problem resolvable at the family or community level and thus not regarded as a violation of a woman’s or girl’s right to security (IOM, 2019).

Tasked with the implementation of law enforcement, the National Police Service remains short-staffed, underfunded, tinted by impunity and lacking proper training on the know-how of handling gender-related cases. Not only are they not conversant with women’s rights, but they also occasionally arrest rape survivors for adultery or detain them as a form of security measure until the culprit is apprehend (IOM, 2019).

Societal reaction mirrors the prevalent shame and blame culture surrounding gender violence in South Sudan and one that suppresses SGBV survivors from coming forward to get assistance. Entrenched social norms act as barriers to survivors due to limitations brought forth on women’s peer support initiatives. Survivors are also not spared from being judged and blamed for initiating the endured abuse. In addition to this blame game, the type of violence experienced determines the sort of shame and stigma directed towards the victim. For instance, sexual violence on an unmarried woman affects the family’s social status in the community and breeds fear that stepping out of the family circle in search of assistance will damage the woman’s chances of securing a husband. This will in turn interfere with the anticipated economic assets brought about by dowry payment hence the reluctance in speaking out. Women also fear that reporting sexual violence will result in them forcefully getting married to their rapists as agreed upon by the traditional authority and family unit.

In terms of responsibilities, men (especially married men as per the traditional sense) engage in the public sphere whereas women focus on domestic activities despite the history of female elders and spiritual and political leaders in the community (CSRF, n.d.). To date, this traditional division of labor is still entrenched in society. Young men are expected to display their masculinity by protecting their families, communities and livestock which at times corresponds to structured violence. Men are therefore considered to be the engine of economic, livelihood, and security matters while women are restricted to domestic labor. Thus, success in the protection and also in warfare elevate the social status of male youth (CSRF).

Women whose husbands get entangled in conflict often become heads of the household and main breadwinners. This amplifies the decision-making power of women but still holds them captive to their traditional obligation of time-intensive domestic activities. The dynamics of women’s roles tend to cause tension especially during the past civil war where some male refugees and IDPs who were unable to secure employment battled to grapple that their wives had become the principal breadwinners and this accounted for the escalation in GBV (CSRF)⁠.

The Covid-19 pandemic has aggravated existing sexual exploitation with increasing harassment and rape cases. Implementation of sanitary restrictions has worsened the situation since young girls have fallen victim to prostitution and early pregnancies with at least 1,535 girls in the Equatoria region going through child marriage, forced prostitution or pregnancies (HRW, 2021). Pandemic-associated risks have also escalated gender-related abuse fuelled by the loss of livelihood, food insecurity, displacement, and heightened levels of insecurity. Food scarcity has exposed women and girls making them easy prey since they travel outside their safety parameters in quest of firewood, food, and water thereby increasing their susceptibility to GBV.

As further sanitary restrictions and lockdowns seem inevitable, an upsurge in SGBV is likely weakening women’s opportunities to seek safe spaces as they are isolated alongside their abusers and any available support system is halted. Further marginalization and tighter budgets will induce donor fatigue so that resources will be diverted to sustain Covid-19 programmes. As a consequence, women’s marginalization in South Sudan is at its peak and pursuit for redemption lies in limbo.

Conclusion

South Sudan’s soaring levels of gender-based violence against women clearly indicate that their rights are botched concepts in need of defense. The traditionally patriarchal element manifested in the South Sudanese society has a significant effect on gender relations as it diminishes the influence of women in shaping decisions since men are enshrined as the household heads and main decision-makers whereas women are expected to be submissive. Additionally, women, especially those living in remote areas, who have limited or no formal education continue experiencing unequal gender relations since formal legislative requirements are not necessarily practiced as the customary law continues being a source of gender inequality.

Sociocultural beliefs that pay homage to bridal wealth and child marriage are the root cause of violence and thus a clarion call to stakeholders to address these setbacks. Last but not least, designing local-level policy interventions while trying to include traditional structures, rather than imposing Western assumptions should also be taken into consideration.

References

CSRF South Sudan. Gender CSRF Gender in South Sudan Research Repository Guide.

El-Bushra, J., & Gardner, J. (2016). The impact of war on Somali men: feminist analysis of masculinities and gender relations in a fragile context. Gender and Development, 24(3), 443–458.

Devon, C. (2019). Still in Danger: Women and girls face sexual violence in South Sudan despite peace deal. Refugees International.

Human Rights Watch. (2021). South Sudan Events of 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/south-sudan. 

International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2019). Gender-based violence knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in South Sudan.  International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/south-sudan-gender-based-kap.pdf . 

Mary, R. (2020, May 10). Child gang-raped, found unconscious in Juba. Eye Radio. https://eyeradio.org/child-gang-raped-found-unconscious-in-juba/

Ministry Legal Affairs and Constitutional (2009, February 10). The Child Act, 2008 Southern Sudan Gazette No. 1 Volume. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/83470/92194/F822057232/SDN83470.pdf. 

Saferworld. (2020, July 20). “It is like another war”: confronting gender-based violence amid COVID-19 in South Sudan. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/887-ait-is-like-another-wara-confronting-gender-based-violence-amid-covid-19-in-south-sudan. 

When Nigeria gained independence from the British colonial government in 1960, joy in the faces of Nigerians witnessing the celebration had no bound as there were great expectations heralding the event. But alas! More than 60 years later, the country’s sickening situation has cast a shadow for its future. Moving further, we have two options as we seek to address the challenges bedeviling this blessed country. On one hand, it is managing a condition where corruption, insecurity, poverty, and injustice are the order of the day. On the other end, a new course for a new Nigeria where justice, peace, progress, national development become the order of the day is needed. This can only be championed by energetic, passionate youth who are hungry for improvement and progress.

According to the UN, the global youth population(between the ages 15 and 24 years) is estimated at 1.8 Billion which is  19% of the world population¹. Africa’s population of young people is the highest share across the globe with Nigeria as the highest on the continent. Of utmost importance to building a better and new Nigeria is the need for young people to explore the political space of the country. Young people have innovative ideas that are useful assets to national development and as such, there is a need for them to get involved in the political process.

