Zeit als strategische Komponente

20 Jahre Afghanistan – Eine lange Zeit. Doch war die Zeit ausreichend, um die selbst auferlegten politischen Ziele realistisch zu erreichen?

Viele strategische Konzepte denken den Faktor Zeit nicht mit (Ebd., S. 62) und Einsätze werden ohne die nötige Berücksichtigung dieses Faktors beschlossen. Viele Benchmarks werden formuliert und schnellstens abgehakt. Eine Nachhaltigkeit der Ziele ist damit unrealistisch. Strategische Ziele sind keine vorgefertigte Kausalabfolge von einzelnen Zielen, sondern als verschiedene Stränge über Zeit zu betrachten, die sich verstärken oder als Pareto-optimum gegenseitig sogar unterminieren können.

Als in Afghanistan „demokratische Wahlen“ abgehalten wurden, war das Ziel der Demokratisierung dann nicht erreicht? Hier stellt sich die Kernfrage von Auslandseinsätzen: Sollen Ziele nur um deren Erreichung Willen erzielt werden, oder steht dahinter eine nachhaltigere Agenda?

Die Zielerreichung einer Strategie wird von verschiedensten Variablen beeinflusst, die sich über Zeit immer wieder verändern. Ein abgeschlossener Endzustand von formulierten strategischen Zielen kann daher nie erreicht werden (Ebd., S. 62). Bei zukünftigen Einsätzen muss die Zeitachse von Anfang an mitgedacht werden. Eine Strategie kann in die Variable f(t) (siehe Abb.1) eingreifen und diese über Zeit verändern, aber nicht zu einem Endzustand führen, denn die Variablen laufen auch nach dem Ende einer Strategie oder eines Auslandseinsatzes weiter. Der NATO-Truppenabzug zeigt, dass erreichte strategische Ziele, nach Beendigung von Einsätzen, wieder verfallen können. Einsätze der UN zeigen, dass Konflikte nach weitaus mehr als 20 Jahren noch nicht gelöst sind. UNMOGIP ist beispielsweise seit 1949 aktiv und MINURSO versucht seit 1991 den Konflikt in der Westsahara zu lösen. Bei beiden Konflikten ist kein Ende absehbar, trotz dessen bleiben die UN mit ihren Missionen aktiv. Teilweise werden Friedensmissionen auch angepasst, da sich die Variablen für eine erfolgreiche Mission ändern. Auch Clausewitz merkte bereits an,

„Da der Krieg kein Akt blinder Leidenschaft ist, sondern der politische Zweck darin vorwaltet, so muß der Wert, den dieser hat, die Größe der Aufopferungen bestimmten, womit wir ihn erkaufen wollen. Dies wird nicht bloß der Fall sein, bei ihrem Umfang, sondern auch bei ihrer Dauer.“ (Clausewitz, 1834 [2018], S. 51)

Bei der Entscheidung, ob ein deutscher Einsatz etabliert werden soll, muss also von Anfang an und fortlaufend die Frage gestellt werden, in welchem Umfang und welche Dauer sind wir bereit zu leisten und was passiert danach?

Abb. 1: Strategische Beispielabbildung nach Voss (S. 65).

Alle Variablen betrachten

Die verschiedenen Einsatzvariablen beeinflussen natürlich die Zielerreichung. Ist das strategische Ziel wie in Afghanistan beispielsweise „Nationbuilding“, so könnte dies von Variablen wie der ökonomischen Situation vor Ort, der Schlagfähigkeit der Taliban oder etwa der Sicherheit der Zivilbevölkerung beeinflusst werden. Diese können dabei unterschiedliches Gewicht einnehmen (Voss, 2021, S. 64). Mathematisch betrachtet könnte das, mit Blick auf Abbildung 1, z.B. f(t) = a*b3*c4*2d*e bedeuten (Ebd., S. 64). Eine essenzielle Variable für eine erfolgreiche strategische Durchführung von Einsätzen ist beispielweise die öffentliche Meinung. Lehnt die Öffentlichkeit einen Einsatz ab, ist eine strategische Durchführung auf lange Zeit nahezu unmöglich. Auch hier zeigt sich, dass strategische Variablen von Auslandseinsätzen nicht nur aus Munition, Brücken und Straßen bestehen. Zugleich können die verschiedenen Variablen einer Strategie jeweils weiter aufgebrochen, priorisiert und mit verschiedenen Minimal- und Strategiezielzonen versehen werden (exemplarisch für Afghanistan Abb.2). Diese müssen von den StrategiearchitektInnen selbst festgelegt werden.

Abb.2: Strategische Betrachtung von Variablen am Beispiel „Nationbuilding in Afghanistan“ nach Voss, S.65

Nicht alle Variablen sind beeinflussbar (Ebd., S. 64). Viel hängt von Variablen ab, die von dem Einsatz gar nicht oder zumindest weniger beeinflussbar bleiben. Nicht beeinflussbare Variablen sollten lediglich als Teil des strategischen Umfelds, in dem operiert wird, betrachtet werden (Ebd., S. 64). Je breiter ein Einsatz jedoch aufgestellt wird, beispielsweise durch Vernetzten Ansatz und Diversifizierung von Instrumenten, desto mehr Variablen sind beeinflussbar. Gleichzeitig müssen Handlungsweisen auf ihren Einfluss auf Variablen über Zeit überprüft und definiert werden, was nicht auf dem Weg in die Strategieerreichungszone passieren darf (Ebd., S. 62). Ist es sinnvoll, die Taliban durch Angriffe zu schwächen, wenn dabei Zivilisten sterben? Der kurzfristige Effekt wäre möglicherweise eine Verbesserung der Variable der Sicherheitssituation. Langfristig würde eine damit einhergehende Bevölkerungsunzufriedenheit jedoch einen Abwärtstrend anderer Variablen verursachen und damit vielleicht das strategische Gesamtziel unterminieren.  Damit stellt sich auch die Frage, welche Variablen ein Pareto-Optimum darstellen und wie diese miteinander abgewogen werden können.

„Wo stehen wir eigentlich?“

Mit der Etablierung eines Einsatzes müssen Variablen, die für einen Erfolg notwendig sind, identifiziert sowie passsende Instrumente für die Beeinflussung benannt und eingesetzt werden. Variablen müssen operationalisiert werden und fortlaufend durch ein Monitoringsystem messbar sein, damit Entscheidungen adäquat angepasst werden können. Das Ziel einer Strategie ist dann, den Bereich unter allen Kurven der Variablen zu maximieren (Ebd., S. 66). Durch Nutzung einer Signpost-Analyse (Abb.3) kann jederzeit kenntlich gemacht werden, wie der aktuelle Stand für eine Variable ist. Durch die Betrachtung der Signpost-Ereignisse wird die ungefähre Lage der Funktion bestimmt und geprüft, ob das Minimallevel unterschritten wird. Anhand der Antizipierung von Situationen können für bestimmte Ereignisse im Vorfeld konkrete Schritte festgelegt werden.

Abb. 3: Beispiel einer Signpost-Analyse für die Sicherheitssituation

Selbstverständlich ist nicht jede Variable von Beginn an identifizierbar. Ein offener Umgang mit neu identifizierten Variablen ist daher essenziell. Alle identifizierten Variablen sollten in ihrer Signifikanz gewichtet und neu identifizierte Variablen stets hinzugefügt werden. Dabei spielt auch die zeitliche Komponente eine zentrale Rolle: Die Veränderung des strategischen Umfeldes kann neue-, obsolet gewordene Variablen oder ein Wandel der Gewichtung bedeuten. Eine Evaluation der Strategie sollte also regelmäßig erfolgen. In Verbindung zum fortlaufenden Monitoring, ist damit eine schnelle Anpassung der Gesamtstrategie und der einzelnen Variablen gewährleistet.

Was kann die militärische Komponente noch leisten?

Ein Wandel der militärischen Komponente vom Hauptakteur zu einer anteiligen Komponente ist für alle Einsätze unerlässlich. Dazu müssen praktische Fragen zum Einsatz von militärischen Mitteln gestellt werden:

• Welche Teilziele kann die militärische Komponente eines Einsatzes zur Erreichung der übergeordneten Ziele beitragen?
• Welche Variablen können mit militärischen Mitteln zu unseren Gunsten beeinflusst werden?

Clausewitz betrachtete die militärische Kriegsführung als „[…] ein Akt der Gewalt, um den Gegner zur Erfüllung unseres Willens zu zwingen“ (Clausewitz, 1834 [2018], S. 24). Aber in einem asymmetrischen Konflikt, wie in Afghanistan, in dem das Ziel Nationbuilding darstellt, darf das Militärische nicht das einzig eingesetzte Instrument darstellen. Es könnte dem Gegner natürlich ein „stabiler Staat“ oder eine Demokratie mit massiven militärischen Mitteln aufgezwungen werden. Diese können aber nur so lange aufgezwungen werden, wie Einsatzkräfte präsent sind. Danach ist eine Rückkehr zum status quo ante wahrscheinlich. Für eine nachhaltige Umsetzung von Zielen ist daher eine Diversifizierung der Instrumente unbedingt notwendig.