The National Youth Service Corps is an initiative that best explains how Nigerians have played significant roles in community development. Established during the Gowon administration in 1973 with the aim of fostering national unity and integration, the scheme requires university graduates to serve a period of one year where they are posted to various communities to play significant roles in community development. In addition, they are exposed to various career opportunities for that period. The scheme has strongly created an avenue for Nigerian youth to demonstrate their productiveness in various dimensions such as community service, election processes, youth advocacy, entrepreneurial development and poverty alleviation.  49 years after its creation, the scorecard of Nigerian youth under the scheme has proven their productivity and innovative ideas towards nation-building.

The recent #Endsars protests that broke out in October 2020 were a historic juncture led by the Nigerian Youth to resist police brutality, harassment, and extortion. The protest was a movement that soon took over social media with the hashtag #EndSARS with up to 28 Million posts on Twitter by prominent actors from across the globe who showed solidarity with the protest against the status quo. Consequently, Nigerian authorities were forced to disband the police unit Furthermore SARS was accused of various degrees of atrocities against the affected victims after the initial protest started. A year on, the Nigerian government has started to embrace initiatives to compensate the families of the victims affected. Additionally, the state governments across the country’s 36 states started to collect detailed information on the atrocities committed by the police forces to assure the masses of their determination to seek justice.

This is a strong illustration that the young people can be a strong agent of national development in the emergence of a new and better Nigeria provided that they are ready to play an active role in developing the country.

Young people also have a key responsibility to play in building a peaceful and safe Nigeria because the young people across the globe are key stakeholders in peacebuilding. According to a recent study carried out by Mercy Corps, many active members of terrorist groups, most especially in the West African region, willfully joined or were forcefully conscripted from the large pool of unemployed youth². The Nigerian youth must thus seek to contribute to building a peaceful nation by embracing peaceful coexistence across divides.

In addition, the young people must learn to deploy their knowledge in addressing the challenges bedeviling the nation through effective means such as national dialogue. Dialogue remains a key tool in peacebuilding and as such, there is a need for the voices of the young people to be heard from the local to national levels by giving them the chance to express their grievances.

Going further, without any doubt, young people across the globe have an extensive network within their various communities, and the fluency with which they use social media to disseminate their messages are unique assets to the promotion of love, tolerance, national development across the globe. Social media, if properly deployed, can be used to help spread peace, encourage dialogue, sensitize young people across all divides, religions, ethnic groups, political affiliations. The Nigerian youth must collectively deploy social media to promote values that can strengthen national unity.

In conclusion, young people represent not only the key stakeholders in national development but also a key risk factor if they are not properly harnessed. Hence, to build a new Nigeria, young people are the key pillars that the country depends on. Young people must also learn to use national dialogue in resolving issues and differences when the need arises. The Nigerian youth cannot afford to disappoint.

The National Youths Development Policy asserts that:

“Youths are the foundation of a society. Their energies, inventiveness, character, and orientation define the pace of development and security of a nation. Through their creative talents and labor power, a nation makes giant strides in economic development and socio-political attainments. In their dreams and hopes, a nation founds her motivation; on their energies, she builds her vitality and purpose. And because of their dreams and aspirations, the future of a nation is assured.”⁴

References

1. United Nations, UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA). 2019. https://www.un.org/en/Africa/peace/.youth.shtml.
2. Mercy Corps. 2016. “Motivation and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth.” https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/boko-haram-nigerian
3. The African Union. 2020. “A Study on the Roles and Contribution of Youth to Peace and Security in Africa.” https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/a-study-on-the-roles-and-contributions-of-youth-to-peace-and-security-in-africa
4. Second National Youth Policy Document of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2009. https://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Nigeria_2009_National_Youth_Policy.pdf

This article is part of CISS’s series “Revisiting African Narratives”. Please find more information here.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

In December 2018, the Théâtre national de Chaillot in Paris unveiled the Porteuse de vies in celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Made from welded bullets, remnants of military confrontations and police violence, keys and a prison door, the massive 4.25m, 220kg statue is the work of Congolese artist Freddy Tsimba. With her bullet body and a book in her hand, the “Carrier of Lives” intervenes in the political imaginary of human rights, violence and gender. Aesthetic insights such as the Porteuse de vies take the relationship between art and international relations seriously by “recogni[sing] that the inevitable difference between the represented and its representation is the very location of politics” (Bleiker 2009: 18-19). How, then, does the Porteuse de viesrepresent peace, violence and universal rights? And what do these representations tell us about international politics?

I Tensions between the Universality of Human Rights and the Civilising Mission

Unveiled on the occasion of the 70-year anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Porteuse de vies comments on the universality of human rights. Tsimba explicitly states that although his art originates from an African country and its own experience with violence, it speaks to everyone.

The artist thereby critically reviews the colonial past of Belgian-administered Congo. In 1948, the year the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in Paris, the Belgian administration introduced a scheme for literate Africans who had successfully rejected “barbaric” traditional practices including sorcery and polygamy and embraced “civilisation” (Landmeters and Tousignant 2019: 97), the so-called the Carte du Mérite Civique. Only 200 Congolese qualified for this status within a five-year period, but even to them political and socio-economic rights remained inaccessible (Mutamba Makombo 1998). Postcolonial critics have long called into question the unequal foundations and futures of the universality of rights (Nguyen 2012).

Bringing together international politics and visual studies, Sharon Sliwinski argues that, from the beginning, the struggle for universal human rights has been linked to the “circulation of visual images and spectators’ complex, emotional experience of viewing them” (2018: 167). Nazi crimes, visualised as photographs from concentration camps such as Buchenwald and Dachau, filled newsstands and public imagery in Allied countries in 1948. The vision set forth in the UDHR seems like a “profound phantasy invented to cover up the Final Solution” (ibid.).

The Porteuse de vies could therefore be a visual representation of an aspirational shift in human rights discourse. Choosing an artist from the DRC who consciously links his art to common human experiences of war and violence is an aesthetic attempt to overcome the exclusionary origins of universal human rights.