Für das Ziel der Schwächung der Taliban, war der Einsatz von physischen Gewaltmitteln das klare Instrument der Wahl. Beim Nationbuilding ist das militärische Instrument jedoch wesentlich begrenzter. Aktivitäten wie Raumnahme, Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung und Ausbildung des afghanischen Sicherheitspersonals sind notwendige Variablen für ein erfolgreiches Nationbuilding, reichen aber für die Zielerreichung nicht aus. Die Ausführung des Vernetzten Ansatzes in Afghanistan war nicht divers genug und zu schwammig. Er ist in seiner Ausübung, durch ein Ungleichgewicht der Akteure und Koordinierungsproblemen an seine Grenzen gestoßen (Matthay, 2021). Eine Dominanz des Militärs muss ausgeschlossen werden, um eine Diversität an Instrumenten zur Variablenbeeinflussung bereit zu stellen. Die militärische Komponente stellt bei Nationbuilding-Einsätzen nur einen Stein im Mosaik dar. Zielführend wäre daher die Einrichtung eines Einsatzstabes für die verschiedenen Missionen, mit Vertretern aller betroffenen Ressorts, die eine Gesamtstrategie entwickeln, laufend die Effektivität überprüfen und Anpassungen vornehmen. Dieser strategische Ansatz ermöglicht es, Variablen zu identifizieren und zu gewichten, um betroffene Ressorts zu identifizieren und nachhaltig in die Strategieentwicklung einzubinden.

Literaturverzeichnis

Clausewitz, Carl von 1834 [2018]: Vom Kriege. Ausgewählt und herausgegeben von Kai Kilian. Köln: Anaconda.

Matthay, Sabina 2021: Was der “vernetzte Ansatz” beim Afghanistan-Einsatz gebracht hat – und was nicht. Deutschlandfunk. Online verfügbar unter https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/afghanistan-sicherheit-vernetzter-ansatz-100.html, zuletzt geprüft am 27.10.2022.

Voss, Mathias 2021: Defence in a changing world. How defensive should (NATO) defence be? Baden-Baden: Nomos (GIDS Analysis, Volume 4).

In an initial step, Bhutan developed GNH as a state philosophy that criticizes the narrow framing of development based on economic growth. GNH was supposed to illustrate what an alternative to likely over-consumption, social inequality, and resource depletion could look like. GNH is supposed to serve as a lens for guiding national development that makes sustainability, well-being, and happiness its key priorities. It does so through the GNH index that – in a second step – developed GNH from a philosophy to a tool for policy making. The index is based on surveys relying on the operationalization of well-being and happiness to make them measurable variables. GNH became a key component of Bhutanese politics when then King Jigme Singye Wangchuck declared that GNH was more important than gross domestic product (GDP) in 1972. It remains debatable whether GNH actually leads to the desired impact.

GNH is an important component of policy and decision making in Bhutan and is now codified as a central political principle in article 9 of the new constitution from 2008. It distinguishes four policy areas: (I) sustainable and equitable socioeconomic development, (II) preservation of the environment, (III) preservation and promotion of culture, and (IV) promotion of good governance. These four fields are central aspects of the surveys for the GNH index, which are created by the Center for Bhutan Studies and GNH Research. The surveys were first carried out in 2008 and have since then been conducted nationwide among 8,000 randomly selected households every five years. The GNH Index is divided into nine core areas: questions on health, education, and living standards are complemented with questions on time use, public administration and governance, environmental and cultural diversity and resilience, and psychological well-being and societal vitality. These areas each include two to four indicators – a total of 33 indicators are incorporated into the GNH index. This process is intended to provide an evaluation of the acceptance of government policies over time and to assess current societal problems, which is hoped to result in greater
policy coherence.

The Bhutanese government has taken a number of measures in recognition of Gross National Happiness. According to environmental protection laws of the constitution, at least 60% of the territory must be permanently forested – currently, the share is about 70%. Deforestation is only allowed if new trees are planted correspondingly. Slash and burn is punishable by law. Unprocessed wood from trees logged in Bhutan must not be exported. Industry businesses are subject to mandatory environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, all of Bhutan’s energy consumption comes from renewable sources generated by hydroelectric and solar power plants – the surplus of which is exported, now being the country’s largest export, accounting for more than one-third of all public revenues. This makes Bhutan the only country in the world whose largest export is energy from renewable sources. Overall, Bhutan can rightfully be considered to be one of the most environmentally friendly countries on earth – it is not only carbon neutral, but carbon negative, meaning it absorbs more carbon than it emits. Bhutan also stands out in questions of social issues. Although access to schools and medical facilities remains difficult in remote areas of Bhutan, education and medical care are free of charge, The average age of the population is approximately 29 years while life expectancy amounts to about 72 years, due to a high birth rate and rapid improvements in medical care and a consequent rise of life expectancy over the past two decades. The illiteracy rate in Bhutan amounts to about 36%, while it is in the low single digits for youths. The corruption rate remains very low. Bhutan ranks 23rd on the Corruption Perception Index, just below nations such as France (22nd), surpasses countries such as the United States (24th), and shows a steady upward trend.

Despite such initiatives and substantial achievements, Bhutan ranked only 97th in the UN’s World Happiness Report, although the index was created on the initiative of Bhutan at the 2012 meeting on „Wellbeing and Happiness: Defining a New Economic Paradigm“. The 2015 GNH surveys found that only 8% were “deeply happy” and 35% were “extensively happy.” 47.9% registered as “narrowly happy”. Existing social problems are diverse. The GNH significantly restricts economic development, for instance, the accession to the World Trade Organization was rejected by the Bhutanese government in 2017, referencing GNH. Bhutan remains one of the least developed countries in the world – most of the population is engaged in subsistence farming. Poverty is particularly prevalent in remote areas of the country that are poorly arable. Youth unemployment amounted to around 10% in 2019. Also, increasing income inequality is emerging as the economy grows. Moreover, coercion of cultural assimilation in minority communities persist. Most notably, Bhutanese people of Nepali descent were victims of assimilation measures, exclusion in citizenship laws and of forced repatriations to Nepal in the late 1980s.

The concept of Gross National Happiness understands general well-being of the population as the central priority of policy making. In light of GNH, the Kingdom of Bhutan has introduced a variety of policies that have been critical in protecting the environment, shaping social development in issues such as education and health, and building a sustainable economy. Although there are significant limitations to the successful implementation of aspects of GNH into policy in Bhutan, GNH nonetheless provides valuable approaches for more sustainable and coherent policy making.

This article was published in the January issue of the “Diplomatisches Magazin”, 2022. Find it here.

Despite cultural ties that go back centuries (Rey M., 2021), and notwithstanding recently growing cooperation, India has had a tumultuous and fickle diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan. The primary reason for this is the constant fluctuations (Thier A. & Woodern S., 2017) in Afghanistan’s Indo-Pakistani policy which stems from unstable political dynamics of the country. Historically, Taliban rule in Afghanistan has led to a tilt towards Pakistan in diplomatic relationships and has had a negative impact on Indo-Afghan cooperation. (Subramanian N., 2021) Additionally, the Taliban have received clandestine support from Islamabad for years. (NSA, 2007)

However, Afghanistan is an essential transit hub between South Asia and Central Asia, and thus has the potential to play a pivotal role in the development and economic prosperity of the region. (Akhlaqi S., 2017) India has been involved in several projects as well as aid and reconstruction programs to exploit this potential. Yet, most of these assistance programs have taken place during the reign of non-fundamentalist, mostly democratically elected governments. In a massive policy change, India has only recently taken initiative to establish diplomatic relationships with the Taliban.

This time around, the Taliban have proven to be more strategically organized, yet, the immediate impact of the establishment of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” is far from positive. Even though the Taliban have declared interests in establishing cordial relations with New Delhi, new Indo-Afghan relations under Taliban rule are unlikely. The induction of the Haqqani group into the Taliban government has already made matters worse to the Indian government and maintains strong ties with Pakistan’s ISI (Miller M., 2017) and, in the past, was involved in several attacks on Indian assets in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Taliban have begun to contradict several of the promises made publicly, which it seems, were only made for the projection of a positive image of the group. No significant steps have been taken by the newly inducted government to make good of its declaration of “cordiality”. Furthermore, the takeover of Taliban increases the risk of indoctrination and violence in the unstable regions of Kashmir. (Wani A., 2021) Despite promises to the contrary, Taliban led Afghanistan could quickly become a breeding ground for other terrorist groups.

When it comes to India’s assets in Afghanistan, the effect on them would depend on the quality of the relations established between the governments of the two countries. On the face of it, the chance of establishing a sustainable cooperative relationship seems bleak due to the inherent nature of Taliban as well as its closeness to Pakistan. It must also be kept in mind that the Chinese government, despite the ideological differences, has been quick to offer assistance to the Taliban. Moreover, it is backing the Taliban’s demand from the U.S. to unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets. India should not overlook these growing trilateral relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and China which would definitely pose a problem for India in the long-run. While Pakistan and China are already “all-weather” allies (Sattat H., 2015), the addition of the Taliban led Afghanistan to this partnership would result in increased trade as well as border related insecurities to India.