II Carrying lives, loving peace? A Critique of the Porteuse de vies and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

The Porteuse de vies, “Venus de Milo noire éventrée” (Sirach 2018) is embedded in a narrative of women as life bearers, loving mothers, guardians of the family, icons of hope and resilience in times of extreme violence. While paying tribute to his own mother, Tsimba was inspired to use his art to highlight women’s resilience after watching a Somali woman forced to flee with her child on her back in a documentary (Braeckman 2016). Tsimba’s vision of women as guardians of peace and community resilience calls to mind the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. According to this international framework, women are either vulnerable and in need of protection or the bulwark against violence, making their political participation a guarantor of peace (Anderlini 2007: 2). Reducing women to these essentialist roles and excluding men and boys from efforts to end sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), has had unintendedly devastating consequences, as it prevents policymakers and peacebuilders from addressing the root causes of conflict that lie beyond gender stereotypes (Myrttinen et al. 2014).

The fate of women and their (reproductive) bodies has historically been linked to the survival or liberation of the nation. From Algeria to South Africa, anti-colonial movements “played upon the patriarchal ideology of women as caregivers and nurturers, upholders of traditions and customs, reservoirs of culture” (Chadya 2003: 153). These “mother politics” led many women to internalise the link between maternity and struggle as they joined politics and entrenched a clear gender bias in nationalist movements whose leadership was often nearly all-male. The Porteuse de vies carries the life and therefore hope of future generations in the DRC and elsewhere. With his claim to a certain universality of the experiences of people living under armed conflict, Tsimba broadens the idea of the nation to an international community, but the iconography of motherhood and its link to the hope for a better future remains. The Porteuse de vies therefore reflects an international political discourse that sees women as, firstly, the guardians of peace due to their nurturing nature and, secondly, the bearers of hope for future nations/an international community based on universal rights.

In stark contrast to these two essentialist but hopeful narratives, the Porteuse de vies tells a third story about the role of women in conflict. Her body is riddled with gaping holes. She is headless, footless, handless. She has no mouth to scream for help, no eyes to cry, no feet to run away from those who chase her. Presenting a mutilated woman as the carrier of life, Tsimba refers to the trauma of SGBV many women continue to experience in the DRC (Ferney 2018). Despite national and international prevention efforts, SGBV in the DRC continues to be on the rise (Freedman 2015: 77). Why does attention to the issue, embodied by the Porteuse de vies for instance, not seem to help to prevent sexual violence? By describing women, and explicitly not men, as passive victims of sexual violence and by separating sexual violence in conflict (perpetrated by violent men associated with the military or a militia) from everyday sexual and gender-based abuse, the narrative clouds root causes. Instead, it would be much more effective to see women in their different roles (victims, survivors, but also perpetrators and resisters), broaden the framework to include all situations of SGBV regardless of gender and to understand violence as a continuum – from the household to the international.

III A Statue as Cultural Diplomacy and Tsimba’s Artistic Subversion

In addition to the political debates around the statue itself, the very act of commissioning and exhibiting the Porteuse de vies in a French public space might be considered an act of cultural diplomacy (Lane 2013).

The artist, protected by an international reputation, is vocal about his criticism of the Congolese state and its self-interested politicians (Delhaye 2018). If his country has survived until now, it is due to artists who create a national identity, not politicians (Braeckman 2016).  While politically minded, Tsimba does not see himself as a politician (Jédor 2018). His work draws attention to the DRC and establishes the country as a culturally important force, although Tsimba separates his artistic advocacy, his cultural-diplomatic potential from official state structures that have, so far, mostly harassed and threatened him.

His critique of state policy is not limited to his own country. Despite Tsimba’s appreciation of French investment in the arts, when questioned about the contested restitution of African art objects that were stolen by former colonial powers and are today on display in European museums, Tsimba takes the opportunity to unequivocally demand their return (Sirach 2018). As his mother and grandmother, for the first time in their lives, (were able to) leave their home in the DRC and travel to Paris for the unveiling of their (grand)son’s statue, Tsimba proclaims free movement to be the most important right (ibid.). His choice reveals a cynical observation. While his artistic practice and reputation allow Tsimba to enter Western states when invited, the vast majority of black bodies are denied the privilege of moving freely, as European policymakers invest endless energy and resources into the securitisation of their external borders.

Although the Porteuse de vies might add to the global prestige of French cultural diplomacy wishing to overcome accusations of neo-colonialism, Tsimba is ultimately able to sustain his critical view of state affairs.

Conclusion

To conclude, Tsimba’s statue is embedded in a discourse that upholds the universality of human rights, despite postcolonial critiques. It develops three distinct narratives of women as guarantors of peace, mothers of the (international) nation and victims of sexual violence in conflict, which resonates with global peacebuilding efforts – with unintended, but ineffective implications. Finally, Tsimba uses his reputation to voice his opinions on Congolese state corruption and French resistance to the restitution of African art and free movement. The Porteuse de vies exemplifies how art and aesthetics provide sometimes provocative and often astonishing insights into international politics. To appreciate the complexity of international affairs beyond the state, researchers and policymakers should take these hidden sites of political and diplomatic contestation seriously.

Bibliography

Anderlini, S. N. (2007). Women building peace: What they do, why it matters. Lynne Rienner Publications.

Bleiker, R. (2009). Aesthetics and World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Braeckman, C. (2016). Congo: Kinshasa aller-retour. Collection L’Âme des Peuples.

Chadya, J. M. (2003). Mother politics: Anti-colonial nationalism and the woman question in Africa. Journal of Women’s History, 15(3), 153-157.

Delhaye, E. (2018, 7 December). Au Palais de Chaillot, une immense statue à 20 000 balles. Télérama. Retrieved from https://www.telerama.fr/sortir/au-palais-de-chaillot,-une-immense-statue-a-20-000-balles,n5907140.php

Ferney, J. (2018, 10 December). Freddy Tsimba, sculpter la guerre. La Croix. Retrieved from https://www.la-croix.com/Culture/Expositions/Freddy-Tsimba-sculpter-guerre-2018-12-10-1200988615

Freedman, J. (2015). Gender, violence and politics in the Democratic Republic of Congo. London: Routledge.

Jédor, S. (2018, 10 December). Freddy Tsimba ou les balles récoltées pour les droits de l’homme. RFI. Retrieved from https://www.rfi.fr/fr/culture/20181210-freddy-tsimba-balles-recoltees-droits-homme

Landmeters, R., & Tousignant, N. (2019). Civiliser les «indigènes» par le droit. Antoine Sohier et les revues juridiques coloniales (1925-1960). Revue interdisciplinaire d’etudes juridiques, 83(2), 81-100.