It is evident that, when it comes to Afghanistan, India’s “Neighbourhood First” policy is failing. The country’s bid to strengthen Indo-Afghan relations and bring stability to the region through investing in Afghanistan has been distressed due to the sudden and rapid takeover by the Taliban. However, India cannot afford to lose Afghanistan as a strategic ally. At the same time, it cannot ignore the human rights violations occurring in Afghanistan. It remains be seen whether India undertakes humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan. On the other hand, keeping in mind the rapid changes occurring in Afghanistan, the Indian government needs to take swift action. Engaging in a bilateral dialogue to negotiate a common ground is what will best serve the needs of the hour. The Indian government needs to keep an eye on the trajectory of Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan and China while proactively reconfiguring its own. It must be remembered that while Taliban leaders have said that the group wants to maintain its ties with India, eventually, Sino-Pakistani influence will definitely bring changes to this position. Hence, the Indian government will need to work towards restrictions of anti-Indian sentiments in Afghanistan that could very well have a detrimental effect on domestic political sovereignty (Lee M., 2018). Nevertheless, Afghanistan cannot survive on Sino-Pakistan support alone and at one point or another, the Taliban will even more on India’s support to maintain legitimacy of their rule.

Youssef N. and Lubold G (2021). Last U.S. Troops Leave Afghanistan After Nearly 20 Years, Wall Street Journal. Accessed 13 September 2021.

British Broadcasting Corporation (2021). Afghanistan: Don’t recognise Taliban regime, resistance urges, Accessed: 13 September 2021.

Embassy of India, Kabul. Indo-Afghan Relations. Accessed 13 September 2021.

Rey M. (2021). Afghanistan’s history and its connections with India, The Daily Guardian. Accessed 15 September 2021.

Khalil A. (2016). The Tangled History of the Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Triangle, The Diplomat. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Thier A. and Wodern S. (2017). Special Report 408, United States Institute of Peace. Accessed: 16 September 2021

Subramanian N. (2021). Explained: A look at Pakistan’s long relationship with the Taliban, The Indian Express. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

The National Security Archive (2007). Pakistan: “The Taliban’s Godfather”?, 14 August 2017.

Akhlaqi S. (2017). Afghanistan: Transit hub for the region, The Economic Times, Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Iwanek K. (2019). 36 Things India Has Done for Afghanistan, The Diplomat, Accessed: 16 September 2021.

Vaid D. (2021). India announces first diplomatic contact with the Taliban, Deutsche Welle. Accessed: 19 September 2021.

Miller M. (2021). Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban: What to Know, Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed 19 September 2021.

Mohanty K. (2021). Explained: Al-Qaeda Ties, Attack On Indian Assets. Why Haqqani Network In Taliban Is Driving Worries, News18. Accessed: 17 September 2021.

Dawn (2021). Taliban pardon rivals, vow to honour women, 18 August 2021. Accessed: 17 September 2021.

Farge E. (2021). Taliban breaking promises including over women, says U.N., Reuters. Accessed: 18 September 2021

Wani A. (2021). Resurgent Taliban and its implications on Kashmir, Observer Research Foundation. Accessed: 20 September 2021.

Chaturvedi A. (2021). ‘Pakistan our second home, there is peace in Afghanistan’: Taliban spokesperson, Hindustan Times. Accessed: 16 September 2021.

British Broadcasting Corporation (2021), China offers $31m in emergency aid to Afghanistan, 9 September 2021. Accessed 16 September 2021.

Business Standard (2021). China backs Taliban’s demand to US to unfreeze Afghanistan’s assets, 15 September 2021. Accessed: 20 September 2021.

Sattar H. (2015). China and Pakistan’s All-Weather Friendship, The Diplomat. Accessed: 14 September 2021.

Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 31st Special Session of the Human Rights Council The serious human rights concerns and situation in Afghanistan, 24 August 2021. Accessed: 19 September 2021.

Lee, M. (2018). The International Politics of Incomplete Sovereignty: How Hostile Neighbors Weaken the State, International Organization, Vol. 72 No. 2, pp. 283-315. Accessed: 20 September 2021

The military, also known as the Tatmadaw, insisted that ‘the voter lists which were used during the multi-party general election held on the 8th of November were found to have huge discrepancies and the Union Election Commission (UEC) failed to settle this matter’ (MWD 2021). It is worth noting that the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, won the elections with an 83 percent of available seats and the military did not expect such a disparity in the results (Reuters 2021). Despite the UEC declaring that there was no evidence to support such claims, the military still disputed the results and filed complaints at the Supreme Court against the president and the chair of the commission.

Myanmar’s political history shows that, since the 1962 coup, the military has been the most powerful political actor in Myanmar (Stokke 2018), directly ruling from 1962 to 2011 and indirectly from 2011 (Prager 2011) until now. This is one of the reasons why the Tatmadaw considers itself the father of the nation, thereby carrying an inherent sense of ‘obligation and entitlement’ to rule the country.

While the army recognizes that sovereignty must derive from its people, they consider themselves entitled to ‘solve the fraudulent elections according to the law’ since such acts contradict the democratic process. In this line, Article 418(a) of the 2018 Constitution has been used as the legal basis for the army to assume the authority of the nation’s legislative, executive and judicial powers. Accordingly, Article 417 reads that any ‘acts or attempts to take over the sovereignty of the Union by wrongful forcible means’ would lead to the declaration of the state of emergency in the territory of Myanmar, in whole or in part, for the period of one year since its promulgation.

Notwithstanding the current coup, with the 2008 Constitution and its amendments giving a quarter of the seats in parliament to the military (Myanmar 2008) and allowing the Tatmadaw to keep the ability to impose its will as soon as its authority over defence was affected by new reforms and thus ensuring the generals’ domination (Albert 2017) of Burmese politics and unchallenged control of the State (Barany 2018), the military already indirectly influenced and exerted its authority during pre-coup ruling.

As a direct consequence of the coup, military’s nationalist discourse (Foxeus 2019) would imply isolation of non-Chinese international partners, who have called on the military to respect the rule of law, resolve disputes through lawful mechanisms and immediately release all civilian leaders and others who have been detained unlawfully thereby restoring the democratic process. In addition, it would also lead to a serious damage of its commercial interests, since the army did not align with Myanmar previous openness to international trade, and view outsiders especially as a danger.

However, not only will the Tatmadaw face challenges internationally. The coup could induce an escalating resentment and resistance from millions of people who voted for the NLD, thus intensifying the existing tension and potentially leading to a stage of bloody riots if the rhetoric of the once again home-arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, of not accepting the coup and protesting against it, is followed by its supporters.

It bears highlighting that it is not the first time there have been allegations concerning electoral fraud in Myanmar. Controversial were also the questionable constitutional referendum in May 2008, without the presence of foreign observers (HRW 2008) and during a period of desolation caused by the largest natural disaster ever to have taken place in Myanmar (HRW 2008), and the November 2010 elections, denounced to be unfair (OHCHR 2011) and fraudulent (Holliday 2010).

Once again, the military argues that these events could ‘lead to a disintegration of national solidarity’, but Myanmar has spoken, and its people want a democratic path. Having unity as a national priority will also give the Tatmadaw the impunity, which it already enjoyed to some extent when the civilian government provided them with cover-up at all stages, to continue and increase the violence and repression exerted towards ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Rohingya community.

It is surprising how the military refers to national security when there is an internal armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and the Rohingya ethnic minority. But most surprising is their seeming preoccupation about an obstruction to ‘the path to democracy’, because what would not hinder it would be a military coup, obviously. They are ‘solving’ this issue in the same way they have denounced the election, by taking the sovereignty of the Union by wrongful forcible means.

Subjecting Myanmar back under a military dictatorship has not only dropped, but also reversed any effort of democratization.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

References

Myawaddy Television (MWD), Statement from Myanmar military on state of emergency, 1 February 2021. Accessed 1 February 2021.

Reuters (2021), Explainer: Crisis in Myanmar after army alleges election fraud, 1 February 2021. Accessed 1 February 2021.

Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 29 May 2008,  Section 436, p.111. Accessed: 3 February 2021.

Prager Nyein, S. (2011), The Armed Forces of Burma: The Constant Sentinel, in Marcus Mietzner (ed.), The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia, Conflict and Leadership, London/New York, Routledge, pp. 24-44.

Stokke, K.; Vakilchuk, R.; Overland, I.(2018), Myanmar: A Political Economy Analysis, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, pp. 8-35. Accessed: 3 February 2021.

Holliday, I. (2014). Addressing Myanmar’s citizenship crisis, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 44 No. 3, pp. 404-421. Accessed: 2 February 2021.

OHCHR (2011). Situation of human rights in Myanmar, A/66/267, 5 August 2011, p.10. Accessed: 2 February 2021.

Human Rights Watch (2008). Vote to Nowhere: The May 2008 Constitutional Referendum in Burma, 30 April 2008. Accessed: 1 February 2021.

Human Rights Watch (2008). ‘Burma: Reject Constitutional Referendum, Government’s Poor Cyclone Response Shows Need for Democratic Reform’, 17 May 2008. Accessed: 1 February 2021.

Foxeus, N. (2019). The Buddha was a devoted nationalist: Buddhist nationalism, ressentiment, and defending Buddhism in Myanmar, Religion, Vol. 49 No. 4, pp.661-690. Accessed: 1 February 2021.

Barany, Z. (2018). Elections and Constitutional Constraints: How the Generals Have Stayed in Power in Myanmar, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp.105-117. Accessed: 3 February 2021.

E. Albert (2017). How Myanmar’s Military Wields Power From the Shadows, Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed: 1 February 2021.

Maya Wang, China Senior Researcher (Human Rights Watch)

I. Introduction

The indigenous ethnic Uyghur-minority faces severe repression by Chinese authorities in the Xinjiang Region. According to estimations of the US think tank Council on Foreign Relations, more than one million Uyghurs have been imprisoned in so-called detention centers, while the rest of the Uyghur population faces intense surveillance, severe restrictions in everyday life as well as discrimination and marginalization on a constant basis. Recently, reports about a predictive policing program on the basis of big data or about a face-scanning system including an ‘Uighur alarm’ employed by Chinese government authorities have led to large international criticism and even comparisons to George Orwell’s ‘1984’ novel (see quote). How does the use of big data and surveillance technology contribute to the discrimination and marginalization of the Uyghurs? In the following, I will briefly examine China’s high-tech methods to govern and suppress the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.

II. The Uyghur-Chinese conflict

The Uyghur population amounts to about eleven million people in total who live in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northeast of China (Maizland 2020). The ethnic minority of the Uyghurs is mostly Muslim and Turkic-speaking (Maizland 2020). With the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong establishing the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the XUAR was brought under the control of the Chinese authorities, though granting very limited (religious) autonomy to the Uyghur population. While ethnoreligious tensions between the Uighur minority and the majority Han Chinese population date back decades, the Urumqi riots of 2009 mark a starting point for increased repression of the Uyghur population. Following an accusation of sexual assault against a Han Chinese woman by Uyghur workers in a toy factory in Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR, riots between Uyghurs and Han Chinese people (incl. police forces) on July 5, 2019, led to many people killed and injured on both sides (Handley 2019). This decisive event increased tensions in the region: As a consequence of terrorist acts of Uyghur separatists in 2012 and of Muslim extremists in 2014, Chinese state authorities started a “Strike Hard Campaign against violent activities and terrorism” (Human Rights Watch 2018) in May 2014, leading to increased suppression of the Uyghur population (Handley 2019). Justified by the intention of preventing extremist and separatist ideas and “eliminating threats to China’s territorial integrity, government and population” (Maizland 2020), between eight hundred thousand to two million Uyghurs have been detained in re-education camps since April 2017 according to the Council on Foreign Relations (Maizland 2020). Critics particularly condemn the seemingly arbitrary detention of people without charge or trial, based on various reasons which reach from being in contact with people from ‘sensitive’ countries (e.g. Turkey, Afghanistan) to quoting the Quran in text messages (Maizland 2020).

III. Surveillance Technology and Big Data in the Context of Repression of the Uyghurs

When fighting the “‘three [evil] forces’, that is, ‘separatism, terrorism and extremism’” (Human Rights Watch 2018) in the Xinjiang region, China relies to a growing extent on new technological developments in the areas of surveillance and big data analysis. According to Human Rights Watch (2018), mass surveillance has increased in the Xinjiang region recently. On the basis of two recent examples, a predictive policing program and a face-scanning system, I will demonstrate how Chinese authorities reinforce already existing marginalization and suppression of the Uyghur ethnic minority in the Xinjiang region and how they use data as a source of knowledge to govern and exert power over the Uyghurs.

a) The Predictive Policing Program “Integrated Joint Operator Platform”

As a part of the “Strike-Hard”-Campaign, a predictive policing program called “Integrated Joint Operators Platform (IJOP)” has been introduced by the Xinjiang Bureau of Public Security in August 2016 (Human Rights Watch 2018). IJOP collects data about the Uyghur population from various sources such as CCTV cameras, “wifi-sniffers”, security checkpoints and visitors’ management systems of access-controlled communities (Human Rights Watch 2018). This digitally exploited information is combined with existing information as well as information gathered from home visits carried out by local officials, where religious practices and family relations are examined (Human Rights Watch 2018). We can, thus, observe the exploitation from multiple data sources by government authorities.

The Uyghurs, as objects of surveillance, are in many cases unaware of them being under surveillance, and the ones “tasked with data collection do not appear to explain the reasons for such data collection, nor give residents a choice to decline to provide the data” (Human Rights Watch 2018). Based on the collected data sets, IJOP categorizes people into “trustworthy” and “non-trustworthy” and flags them accordingly, pushing the potentially threatening “non-trustworthy” candidates on to the police or government authorities for further investigation (Human Rights Watch 2018). Reasons for non-trustworthiness can reach from a supposedly wrong political or ideological mindset, active practice of religion to simple things such as possessing too many books, if not being in a teaching position (Human Rights Watch 2018). The government officials then decide upon the further procedure, not seldomly resulting in the flagged person being held in detention centers and selected for political re-education (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Surveillance data systematically leads to discrimination and marginalization of the Uyghur population because of their ethnicity or religious beliefs. Apart from the many Uyghurs being held in re-education camps, the rest of the Uyghur population is under constant surveillance thus suffering hard from China’s crackdown. The categorization of the population into different groups, here the Han ethnicity and the Uyghur ethnicity, that are treated differently, is what Lyon calls “social sorting” (Lyon 2019). According to Lyon (2019), already existing marginalization is reinforced through big data, as can be observed in the case of the Uyghurs. By exploiting different sources of data in the context of the IJOP, private information on the Uyghur-population is collected in an extensive manner, thereby creating knowledge. This knowledge serves the Chinese authorities as a means to govern and exercise power over the Uyghur-population, turning the Uyghurs into objects of power while simultaneously creating ever new knowledge about them. This mutual reinforcement of power and knowledge is what Foucault (cited in Sherida, 1980) fittingly termed as “power-knowledge”. According to this concept, the exercise of power heavily relies on knowledge, while conversely the accumulation and formation of knowledge needs to be embedded in a system of power (Foucault, cited in Sheridan 1980). Through a triangle of power-knowledge, consisting of surveillance, use of force, and constant intimidation and humiliation, the Uyghur minority shall be deprived of their religious beliefs and cultural traditions and be re-educated in a more pro-Chinese way in re-education centers.

b) Face-Scanning Technology with included “Uighur alarm”

A second, more recent, example of how technological advancements are used to repress the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region are tests of a face-scanning system by the Chinese tech giant Huawei. It includes an AI software which is capable of recognizing and identifying a person as belonging to the Uyghur ethnicity by his or her facial features, and subsequently triggering an “Uighur alarm” (Harwell und Dou 2020). As the Washington Post revealed on December 8, 2020, Huawei cooperated in 2018 with a facial recognition start-up called ‘Megvii’ to “test an artificial-intelligence camera system that could scan faces in a crowd and estimate each person’s age, sex and ethnicity” (Harwell und Dou 2020). The report of this test also speaks of the capability of the system to trigger an “Uighur alarm”, whenever a face of this ethnic group is recognized by the surveillance technology (Harwell und Dou 2020). Once the alarm is triggered, the necessary information is passed on to police authorities (Harwell und Dou 2020). Huawei and Megvii both claim that the “Uighur alarm” is not used in real-world settings and deny that the purpose of this technical possibility is to label ethnic groups. However, this example demonstrates how discriminatory technology could be (and maybe already is) used in order to suppress the Uyghur population. As Clare Gavie, a senior associate with the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law, phrased fittingly, the “software represents a dangerous step toward automating ethnic discrimination at a devastating scale” (Harwell und Dou 2020). Likewise striking is the intertwinement and technological cooperation between public authorities and private companies like Huawei: Through development of such surveillance technology, Huawei knowingly (and willingly) contributes to discriminating governmental practices. Government authorities, on the other hand, ensure the long-term possession of cutting-edge technology for their purposes.

IV. Conclusion

China heavily makes use of new technological developments in the areas of surveillance and big data to effectively exert power and control over the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang region. Chinese authorities established a system of state surveillance fed by multiple sources that reaches far into the private spheres of the Uyghur population, enabling the authorities to crack down on the Uyghur ethnical minority. In cooperation with private companies like Huawei, discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religious beliefs is automated with severe consequences for the victims who have to fear being held in detention camps and being forced to political re-education.