Lane, P. (2013). French scientific and cultural diplomacy. Oxford University Press.

Mutamba Makombo, J. M. (1998). Du Congo belge au Congo indépendant, 1940–1960 : Emergence des «évolués» et genèse du nationalisme. Kinshasa: Institut de formation et d’études politiques.

Myrttinen, H., Naujoks, J., and El-Bushra, J. (2014). Rethinking Gender in Peacebuilding. International Alert.

Sirach, M-J. (2018, 10 December). Une sculpture géante pour célébrer les droits de l’homme. Culture & Savoirs.

This article is part of CISS’s series “Revisiting African Narratives”. Please find more information here.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

The current human rights violations arising from political strife in Ethiopia, Mali and Mozambique almost seem like a normal day in the African continent, with victims of the violence likely to remain unheard. However, this impunity surrounding human rights violation in Africa was never meant to be permanent; when the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was introduced, it was supposed to provide victims with effective remedies and compensation.

In reality, despite having gained broad approval amongst Member States of the African Union during its formation, only 30 out of the 51 AU states ratified the Protocol. Furthermore, only 10 States accepted the Court’s jurisdiction to hear complaints from individuals and NGOs on alleged rights violations- something which might seem unexpected to people familiar with the caseload of the European human rights mechanism. While this lethargic rollout already indicated underlying issues, the challenges of the African Court has only increased with time.

In 2016, Rwanda withdrew its acceptance of individual and NGO access to the Court, in response to a judgment that had ramifications to its domestic politics. Rwanda’s withdrawal was followed by Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, who also pulled out of the Court following decisions against their respective governments. With only seven states allowing effective access, the African court can no longer be considered as a truly Pan-African mechanism. If the situation does not change, it is likely that the African aspirations of a thriving community of democracies will remain a pipedream.

As far back as 2008, African leaders had tried to encourage governments to be more participative in the Court, by adopting a resolution which would replace the current mechanism with an “African Court of Justice and Human Rights”. This was intended to reduce the concerns by African governments of being subject to extra-national adjudication mechanisms which would restrict their sovereign powers. However, the proposal seems to have similarly failed, with only eight ratifications approving the change.

This only shows that the answer to the Court’s problems is not to create another court to replace the current mechanism. Instead, the only possible change is not a legal one but is rather an educative process. Only strong human rights education combined with advocacy from civil society can alter the deteriorating situation. African states with strong human rights records such as Mauritius, Botswana and South Africa should not only lobby other African states to enhance their human rights records, but should themselves embrace the Court – something which we have not seen yet.

The Tanzanian government’s reversal of its decision to withdraw its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction is only a first step. It is crucial for African organizations to pressure African states to support the Court from the attacks and irrelevance it faces. Failure to do so would only consolidate the idea that Africa is constantly focused on rhetoric rather than concrete actions.

Somalia, a land of poets, is scarred by decades of hostility and political instability especially after 1991 when the head of state, Said Barre was ousted. Additionally, Somalia is home to armed clans and groups who have significant influence and power as compared to the regime in power. Whereas the federal government dominates only a section of Somalia territory, it is dependent on AMISOM, the AU peacekeeping troops, to tackle the al-Shabaab militia that emerged out of the power vacuum.

With the Al-Shabaab transcending national borders it is a security risk to not only Somalia but to its neighbors with porous borders predominantly Kenya’s north-eastern towns, which have been victim of violent attacks. The group is known for exploiting lapses in the security apparatus of states as governments divert resources to tackling the locust invasion amidst the coronavirus pandemic. Economic stress triggered by Covid-19 has fuelled rage, which the group capitalizes to breed friction, recruit new followers, and justify their actions thereby destabilizes the region.

The pursuit for national interest has also exposed the AU mission to deficiencies in command and control and the spat between the two key troop contributors (Ethiopia and Kenya) has aggravated the situation. Although Ethiopia and Kenya avoid a direct clash, their interests raise alarm as to the extent they might go to militarily to support their respective Somalia allies (Crisis Group, 2020).

Kenya-Somalia Clash

Somalia’s high dependency on Kenya cannot afford to spiral into conflict between the two countries. This article will deduce the root cause of Mogadishu’s and Nairobi’s foiled relation and Somalia’s instability based on its political divide.

Mogadishu and Nairobi’s pandora box can be traced back to the territorial dispute between the two nations and Nairobi’s alleged involvement in the internal affairs of Mogadishu. One may be puzzled as to what motivates the territorial feud and Kenya’s supposed engagement in Somalia’s internal affairs?

Anchored on a perimeter extension disagreement, the rift is kindled by the Indan Ocean which holds an opulent 160,580-square-kilometres triangular shaped oil and gas zone claimed by the two states. Although Kenya retains Jubaland as a buffer between it and the Al-Shabaab militia, discord continues to flare over Nairobi’s alleged involvement in Mogadishu’s internal affairs and its pretext for this particular interest. The divergence is a grave challenge to AMISOM’s effectiveness especially with the key contributors supporting opposing parties. Somalia has furthered its accusation on the destructive nature of the Kenyan forces which has resulted in the destruction of the telecommunication apparatus in zones where they have been stationed. Kenyan forces are also accused of being party to the illicit coal and sugar dealing in the Kismayo port and equipping radicals to attack the lower Somalia townships.

These clashes ignite a flexing of muscles between the two nations’ militaries along the borderline with Somali’s troops stationed at Beled-Hawo. In opposition, troops from Somalia’s Jubaland region, Nairobi’s ally, are based in the north-eastern town of Mandera. Seen as a window of opportunity, Jubaland’s troops positioned in Mandera have orchestrated a cross-border offensive in Beled-Hawo killing dozens of civilians. As a consequence, the incident has been criticized by locals of Mandera who have protested against the attack and pushed for Jubaland’s forces withdrawal from their locality in order to safeguard them from external attack (Yusuf, 2020).

Somalia’s internal fall out

Somalia’s political divide and stability is hinged on the clan system. It is due to this that Mogadishu is on the brink of clan-based conflict which will unveil the political polarization that plays a significant role in politics and one that might trigger a degree of volatility. The deadlock between the president Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo”, and Jubaland’s leader, Sheikh Ahmad Mohamed “Madobe”, is prompted by the government’s veto to recognize the vote of August 2019 where Madobe secured a victory for a second term. These tension also signifies the incompatibility over power allocation between Farmajo and Madobe. The differences stir up conflict through clan coalitions that dictate the political arena. To circumvent another humanitarian crisis due to armed conflict, reconciliation is a prerequisite and failure to adhere to it grants the Al-Shabaab insurgents an upper hand which would jeopardize the region’s stability (Crisis Group, 2020).

With the current president Farmajo anticipating his re-election, the upcoming election is one to watch out for. However, the president’s quest to solidify his second term is one that is bound to hit a roadblock as his opponents strive to thwart his re-election. With opponents like prior presidents, Sharif Sheikh Mohamud (2009-2012) and Hassan Sheikh Ahmed (2012-2017) capable of mobilizing clans, a fall-out is more likely to be seen. Jubaland and Puntland leaders are equally determined to set the seal on the ousting of Farmajo (Crisis Group, 2021). With an already divided clan-based system, violent conflict is a disaster in waiting and a clash between the centralised and regional forces seems to be inevitable.

Unwavering fear of a constitutional crisis is a recipe for violence that cannot be overlooked. Certainly, the current unsettled grievances are conducive to benefit a selected few middlemen. If federal and regional authorities fizzle out and overlook the electoral model agreement from Dusamareb, Somalia will continue to be situated in a peculiar phase where the head of state and parliament have no authority. However, if a consensus is reached, the bargain over the election model could equally fall to pieces swiftly as witnessed in the September 2020 election road map (Hairsine & Odowa, 2021).

Delayed elections can be ascribed to a toxic dynamic between the regional states and the federal government. The electoral system on the other hand is one marred by poorly uncoordinated preparations that has seen the elite lock horns over the management of electoral procedures as they  are the easiest to manipulate. Farmajo’s opponents refuse to acknowledge the newly formed federal and state electoral committees due to the positioning of Farmajo stalwarts who are likely to alter results. The deadlock is threatening the election’s credibility and if not ironed out could erupt in violence (Crisis Group, 2021).

If Somalia is able to record a peaceful election, the president ascending to power inherits a legacy of political division tainted by levels of volatility. Though a tip of the iceberg, political divide rings alarm bells for urgent federal and regional government reconciliation. However, the current administration has inflated the fault line by its failure to unify regional authorities and extending its overall influence. Whereas the clan system undermines any efforts of conflict resolution, there is need for dialogue and consensus building. Attaining this equilibrium therefore requires constitutional and electoral review, equal allocation of power and resource sharing.

Food for thought

The conflict between Nairobi and Mogadishu undoubtedly transcends national borders thereby spreading into the entire Horn of Africa. As the hegemonies keep up the fight for affluence, trade, transport, security, health and education continue to pay the price.

While Kenya and Somalia remain intertwined on many levels, the deteriorating relationship is a lose-lose situation since no side is benefiting. Is the political cycle therefore to blame for the feuds? And should Kenya’s close ties with Jubaland through regional president Madobe standing as opposition candidate, be interpreted as Kenya’s way of supporting Somalia’s opposition thereby fostering the fragile relation?

Finally, as Al-Shabaab, utilizes this spat to its advantage to flex its muscles, political tensions are likely to escalate and the fate of the Somali refugees harboured in the Dadaab and Kakuma camp and the Somali population will remain sealed in a labyrinth.

References

Hairsine, K. & Odowa, M. (2021). Somalia holds emergency talks over election crisis. Retrieved from: https://p.dw.com/p/3oiO7

International Crisis Group. (2021). Stabilising Somalia for Elections and What Comes After. Retrieved from: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/stabilising-somalia-elections-and-what-comes-after

Isilow, H. (2020). Somalia, Kenya diplomatic row unfortunate: Experts Somalia’s decision to snap diplomatic ties with Kenya to affect ordinary citizens, believe experts. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-kenya-diplomatic-row-unfortunate-experts/2082752

Yusuf, M. (2020). Residents of Kenya-Somalia Border Area Fear Conflict Amid Diplomatic Tensions. Voice of America. Retrieved from: https://www.voanews.com/africa/residents-kenya-somalia-border-area-fear-conflict-amid-diplomatic-tensions

CISS is looking to revisit existing African narratives. As a young think tank, we want to open a dialogue between young voices to envision future perspectives. Your submission should deal with under-explored topics, reflect on existing debates and propose new paths. Analyses (ca. 1,500 words) and opinion pieces (ca. 500 words) on current affairs should engage critically with narratives on Africa.

Send us your article that can explore politics and society but can also draw on economic questions or international law. There are no limits regarding the focus of your work – as long as it centers around the above-mentioned theme. After a peer-reviewing process with CISS’s regional division (can take up to 6-8 weeks), a series of successful articles will be published on CISS’s website. In addition, Revisiting African Narratives will be part of a broader CISS project with online events and further content over the course of 2021.

Please see the guidelines attached for further information. Article submissions are accepted on a rolling basis until June 1, 2021. Send your submission (English or German) in Microsoft Word Format to CISS’s Regional Director for Sub-Saharan Africa Gelila Enbaye, at gelila.enbaye@ciss.eu.

How can vulnerable populations in conflict be protected? How can we classify military conscripts sent to war by an unaccountable leader? The special position of Eritreans in Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict forces us to reflect about these questions and demonstrates the complexity of contemporary conflicts. February 4, 2021 marked three months of conflict between Ethiopia’s federal government under prime minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray regional government. According to UN estimates, about 2.3 million people in Tigray are currently in need for immediate humanitarian assistance, including Eritrean refugees living in camps along the border to Ethiopia. In addition, it is estimated that around 20,000 Eritrean refugees are missing after two refugee camps in Tigray were attacked by Ethiopian federal troops.