Bibliography:

Handley, Erin 2019: How China’s mass detention of Uyghut Muslims stemmed from the 2009 Urumqi riots. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-05/china-xinjiang-urumqi-riots-10th-anniversary-uyghur-muslims/11270320 (accessed December 19, 2020).

Harwell, Drew & Dou, Eva 2020: Huawei tested AI software that could recognize Uighur minorities and alert police, report says. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/12/08/huawei-tested-ai-software-that-could-recognize-uighur-minorities-alert-police-report-says/ (accessed December 19, 2020).

Human Rights Watch 2018: China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region (accessed December 19, 2020).

Lyon, David 2019: Surveillance Capitalism, Surveillance Culture and Data Politics, in: Bigo, Didier; Isin, Engin; Ruppert, Evelyn (eds.), Data Politics: Worlds, Subjects, Rights, London: Routledge, pages 64-78.

Maizland, Lindsay (Council on Foreign Relations) 2020: China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang#:~:text=China%E2%80%99s%20Repression%20of%20Uighurs%20in%20Xinjiang%20More%20than,his%20shop%20in%20Kashgar%20in%20the%20Xinjiang%20region (accessed December 19, 2020).

Sheridan, Alan 1980: Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, London: Routledge.

For nearly three decades, the frozen conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been largely omitted by the international community, despite continued breaches of ceasefire. After sixteen people were killed in a border skirmish on July 12 (Stronski, 2020), tensions further escalated, culminating in weeks of heavy combat in the autumn of 2020 (BBC, 2020a). This new low in the nations’ bilateral relations represents a watershed in the region’s troubled history, spelling potential catastrophe and begging for an international solution, especially when considering that the peace deal Russia brokered in the beginning of November bears the potential to instigate the conflict even further (BBC, 2020b). This article recounts developments leading up to the current situation, approaching the apparent deadlock by investigating the interest structures of the two main regional powers involved in the conflict – Russia and Turkey – that have the capacity to sustainably alter the conflict’s trajectory.

Historical Background

The ongoing confrontation results from deep historical animosities that have plagued the region for a century. One of the earliest events that unquestionably fuels this division is the Armenian genocide (Editors H.com, 2010) committed by the Ottoman Empire which at the time ruled over present-day Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the shadow of the first World War it launched an ethnic cleansing campaign against Armenians, causing an estimated death toll of up to a million and a reduction of West Armenian territories. Though Azeris were not directly involved in the genocide, their ethnic and religious affiliation with Turkey still heavily undermines their relation to Armenia. In the contemporary conflict, both the Azeri and Armenian leadership often attempt to reincite nationalist sentiment and garner the support of their constituencies through accusing the other state of unwarranted aggression.

Acknowledging the ethnic divide between the countries provides a favourable vantage point for making sense of the centerpiece of the border dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Nagorno-Karabakh. The enclave, mainly inhabited by ethnic Armenians, is situated in the south of Azerbaijan and surrounded from all sides by Azeri territory. While Soviet leadership had delegated administration over the semi-autonomous region to Azerbaijan, grievances over this largely bureaucratic act were curbed by both countries coexisting under the stabilising umbrella of the Soviet empire.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union of course changed that dynamic and gave rise to a regional power vacuum in which the Nagorno-Karabakh War unravelled in 1988. Over the course of the following six years the war left about 20.000 dead while displacing 700.000 Azeris and 300.000 Armenians. Finally, thanks to efforts by the Russian government, a ceasefire was negotiated in 1994 which is frequently broken from both sides until this day. (Carney, 2020)

When merely considering bilateral dynamics, a textbook case of a conflict in deadlock emerges which is further amplified when taking into consideration the geopolitical interests at play here. In suggesting a potential solution to the conflict, we argue that a common shortcoming of relevant coverage is that the two adversaries are analyzed in a vacuum, disregarding other state actors involved that support either (or both) Azeri and Armenian governments.

Russian Bearing on Nagorno-Karabakh

Albeit overtly acting on behalf of the conflict parties – Russia hosted several trilateral summits between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has brokered the recent peace accords -, tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh create a volatile climate in which Russian presence as a regional balancing factor is indispensable. However, Russia also effectively utilizes this instability, going to considerable lengths to further its geopolitical interests (Cavanaugh, 2017).

Following the USSR’s dissolution, Armenia and Russia have maintained a close but asymmetrical partnership insofar as Armenia relies on Russia as the primary supplier of discounted weaponry and gas to ensure its (energy-) security (Giragosian, 2019, p. 5-6). Via this support, the Russian government attempts to solidify its position in a region of high strategic importance and close remaining security-vacuums in its immediate neighbourhood.

As they directly relate to Armenian national security, both gas and defence equipment can also be effectively used as levers to influence Armenian politics. For example, Armenia’s declaration to further integrate with the EU led Russia to “increase military cooperation with Armenia’s fiercest foe, Azerbaijan, in the form of supplying Russian military hardware worth $4 billion”, thereby tilting the regional balance of power. Further, Russia “played its energy card” by raising Armenian gas prices by 50 percent (Terzyan, 2017, p.190). The prices were immediately reduced in 2013 when Armenia opted to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), instead of advancing on the Association Agreement with the European Union. The potential economic gains for Armenia from being integrated with the EAEU, however, come at the opportunity cost of more beneficial cooperation agreements and possibly the price of regional stability.

Accounting for Russian interest in the region – which is now safeguarded by peacekeeping troops in Nagorno-Karabakh -, other global actors would be well advised to support Armenia both in security and economic terms. Exemplary, the EU represents Armenia’s biggest export market (European Commission, 2016) and could, in context of their new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement emphasize trade expansions and tariff reductions on products sourced and manufactured in Armenia as to not violate the country’s commitments to the EAEU. Most relevant, the EU already committed to mediating between Armenia and Georgia to establish energy transit routes, enhance Armenian energy security and thereby remedy reliance on Russian gas.

Turkish Influence 

In contrast, Turkey, as pointed out before, firmly supports Azerbaijan, giving rise to a regional power balance around Nagorno-Karabakh within which interest structures are firmly dependent on a prolongment of the conflict. Within this scheme, merely the local populations would benefit significantly from a peaceful resolution in both economic and social terms (Saha, 2018).

While Armenia remains generally dependent on Russian benevolence, Turkey can be seen as the Azeris’ biggest supporter in respect to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and regional cooperation overall. That is firstly due to the countries’ historically salient ethno-religious ties which manifest in joint initiatives such as building a regional energy infrastructure largely bypassing Armenia to the detriment of its economy (Giragosian, 2009).

Moreover, the history of Turkish-Armenian relations was unequivocally marked by conflict, tension, and division. As described above, ethnic enmities on both sides led to territorial conflicts in the area around Erzurum (nowadays Eastern Turkey) and most prominently culminated in the Armenian genocide which to this day has not been acknowledged by the Turkish state. In this context, Turkey has also fully stalled diplomatic relations with Armenia (including closing the border).

All things considered, it therefore becomes clear why Turkey has taken the side of Azerbaijan and supports its territorial claims. While Turkey’s involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh has been of rather indirect nature, it clearly aims to use its leverage over Azerbaijan to push back on Russian supremacy and solidify its own geopolitical standing in the area (New York Times, 2020). However, with the successful signing of the Russian-brokered peace deal, the opposite has occurred as Russian peacekeeping forces are now patrolling the strategically crucial Lachin corridor and Turkey is less perceived as a stabilizing force and more as an aggressor, partly due to its reported involvement in Azeri air strikes.

Acknowledging Turkey’s eagerness to assert itself as a balancing factor against Russia meanwhile stands in stark contrast to basing its support for the Azeris on purely ethno-religious grounds. This stance has strengthened the deadlock around Nagorno-Karabakh which has now lasted for three decades and impedes development in the entire Caucasus region; while hindering Turkey from achieving its geopolitical aims. Of course, one must acknowledge that these enmities are by no means easy to overcome, though improving the relationship between Armenia and Turkey may constitute a feasible -and highly effective- first step towards disentangling the deadlock between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

As laid out by Giragosian (2009), this could commence by resuming diplomatic relations with Armenia, opening the border, and therefore giving rise to opportunities for trade both countries could vastly profit from -economically and, in the case of Turkey, also politically. That is because Turkey’s strategic interest to establish itself as a force for peaceful cooperation in the region, including a settlement on the Armenian genocide, is a likely prerequisite to further convergence with the EU and would also be welcomed by the US.

Concluding Remarks

The illustration of Russian and Turkish involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict exposes a number of levers available to actors inside and outside the Caucasus with which to affect the conflict’s trajectory. Of the two regional powers analysed above, Turkey stands to gain more from changing course and pursuing a diplomatic alternative in light of growing Russian dominance. Though, one needs to qualify that, firstly, the Erdoğan administration has continuously alienated itself from its (Western) allies by taking a more offensive diplomatic approach while his rhetoric remains more ethnically divisive than reconciling. Second, even if such advances were to be facilitated and the deadlock loosened, this would not ensure that these changes are actually desirable for the local population or lead to a likely consensus among the states involved. As we made clear, ethnic enmities run deep and will take generations to ameliorate.