Although Ethiopia’s prime minister Abiy declared the confrontation’s final offensive last year, the drastic consequences of this crisis continue to be borne by the Tigray civilian population and Eritrean refugees. Furthermore, the initial intra-state confrontation has developed into a regional tinder box with Eritrean and alleged Somali involvement on Ethiopia’s side. This situation also draws attention to long-term human security in conflict zones and the accountability of governments in war. In Tigray, the Hitsats massacre killing 300 Eritrean refugees in November 2020 demonstrated how refugees are particularly at risk in conflict situations. Having already endured the long trek to neighboring Ethiopia and possessing no social safety net, refugees are particularly vulnerable to violence from all conflict parties. In addition, the Tigray conflict is likely to introduce new and aggravate existing hostilities due to the intensity and brutality employed by the warring parties. However, this crisis also draws attention to Eritrea’s special position in this conflict. Eritrea’s military apparatus is sustained by national conscripts which forcibly recruits Eritreans and retains many conscripts for life. Part of these conscripts is currently deployed to fight alongside Ethiopian forces and is involved in severe war crimes. Their deployment has been compared to that during the 2001 Ethiopian-Eritrean border war when Eritrea claimed 19,000 casualties. In both contexts, conscripts were not able to make informed decisions or rely on accountable leadership. Moreover, Eritreans inside Eritrea have been isolated for years and lack support by their government that continues to blockade its own citizens. With the government’s involvement in the Tigray conflict, their humanitarian situation remains critical.

The situation of Eritreans in the Tigray conflict exemplifies how all Eritreans – refugees in Ethiopia, Eritrean civilians and conscripts – lack an advocate that amplifies their hardship. While the Tigray population is also suffering from starvation, it can find a political advocate in the Tigray regional government. In contrast, Eritrean refugees are caught in military action outside of their own control while Eritrean conscripts are led into war by an unaccountable leader.

So how can protection for the most vulnerable – the civilian population in Tigray and Eritreans – be ensured? In the short-term, Ethiopia’s international partners including international organizations and governments must call out Tigray’s current situation as a serious conflict that is drawing in neighboring countries and threatens regional stability. As more parties become involved, international or regional external mediation becomes imperative to enable a ceasefire. As a consequence, international aid should be immediately allowed to reach Tigray region that is currently blocked by the Ethiopian federal government. In the long-term, it must be emphasized that Eritrean hardship did not emerge with the Tigray conflict and is not likely to be alleviated without a sustainable solution. Holistic political reform in Eritrea is thus the only way to exit Eritrea’s refugee crisis and to mitigate further destabilization. But no matter the demands made or policies implemented, Eritreans should not become collateral damage in the Tigray conflict.

Following the surprise resignation of the current Director General Roberto Azevedo, a new call is coming from the African nations for an African leader for global trade. There are several reasons that not only indicate that Africa is the better choice, but also that it is now time for the oldest continent in the world to take the reins of the ailing organization, with pressures mounting on major trade actors to support an African bid.

However, conflicts between African nations and the lack of a united African Union (AU) candidate seems to be making the prospects of an African Director-General weaker by the day. With clashes between Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt in regards to leadership position, it is important to re-emphasize on why Africa should be the one that holds the reigns of the future of world trade.

There has never been an African or female Director General of the WTO

The first reason stated by many in support of African leadership is the alarming lack of representation at the WTO. Africa has never had the opportunity to see the position of Director-General being occupied by an individual from any of the 54 nations of the African continent. While many United Nations (UN) organs and other International Organizations are obliged to provide for representation when it comes to leadership positions under their constitutive treaties, such is not the case for the WTO. With representation and diversity being seen as something more important than ever before, it is imperative that nations move towards a newer, fresher perspective that could be provided by any one of the African candidates.

With Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt all proposing excellent, experienced candidates with their own strengths and unique views, it is also undoubtedly true that the African candidates are not in any way inferior to their western counterparts. Moreover, we can also consider the fact that with two out of the three African candidates being women, this election provides an opportunity for a trailblazer – an African Woman as an international trade leader, which would be a first of firsts for the organization. It is therefore imperative that with such an opportunity in front of us, states do not disregard the power of representation when it comes to positive change and inclusiveness.

Africa is one of the largest victims of the flaws in the current trade regime

There is no doubt that the current trade framework is wrong – this is something that countries ranging from the United States (US) to the Dominican Republic agree on. However, it is also true that Africa seems to be by far the largest victim when it comes to exports of cheap and sometimes unhealthy foods mainly from Europe that seem to be killing the local food producers.

From the flooding of subsidized poultry in Ghana[1] to the flooding of fat filled milk powder that devastated the dairy industry in West Africa, the current free trade regime is creating health and economic disasters in the continent. It has also become a crisis with some foreign companies boosted by subsidies, illegally fishing in African waters[2], wreaking havoc in the local marine ecosystem and the costal economy. With the way that unfair competition from foreign players keep harming African interests, it would not be unfair to say that the regime has been needlessly cruel with the African continent.

With the current trends moving towards more protectionism by African nations hit hard by the European Union (EU) zone’s subsidies, an African representative at the helm of the most prominent international trade organization can go a long way towards friendlier and fairer trade relationships between African and European States. This is more so, when considering the fact that the African candidates from Nigeria and Kenya have close governmental ties, which could be a move towards the easing of oftentimes bitter trade relations.

Africa is uniquely positioned as a neutral party to heal the current trade conflicts between the East and West

Being a country that has accepted investment and grants from the US, Europe and China, African nations hold a unique position whereby they are not necessarily under the influence of one specific power. With trade tensions between the US and China higher than ever, and US foreign policy having a distinctly anti-China view, it is absolutely vital for the new Director-General to be a neutral arbiter who is able to satisfy both the US and China, while not alienating everyone else.

As highlighted by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the Nigerian candidate for the WTO leadership, African countries having relationships with both the West and the East may be the best compromise candidate[3] option between the two trade blocs. Their position of neutrality could make them uniquely suited to fix the troubles faced by the WTO, thereby making the international organization relevant again.

Developing countries being most affected by the COVID crisis must also be the ones to move towards recovery

If there is one observation that many International economists would agree in regards to the pandemic, it is that the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to hit African economies extremely hard. African Countries, being some of the most under-developed in the world, will likely be facing their first recession in 25 years, making the need for growth opportunities more crucial than ever.