This prognosis reiterates that time is running out as continuing the delay of decisive action will further entrench path-dependencies whose reversal will consume exceeding amounts of resources and political will, rendering future peaceful resolution of the conflict all the more unlikely. Undoubtedly, tensions not settling even after yet another peace deal was struck further underline the necessity to break the deadlock now.

Bibliography

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia sign Nagorno-Karabakh peace deal. (2020a, November 10). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564.

Cornell, S. E. (1998). Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A delicate balance. Middle Eastern Studies, 34(1), 51–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209808701209.

Carney, T. (2020). Applying International Law to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Opinio Juris.  http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/22/applying-international-law-to-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/.

Cavanaugh, C. (2017). Renewed Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh. Council on Foreign Relations.

Editors, H. com. (2010). Armenian Genocide. HISTORY. A&E Television Networks. Retrieved August 20, 2020, from https://www.history.com/topics/world-war- i/armenian-genocide.

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Ghazaryan, N., & Delcour, L. (2018). From EU Integration Process to the Eurasian Economic Union: The Case of Armenia. In Post-Soviet Constitutions and Challenges of Regional Integration. Routledge. https://nottinghamrepository.worktribe.com/preview/897947/Ghazaryan%20and%20Delcour.pdf.

Giragosian, R. (2009). Changing Armenia-Turkish Relations. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/georgien/06380.pdf.

Giragosian, R. (2019). Paradox of power: Russia, Armenia, and Europe after the Velvet Revolution. European Council on Foreign Relations, 17. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/russia_armenia_and_europe_after_the_velvet_revolution.pdf

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Saha, D., Giucci, R., Lücke, M., Kirchner, R., Movchan, V., & Zachmann, G. (2018). The economic effect of a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Berlin Economics. https://berlin-economics.com/wp- content/uploads/The_Economic_Effect_Of_A_Resolution_Of_The_Nagorno-Karabakh_Conflict.pdf.

Terzyan, A. (2017). The EU vs. Russia in the foreign policy discourse of Armenia: The fragility of normative power or the power of Russian coercion? Eastern Journal of  European Studies, 8(2), 185–202.

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The final aim of the Ashrayan Project is to alleviate poverty of the Rohingya refugees by providing shelter and human resource development activities, thereby improving the standard of living of the people, ensuring basic education, health care and skill development on income generating activities (Bangladesh, 2016). However, even if a priori the plan can also be justified by the camps’ congestion, reality has proven to be quite different as what has been stated by Bangladesh authorities (Banerjee 2020).

After the failed attempt to repatriate Rohingyas to Myanmar in August 2019 (Banerjee 2019), in September Bangladesh imposed widespread restrictions on the conditions of life of the Rohingyas in the refugee camps, such as high-speed mobile internet ban, closure of markets or hinders to humanitarian aid (Marsh & Ahmed 2019). These constraints appear to be aimed at indirectly forcing the refugees to either return to Myanmar or move to Bhasan Char, living them with little margin of choice (Banerjee 2020). However positive governmental prognostics are, Rohingyas are unwilling to move to the island since they fear death by starvation, floods and lack of humanitarian aid (HRW 2018).

Is Bhasan Char Island an adequate destination for relocation?

Emerged from the sea in 2006, Bhasan Char is an unstable island extremely vulnerable to monsoons that does not provide the suitable environment for the development of a stable, self-sufficient community in the long term (UNHCR 2020). Considering the fact that Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable States to sea level rises, this recently-emerged island in the Ganges Delta is even more likely to suffer from environmental catastrophes. Additionally, Bhasan Char’s isolation in the event of cyclones or other natural disasters is a matter of great concern (HRW 2020).

Investigation about the habitability of the island has not yet occurred, thus one has to rely on two opposite views. On the one hand, authorities from Bangladesh affirm that those refugees who choose to be relocated in Bhasan Char would have access to the same basic rights as those in Cox’ Bazar (Bangladesh 2016). On the other hand, several NGOs (AI 2019) as well the UNHCR have expressed the need for further discussion with the authorities on fundamental protection matters crucial to understand relocation plans, including viability of the site to offer dignified living conditions, safety and security considerations, access to food and water, voluntariness (HRW 2018) and other factors regarding freedom of movement, right to work or humanitarian access and presence (UNHCR 2020).

After the former UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, visited the island, she questioned whether it was ‘truly habitable’ (UHCHR 2019). Despite the acknowledgment of the commitment to identify alternative durable solutions for Rohingya refugees, HRW claimed that governmental authorities are believed to be including individual’s names on the relocation lists without their knowledge and consent and declared any relocations must be proceeding ‘on a voluntary basis’ (HRW 2019). Refugees International also recognises that questions about safety and voluntariness of the intended relocation ‘remain unanswered’ and reiterated the need for Bangladesh to conduct independent technical and protection assessments by the UNHCR and other international actors to determine the feasibility and safety of the move (RI 2019).

Requirements for the lawful relocation of refugees

Assessment of the protection of Rohingya in Bhasan Char is crucial for the determination of the legality of the intended relocation. The UN Special Rapporteur has insisted that the intended relocation must comply with international standards of safety, voluntariness, dignity and sustainability and that the government of Bangladesh should share feasibility studies and allow the UN to carry out a full technical and humanitarian assessment before making any further pans for the move of people to the island (OHCHR 2019).

These relocation plans must fully entail the engagement and participation of refugees, including through consultation and on-site visits since without individual fully informed consent, such plans cannot move forwards. All in all, relevant information on the project to the affected refugees must be provided at all times, prior and after the intended relocation that should, indeed, be aimed at improving refugees’ conditions of life instead of creating a new crisis (UHCHR 2019).

Are these relocation plans lawful under International Law?

In light of Article 12(1) ICCPR, Rohingya refugees should enjoy the right to freely move and choose their residence and be protected against all forms of forced internal displacement. Restrictions set by Bangladesh are not within the constraints laid down in Article 12(3) ICCPR. In fact, The Human Rights Committee recognised its concerns about their relocation to the island due to its proneness to floods, the lack of necessary infrastructure to ensure respect for basic human rights and the moving ‘without the full and free consent of the affected individuals’ (UNHCR 2018).

Moreover, neither the principle of proportionality, being the relocation the appropriate and least intrusive instrument for the desired result proportionated to the interest to be protected, nor clarity or preciseness in determining the criteria have been taken into account for the development of the relocation plan to Bhasan Char. Relocation of refugees in an isolated island which is a geographically limited area, also constitutes an unlawful restriction of freedom of movement (Zieck 2018).

Consequently, this considerable degree of restriction on Rohingyas’ internal freedom of movement supposes a constraint in the conditions of life (Fine & Ypi 2016). Therefore, not only Article 12 ICCPR is affected, but also Articles 7 (Prohibition of Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), 9 (Liberty and security of person), 17 (Right to Privacy) of the ICCPR and Articles 11 (Right to an Adequate Standard of Living) and 12 (Right to Health) ICESC.

The amount of uncertainty about the adequacy of the island, and the nature and purpose of the treatment of refugees, is putting Rohingya at unnecessary further risk and the relocation plans to move Rohingya refugees to Bhasan Char are unacceptable. Therefore, the intended relocation plans from Bangladeshi authorities are in contravention to international human rights law and must thereby be considered as unlawful. If the purpose were to find a durable solution, Bhasan Char is definitely neither durable nor a solution.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

References

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Banerjee, S. (2019). Rohingya Muslims return to “safety”: A regional approach. ORF Issue Brief No.396.

Banerjee, S. (2020). From Cox’s Bazar to Bhasan Char: An Assessment of Bangladesh’s Relocation Plan for Rohingya Refugees. ORF Issue Brief No.357.

Deputy Commissioner (2019). Interview of Md. Kamal Hossain, Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh). Voices of America.

Fine, S. & Ypi, L. (2016). Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership. Oxford University Press, 32-56.

Government of People’s Republic of Bangladesh (2016). “Ashrayan Prakalpa”. http://www.ashrayanpmo.gov.bd/site/page/5e75d465-34fa-48a6-b1af-54b983a666d7/). Accessed: 2 December 2020

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HRW (2018). ‘Bangladesh Is Not My Country’ The Plight of Rohingya Refugees from Myanmar.  https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/08/05/bangladesh-not-my-country/plight-rohingya-refugees-myanmar. Accessed: 2 December 2020

HRW (2019). Joint Letter to Prime Minister Hasina on Bhasan Char. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/12/joint-letter-prime-minister-hasina-bhasan-char. Accessed: 2 December 2020

HRW (2020). Bangladesh: Cyclone Endangers Rohingya on Silt Island. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/20/bangladesh-cyclone-endangers-rohingya-silt-island. Accessed: 2 December 2020

Marsh, S. & Ahmed, R. (2019). ‘Our only aim is to go home’: Rohingya refugees face stark choice. The Guardian.

OHCHR (2019). End of mission statement by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24114&LangID=E. Accessed: 2 December 2020

Rahman, S. A. (2017). Plan to move Rohingya to remote island prompts fears of human catastrophe. The Guardian.

Refugees International (2019). Statement: Refugees International Warns Against Relocating Rohingya to Bhashan Char Island. https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2019/3/28/refugees-international-warns-against-relocating-rohingya-to-bhashan-char-island. Accessed: 2 December 2020

UHCHR (2019). Oral statement by Ms Yanghee Lee, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar at the 40th session of the Human Rights Council. https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24299. Accessed: 2 December 2020

UN OCHA (2018). “Myanmar Humanitarian Brief”, 2. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA%20Myanmar%20Humanitarian%20Brief%20-%20September%202018.pdf. Accessed: 2 December 2020

UNHCR (2018), Submission on Bangladesh: 30th UPR session. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b081ec94.html. Accessed: 2 December 2020

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Zieck, M. (2018). Refugees and the Right to Freedom of Movement: From Flight to Return. Michigan Journal of International Law, 39(1), 85.

More than 700,000 people of the persecuted Rohingya minority of Myanmar have fled to neighboring Bangladesh following the military crackdown launched against them in August of 2017. Housing temporarily in the Bangladeshi south-eastern region of Cox’s Bazar, along with previously dwelling Rohingya refugees, the region is now home to over nine hundred thousand Rohingya refugees. The overcrowded refugee camps in the region is the biggest refugee camp in the entire world. Approximately 52% of the people there are females, who are persistently vulnerable to harassment and exploitation, coupled with stigma.

Many of the women crossed the border alone and in a lot of the cases with little children. Despite having fled their persecution, Rohingya women and girls face additional threats: violence, vulnerability to abuse, limited mobility, human trafficking, harassment, and suppression of their speech in their communities. Access to humanitarian assistance and certainty of their rights within the camps are highly influenced by cultural norms and societal habits within the community. Absence of institutions, inadequacy of the ones that exist and the lack of implementation due to a variety of reasons is just one of the imaginable reasons for gender gaps. Other elements of psychosocial challenges include the issues surrounding psychosomatic characteristics of women due to past trauma and stigma within the community.

Women in a crisis: Caught in a Limbo

In 2007, Pittway described the horrendous situation of the two registered Rohingya refugee camps in Nayapara and Kutupalong. “In 30 years in the field, I have never before been in an established camp where the fear was so palpable and pervasive and where malnutrition and poverty was so rife. Corruption, rape, sexual abuse, abductions, trafficking, organized prostitution, including of children, ration fraud and a systematized regime of terror has left a population of at least 26,000 refugees in a state of trauma and with little or no hope for the future. I have never seen so many ‘sexualized’ children. Deaths from malnutrition and untreated medical conditions are common. These refugees have been living in the camps for up to 15 years.”^[1] At that time, the improvised refugee camps, where the refugees had been living since the mid-1970s, were described as one of the worst in the world, with little aid, constant violence, and exploitation. One characteristic of the camps was gender-specific violence.

According to Pittway, girls as young as nine years of age were abducted and married by locals. Child prostitution was encouraged within the camps, while women and girls were also trafficked into the nearby sex markets in the city. It was reported that some were abducted by local police, military, and civilians and that children of rape are being aborted in unhealthy and life-threatening manners in the camps.

Twelve years later, little has changed. Even though there have been significant improvements in the provision of rations, institutions as well as other services in the refugee camps, the causes of insecurity persist. In a news report by International Organization for Migration (IOM) security of women was named to be the one of the most pressing issue in the camps right now, particularly due to cases of kidnapping and that the lack of sufficient electricity in the camps makes the area more vulnerable to abductors and traffickers at night. More personal impediments for refugee women are categorized into two main tendencies: First, the past stigma and refusal, which records the misery and rejection of the past traumas of the Rohingya women by themselves; second, psychosomatic impacts, which highlights the issue of a high degree of mental health problems due to past and present oppressions they have faced; third, there is much contention regarding capacities and participations.

            i. The Past, Stigma and Refusal

‘Widespread sexual violence perpetrated by Myanmar military soldiers has been a hallmark of the culture of abuse and impunity in Burma’s decades-long civil war with its ethnic groups, the Rohingya.’ – Human Rights Watch

In May of 2018, it was reported that almost every woman and girl has experienced “patterns of rape, gang rape, forced nudity and abduction for the purpose of sexual slavery during military campaigns of slaughter, looting and the razing of homes and villages.” As a result, UN officials estimated in mid-2018 that there were about 40,000 pregnant Rohingya women ready to give birth. NGOs have since made efforts to find women and young girls to ensure healthy births.  “The stigma of a pregnancy as a result of rape makes it very hard for [women] to come out openly with the fact of their pregnancy,” as it was put by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten. The socio-economic consequences coupled with a lifetime of psychosomatic impacts coupled with stigma, scar the women and children of rape^[2].

            ii. Psychosomatic Impacts

The women are vulnerable to a wide range of mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. Issues of concern within the emergency and post-emergency operation in Bangladesh include the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, lack of privacy and safe spaces and limited access to integrated psychosocial and mental health support remain issues of concern. Studies show high levels of symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (36%) and depression (89%) in the refugee camps of Kutupalong and Nayapara.

Suicidal thoughts are reportedly common among the Rohingya people in the refugee camps and elsewhere. This is linked to the strong sense of hopelessness due to displacement and unpromising prospects for the future. As Islam prohibits suicide, women refuse to express their suicidal thoughts to family and friends. According to a report by IOM, 62% of women with young children expressed suicidal thoughts in 2018. More consequences include visual or auditory hallucinations, psychoses, and manic states. Other than that, women have also reported emotional distress and burning sensations.

            iii. Institutions & Participants: Are They on the Same Page?

The antenatal and postnatal period of motherhood are critical periods for both the mother and the baby. To guide them through these important times, not only healthcare centers, but also nutrition centers set up by various NGOs play an essential role in maintaining the healthy lifestyle of women and children. However, despite being in place around the refugee camps, many women prefer to not take advantage of these institutions. Instead,  they often opt for home births as opposed to giving birth at medical centers based on traditional reasons and pressure from their community.

Their reluctance to seek formal mental health assistance is the limited understanding of concepts of mental health and counseling or knowledge of where to seek services. Due to the lack of education and awareness regarding mental health issues, the Rohingya community has a low familiarity with the importance of such a burning issue. With religious roots being at the center of support and strength for the Rohingya people, reserving to traditional healers is a prevalent tendency within the refugee camps. As with physical health, the women also prefer not seeking established medical assistance when it comes to mental health as traditional healing methods play an essential role in Rohingya culture. One must also keep in mind the limited number of female refugees who do seek this informal, more customary form of assistance.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations: The Future of Rohingya Females in Refugee Camps

Rohingya women are prone to mental frangibility due to past traumatic experience. Due to previously experiencing gender-based discrimination and sexual exploitation, the women in the camps are still in constant fear for their safety and security.

By now, women and girls are provided with various work programs. They are often trained beforehand. For example, Nur Kaidia, an adolescent Rohingya girl, completed her two-month tailoring course at the UN Women-Constructed Multi-Purpose Women Center. And now she can make clothes for herself and her family as well as taking orders from neighbors, there by supporting herself and her family through the skill that she acquired^[3]. Other than that, around 295 women are participating in World Vision’s initiative of work. Hamida is one of the women involved in the program; she is breaking the barrier of Rohingya refugees’ conservative Muslim culture and says that, “We don’t care what kind of work we are given. We fill bags with sand and cement, level pathways and weave bamboo fences while men do the heavier work.” Most of the women employed under this program are young widows. The Women Centre also provides women with counseling to develop their psychosocial condition and to strengthen their position in the society. While there have been some stellar progresses made to free the refugee women from the tainted bars of stigma and bring them on their feet, the pace of the progress remains limited, as most have been reached out to, yet only a few have participated.

Image: @Dhaka Tribune

[1] Pittaway, E. “The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection Regime.” Research Gate, accessed 07 November 2019.

[2] Gender Reflection: Two Years of Rohingya Refugee Response (September 2019) (ReliefWeb, 2019), p. 1, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/gender_reflections_sept19.pdf

[3] Gender in Humanitarian Action Brief No. 5 (July 2018) (Inter Sector Coordination Group, 2018) https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/iscg_giha_brief_no._5_gender_equality_interventions_adolescent_rohingya_girls_and_boys_-_final30july2018.pdf

The transformation from threat to ‘benefactor’ has enabled China to talk the international community into thinking that it has both the ability and willingness to be a great power. It is deeply enshrined in “China’s new way”, propagated by Zheng Bijiang, Deputy Head of the Ministry of Propaganda, as early as 1978. The most dramatic change in other states’ reception of China can be identified in the developing countries of Asia and Africa. But this transformation is also becoming partly apparent in some industrialized countries – and results largely from the Middle Kingdom’s growing soft power. To evaluate this ‘weapon in Beijing’s foreign policy arsenal’, a clear definition is necessary.