Studies have shown that in the long run, trade openness might be favourable to economic growth, with such being the reason why Africa seems to be emphasizing heavily in its own regional trade agreement, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). With an African leader at the helm of the organization, we can hope for a much more understanding and nuanced approach towards trade, whereby the needs of the wrecked economies of developing countries are given the attention that they require.

When considering such, we can very much consider the catchall phrase coined by the eminent political economist George Ayittey, that of “African solutions to African problems”. With African leadership at the helm of the WTO, this viewpoint will likely hold some truth.

An African leadership at the WTO could benefit the subcontinent by promoting the AfCFTA

With the COVID-19 pandemic postponing the implementation[4] of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to January 2021, an African leadership of the WTO can help the implementation of the trade agreement by providing full WTO support in order to ensure the deal’s success. With African companies being some of the least competitive economies[5] in the world, an Inter-African deal blessed by the WTO has more chances of success, which can have positive consequences for the economic situation in the subcontinent.

An African leadership can very much provide the African Union Commission with the support and expertise that it needs to be a success. Given the increasing pessimism in regards to the AfCFTA, an Africa-focused discussion on global trade rules can only be a boon for some of the poorest countries in the world.

The COVID-19 pandemic may have caused serious damage to trade, but it has not eliminated the prospects of a fairer and more just international trade system. While it is still possible for an African candidate to be elected as Director General, infighting between African countries has greatly hindered the coalition-building that is required to turn such an idea into reality. With the continent decried as the most underdeveloped in the world, and the effects of COVID-19 strangling last hopes for growth, it is well beyond the time for African leaders to roll up their sleeves, nominate a consensus candidate, and create a system that would be fairer to the continent.

References

[1] Livingstone, Emmet, and Simon Marks. “Ghana’s Poultry Industry Accuses EU of Unfair Competition.” POLITICO, POLITICO, 19 August 2020, www.politico.eu/interactive/ghanas-poultry-industry-accuses-eu-of-unfair-competition/.

[2] Belhabib, D. (2017). West Africa: Illegal fishing, the black hole in the seas. Samudra Report, (77). Retrieved from https://www.icsf.net/images/samudra/pdf/english/issue_77/4319_art_Sam77_e_art06.pdf.

[3]Marks, Simon, and Jakob Hanke Vela. “Nigeria’s WTO Candidate Looks to Bridge the US-China Schism.” POLITICO, POLITICO, 10 July 2020, www.politico.eu/article/ngozi-okonjo-iweala-nigeria-wto-candidate-looks-to-bridge-the-us-china-schism/.

[4] da Silva, Issa Sikiti. Pessimism Surges, but Many Insist African Free Trade Will Take Off, TRT World, 31 July 2020, www.trtworld.com/magazine/pessimism-surges-but-many-insist-african-free-trade-will-take-off-38556.

[5] Caroline Galvan,“What Are the 10 Most Competitive Economies in Sub-Saharan Africa?” World Economic Forum, 30 September 2015, www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/what-are-the-10-most-competitive-economies-in-sub-saharan-africa/.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic sparking a significant health and economic crisis not only among developed but also developing countries, creating effective policies and interventions to protect citizens from the negative impacts needs to be on the agenda of policy makers. This is especially true for women and girls, as they are not only more affected by poverty than same-aged boys, but they also become victims of the adverse effects of crisis more easily (Rauf, 2016, p. 9). As previous health crises have shown, the negative impact on the economic, social and health lives of girls can be detrimental. This article will explore how the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone impacted women and girls and which policies worked to protect them, which possibly helps to mitigate the negative consequences of the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Ebola in Sierra Leone

Just a few years ago, from 2014 to 2016, Sierra Leone, a small country in West Africa with over seven million citizens, was severely affected by the spread of the Ebola virus disease (EVD). The 2014-16 outbreak in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone was an unprecedented severe epidemic of Ebola, with over 11,000 deaths (Roemer-Mahler and Rushton, 2016, p. 373). Half of all cases were hosted by Sierra Leone, making it the country most affected due to rapid contagion, which was caused by high rates of geographic mobility and the use of traditional burial practices (Bandiera et al., 2019, pp. 1–8). To contain the fast spreading of the disease, the Sierra Leonean government closed all primary and secondary schools in the 2014-15 academic year. Some villages were locked down and travel was banned, which in turn severely curtailed economic activity. Several health facilities were transformed into Ebola holding centers and health workers were mobilized to track contagion. However, not until November 2016 Sierra Leone was declared Ebola free (Bandiera et al., 2019, pp. 8–14).

COVID-19 in Sierra Leone

Now, COVID-19 created a new crisis, with its potential impacts extending beyond public health. Luckily, as parts of the Ebola response efforts were inherited into the current response, it seems reasonably well-organized this time. Sierra Leone closed all its land borders on March 25^th, and quickly followed to close education institutions, village markets and restaurants (Grieco and Yusuf, 2020, pp. 7–10). However, the consequences of these measures are difficult to predict. The Sierra Leone Telegraph wrote that “[…] health crises such as the Ebola and now the COVID-19 crisis undermine strategies to end sexual and gender-based violence (GBV) and other harmful practices and pose a serious threat […]” (Coulson et al., 2020). To better design policies and interventions this time, it is helpful to examine the impact of the EVD crisis on young women in Sierra Leone.

The negative effects of the EVD epidemic on women

As several studies show, the negative effect of the EVD epidemic on young women is not only limited to their health and reproductive lives, but their economic and social lives were disturbed as well. They were more affected by the economic downturn (which amounted to a contraction of GDP growth of 20 percent) caused by travel bans, increased transport costs and government restrictions. Non-agricultural self-employment (such as petty traders and food processing), consists to a large degree of women and was hit particularly hard (Fu et al., 2015, p. 13). Additionally, the gap in the health care system caused by an inadequate number of specialist health workers and an inequitable distribution of personnel is filled by women’s unpaid labor (Roemer-Mahler and Rushton, 2016, p. 378). Hence, women have taken on much of the burden in the Ebola outbreak, being directly at risk for contraction and indirectly affected by a worsening of the access to maternal and reproductive health care and carrying out traditional burial practices (Anderson and Beresford, 2016). Furthermore, with the reopening of school, the Ministry of Education of Sierra Leone introduced a new policy, deciding that ‘visibly pregnant’ girls were unable to re-enroll due to the believe that they impact other girls negatively. The enforcement of this ban was left to school principles. Thus, girls spent significantly more time with men, which led to an increase in unwanted and unprotected sex as well as teen pregnancies, and school enrollment post-crisis dropped significantly (Bandiera et al., 2019). The severity of the consequences on young women and girls is apparent.