Soft power, in contrast to Max Weber’s concept of power characterized by coercion, is based on the ability to attract people and to shape their preferences – Joseph Nye’s carrot and stick (Nye 1990: 153). Unlike “asserting one’s own will even against resistance” (Weber 1980: 28), attraction often leads to tolerance. The soft power of a country is based primarily on three resources: its culture (or the cultural aspects that are attractive to others), its political values (as long as it lives up to them nationally and internationally) and its foreign policy (if it is recognized as legitimate and has moral authority).

Public Diplomacy: „Propaganda work is spiritual work”

On the other hand, public diplomacy – as a means of promoting soft power – is understood as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and cultures, as well as its national goals and current policies” (Tuch 1990: 20). Aptly referring to China, the aspect of influencing a foreign government by influencing its people can be added. Public diplomacy, as part of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, thus serves different levels of expectations of the above-mentioned broad foreign public. “Public diplomacy is an important tool in the arsenal of smart power, but smart public diplomacy requires an understanding of the role of credibility, self-criticism, and the role of civil society in generating soft power” (Nye 2008: 108). It is therefore a struggle over winning hearts and minds.

The development of China’s public diplomacy must be seen in the context of the development of its diplomacy as a whole, as well as its economic rise and its political core interests. Usually, public diplomacy and foreign policy differ de facto in the instruments and objectives used. In the People’s Republic of China however, foreign policy, diplomacy and public diplomacy cannot be separated in the classical sense, what is mainly due to the historical significance of propaganda work.

China’s public diplomacy tools

Based on this framework, five categories of Chinese public diplomacy are served: information diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, financial diplomacy and elite diplomacy. The Chinese government chooses the means according to its needs in order to drive bringing positive messages about its own culture, values and attitudes to the public forward.

Information and cultural diplomacy are graded as ‘classic one-way communication’ in the sense of a push-strategy. The broad audience is reached by the commercial sector – painting and calligraphy, literature, traditional Chinese medicine and Chinese cuisine – through institutions like radio broadcasts, international television and, with regards to the promotion of the Chinese language, Confucius Institutes. In the media sector, Xinhua News, a mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China (CPC), is particularly noteworthy. According to founding father Mao Zedong, the agency’s raison d’être was above all to send journalists abroad and let the world hear China’s voice (Custer 2018: 8). In 2020, Xinhua News runs more than 170 foreign offices through the use of local media. The non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borders classifies Xinhua as “the largest propaganda agency in the world” (Reporters Without Borders 2005), which is nothing more than the lynchpin of state media control. Another field of cultural propaganda is the dissemination of Confucian values, which still form Chinese society today and which structurally shapes the way relationships are build.[1]

In comparison, financial diplomacy, exchange diplomacy and elite diplomacy are part of the ‘two-way communication’ in the context of push- and pull-strategies. The first is limited to the four categories that are most visible to citizens as well as Heads of State or Government: Infrastructure investment, humanitarian aid, budget support and debt relief. In the East Asia Pacific region alone, funds from 2000 to 2016 amounted to over USD 48 billion – a sum, only fundable because of Beijing’s massive economic power. The latter strengthens personal relationships both on social and management level, which are closely linked to the academic work of the Confucius Institutes and their awarding of attractive scholarships. According to UNESCO, 178,271 students spent an exchange semester on mainland China in 2018 – more than twice as many as in 2012. 193 universities offered Confucius scholarships to students of various disciplines, partly tied to the condition of promoting Chinese language training in their respective home country. Lastly, twin cities are also subsumed as exchange diplomacy tools, since they strengthen interaction between representatives of the local economy and their Chinese counterparts (Custer 2018: 12).

Self-portrayal

The CPC’s own account of its diplomacy strategy differs in part considerably from that of Western authors (Jin et al.: 2017). As a global player, the People’s Republic would pursue values such as peace, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, without subordinating its own core interests to any of these values. Security and cooperation as well as innovation and civil exchange would be characterized by harmony, but not by uniformity. President Xi Jinping describes his country’s diplomacy as a gatekeeper of unity between stability and flexibility, located between justice and the pursuit of interests, and between words and deeds. Since partnership should not automatically equate friendship, a clear distinction between diplomatic relations based on trust, on the one hand, and strategically reciprocal relations, on the other, has to be emphasized. Xi’s increasingly proactive diplomacy is based on four pillars: Great countries diplomacy (aimed at rebuilding good relations with the United States of America, Russia and the European Union), neighborhood diplomacy, partnership diplomacy and global governance. In the course of partnership diplomacy, Beijing has meanwhile concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements with over 90 countries or organizations.

Conclusion

This analysis has provided an introductory insight into the mode of operation of Chinese soft power and public diplomacy in international relations. The marketing of one’s own culture, the approximation of one’s own values and the global expansion of economic influence can undeniably be regarded as overriding goals. The essential question in the assessment is which theoretical approach is appropriate.

Starting from an analytical perspective, Nye created clearly definable categories. However, his partially very simplistic separation into hard power and soft power can be criticized as too under-complex. In fact, representatives of the China-based academy argue that the identification of a power resource as hard or soft is not fixed from the outset, but rather depends on the perception and feelings of the respective actors in individual situations. While large parts of the hard power aspects are clearly located within the state, the allocation of soft power tools is often not so clear-cut.

Finally, it can be said that Beijing still feels a certain deficit of soft power: “While China’s economic prowess impresses much of the world, its authoritarian political system and mercantilist business practices tarnish its reputation” (Shambaugh 2015: 99). The structural problem results, however, is not in the lack of soft power, but in its instrumentalization for hard power – or, to put it bluntly, hiding hard power in a velvet glove. The “peace” in the country’s concept of a peaceful rise to superpower can therefore be called into question.

[1] Worth mentioning are guanxi and mianzi, multi-meaning words that most likely translate to ‘relationship’ and ‘face’. Guanxi relationships on an individual human level are based on reciprocity. Mianzi or prestige is given through social recognition and withdrawn through disregard. Both are essential for building professional networks.

Bibliography

Custer, Samantha; Russell, Brooke; DiLorenzo, Matthew; Cheng, Mengfan; Ghose, Siddhartha; Sims, Jacob, Turner, Jennifer; Desai, Harsh (2018): Ties that Bind. Quantifying China’s public diplomacy and its “good neighbor” effect, Williamsburg: AidData at William & Mary.

Jin, Canrong; Dai, Weilai; Zhou, Xinyu; Sun, Xihui; Wang, Shushen; Kang, Xiao et al. (2017): China’s Wisdom, China’s Diplomacy since the 18th CPC National Congress, Beijing: China Renmin University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. 1990: Soft Power, in: Foreign Policy 20 (80).

Nye, Joseph S. 2008: Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, in: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (616).

Reporters Without Borders 2005: Xinhua: The largest propaganda agency in the world, Berlin.

Shambaugh, David 2015: China‘s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect, in: Foreign Affairs 94 (4).

Tuch, Hans N. 1990: Communicating with the world: U.S. public diplomacy overseas, New York: St. Martin’s.

Weber, Max 1980: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie, 5. ed., Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

The Indo-Chinese border, or “Line of Actual Control”, is among the longest borders in the world. Certain parts of the border have been subject to dispute between the two most populous countries in the world. The root lies in 1914 when a border was determined by the British Empire without the consent of the Republic of China.

The area is strategically, economically and militarily important to both India and China. The two nuclear powers have a long history of border disputes with a total of eleven territorial disputes today. In 1962, a brief war erupted as a result of several violent incidents and lasted for a month, leaving thousands of soldiers dead or imprisoned. Now, there are thousands of troops on each side, but there have been no casualties since 1967.

In August of 2019, the Indian parliament decided to end the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir and reconstitute Ladakh to a union territory. These actions were criticized as an affront to Chinese territorial integrity as both India and China claim parts of the area. Increased road construction work by India in the region added fuel to the fire. Similarly, China expanded its work on new infrastructure and deployed more troops, which was consequently criticized by India. Now, both side’s forces are in close proximity and the risk of confrontation is high.

India faces an increasing imbalance of military means compared to the Chinese military which dominates in most criteria. Also, closer relations between India and the United States anger China as the two countries share rather anti-Chinese views. Likewise, China actively expands relations with Pakistan, sharing anti-Indian views.

All this poses the question, whether and how the Indo-Chinese border conflict will proceed. The war in 1962 was preceded by similar tensions and incidents. The two countries have remained cautious for a long time; however, the conflict potential is immense. China claims about 90.000 square kilometres currently controlled by India. Several attempts to resolve the conflict have not shown significant success. More conflict would have significant consequences for regional security. Both the Chinese and Indian governments will not accept a shift of the border to their disadvantage.

However, both the Chinese and the Indian government have announced their intention to defuse the situation and maintain peace in the disputed areas. The two countries maintain substantial multilateral cooperation, e.g. through BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Especially at a time of economic decline and the Covid-19 pandemic, non-military actions are more likely options for both conflict partners.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.