Interventions to mitigate negative effects during Ebola

Consequently, the question of the prevention of similar effects caused by comparable measures introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic arises.

One intervention which proved to a certain extent successful is the creation of safe spaces for girls, where they can spend time away from men. Pre-Ebola, the NGO BRAC established such safe spaces in the form of clubs in many villages. The effects were studied thoroughly: the fall in school enrollment rates was completely offset by the program, it improved basic numeracy and literacy skills, reduced time spent with men or alone and prevented out-of-wedlock pregnancies (Bandiera et al., 2019) .

Examining the program in more detail, one can find that the wholesome design makes it attractive for women to go to the clubs: they offer life skills, vocational skills and microfinance programs, a fixed location in a village where club members can gather and socialize and the modules cover subjects such as reproductive health, STDs, family planning and legal knowledge on bride price. Furthermore, the vocational skills program includes tailoring, soap making, hairdressing and tie dying. The program, which is called Empowerment and Livelihoods Action Program (ELA) established 150 clubs and reached 3,592 girls across Sierra Leone. Throughout the epidemic, most of the clubs managed to continue operating, sometimes with limited capacity (Bandiera et al., 2019, pp. 10–12).

In a study by Bandiera et al. (2019), over 4,700 girls were surveyed pre- and post-crisis. The researchers classified villages which either experienced low disruption or were highly disrupted by Ebola due to a low functioning of the nearest primary health unit (PHU) facility and the nearest secondary school. Furthermore, villages were categorized into control and treatment villages, depending on the presence of an ELA club (Bandiera et al., 2019, p. 19).

In villages without the program and high Ebola disruption, teen pregnancies rose by almost 11 percent. However, these effects are almost entirely reversed in villages with the ELA program and high Ebola disruption, which enables the girls to spend more time away from men. Hence, out-of-wedlock pregnancies are prevented, and girls re-enroll in school post-crisis.

However, as this intervention might seem hopeful for implementation during COVID-19, negative results need to be addressed as well. While young girls significantly benefitted from the program, older girls aged 18 to 25 reported an increase in unwanted or transactional sex. This occurs because younger girls are less available to men due to the ELA clubs and thus men turn to older girls for sexual relations (Bandiera et al., 2019, p. 32). These negative externalities for older girls need to be addressed when designing further interventions. Additionally, the implementation of ELA clubs in other countries showed that insufficient funding induced incomplete programs, which can be detrimental.

The mechanism of providing a safe space in combination with educating girls on reproductive health yielded a positive impact. However, safe spaces need to be constructed such that older girls benefit from them as well. As the COVID-19 pandemic also hit Sierra Leone, these kinds of interventions might not only make a meaningful difference for women in Sierra Leone, but perhaps also in other developing countries.

Policy recommendations

The COVID-19 crisis shows significant differences to the EVD epidemic. Political fears about the negative economic consequences of restrictions on economic activity may lead the government not to implement highly restrictive social distancing policies (Grieco and Yusuf, 2020). However, the global economic downturn will affect the economic lives of women and girls in Sierra Leone, too. Thus, job losses and school closures can lead to an increase in sexual and gender-based violence. Interventions such as the ELA program can help mitigate negative effects.  As the implementation of the program in other countries has shown, sufficient funding is key. Therefore, policy makers in development aid in donor countries should support programs of this kind with sufficient funds to protect women and girls from the negative impacts of the current health crisis.

References

Anderson, E.-L. and Beresford, A. (2016) ‘Infectious injustice: the political foundations of the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone’, Third World Quarterly, 37(3), pp. 468–486.

Bandiera, O., Buehren, N., Goldstein, M., Rasul, I. and Smurra, A. (2019) ‘The Economic Lives of Young Women in the Time of Ebola: Lessons from an Empowerment Program’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, no. 8760 [Online]. Available at https://​openknowledge.worldbank.org​/​bitstream/​handle/​10986/​31219/​134123-​WP-​PUBLIC-​The-​Economic-​Lives-​of-​Young-​Women-​in-​the-​Time-​of-​Ebola.pdf​?​sequence=​1&​isAllowed=​y (Accessed 27 June 2019).

Coulson, J., Clarke, R. and Fall, M. M. (2020) ‘COVID-19 jeopardises progress in protecting women and girls from violence and harmful practices’, The Sierra Leone Telegraph, 16 June [Online]. Available at https://​www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com​/​covid-​19-​jeopardises-​progress-​in-​protecting-​women-​and-​girls-​from-​violence-​and-​harmful-​practices/​ (Accessed 9 July 2020).

Fu, N., Glennerster, R., Himelein, K. and Rosas, N. (2015) ‘The Socio-Economic Impacts of Ebola in Sierra Leone: Results from a High Frequency Cell Phone Survey, Round 1’ [Online]. Available at http://​www.worldbank.org​/​content/​dam/​Worldbank/​document/​Poverty%20documents/​Socio-​Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Ebola%20in%20Sierra%20Leone,​%20Jan%2012%20(final).pdf (Accessed 13 June 2019).

Grieco, K. and Yusuf, Y. (2020) COVID-19 Series: Working Paper – Sierra Leone [Online], Maintains. Available at https://​maintainsprogramme.org​/​rc/​covid-​19-​series-​working-​paper-​study-​sierra-​leone/​ (Accessed 9 July 2020).

Rauf, W. (2016) ‘Empowering women and girls affected by crisis’, Care Insights [Online]. Available at https://​www.care-international.org​/​files/​files/​Empowering_​women_​and_​girls_​affected_​by_​crises.pdf (Accessed 12 June 2019).

Roemer-Mahler, A. and Rushton, S. (2016) ‘Introduction: Ebola and International Relations’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 373–379.