Auch neben der Ausrichtung der WM versucht Katar zunehmend international Einfluss zu nehmen, so sollen 2019 44,78 Milliarden Dollar Direktinvestitionen in über 80 Länder geflossen sein. Dabei wird einerseits in den Sport investiert, so ist Qatar Sports Investments beispielsweise der Eigentümer des vielfachen französischen Meisters Paris Saint-Germain FC. Daneben wurde jüngst Interesse am englischen Schwergewicht Manchester United FC bekundet. Andererseits diversifiziert Katar aktiv sein Aktienportfolio bei europäischen Unternehmen: In Deutschland hält Katar beispielsweise 12% der Anteile an Hapag-Lloyd, 9% an RWE und 11% an VW, in Großbritannien gehören den Kataris unter anderem 20% der Anteile am Flughafen Heathrow, 15% an der Supermarktkette Sainsbury’s sowie 8% an der Londoner Börse. In anderen europäischen Ländern fällt die Statistik vergleichbar aus.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber ist seit 2015 Professor für Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens an der FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg und unter anderem auch Vorstandsmitglied der Deutschen Arbeitsgemeinschaft Vorderer Orient (DAVO). Im Interview spricht Prof. Demmelhuber über die jüngsten Entwicklungen in Katar sowie die politischen Ambitionen des Landes.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber, welche geopolitischen Interessen verfolgt Katar, bis vor kurzem noch ein vergleichsweise armer Wüstenstaat, nach außen?

“Sportpolitische Investments sehe ich erstens als Vehikel, um politische und ökonomische Gestaltungsmacht zu zeigen und sich als internationaler Austragungsort von sportlichen Großveranstaltungen zu inszenieren und damit ein positives Bild des Landes auszusenden. Zweitens dient es als Legitimitätsressource gegenüber den eigenen Staatsbürger*innen und drittens sind Investments beispielsweise in zahlreiche DaxKonzerne durch den katarischen Staatsfonds als langfristige Strategie zu verstehen, die Wirtschaft für das Post-Öl-Zeitalter zu diversifizieren.”

Inwiefern unterscheiden sich die Interessen und die Entwicklung Katars von denen anderer Golfstaaten? 

“Bis vor wenigen Jahren begriff man die Golfstaaten, allesamt Mitglied des Golfkooperationsrat, als epistemische Gemeinschaft, quasi eine durch monarchische Solidarität verbundene Schicksalsgemeinschaft. Dieses Argument hat in den letzten Jahren massiv an Erklärungskraft verloren. Sicherlich ist der Golfkooperationsrat – im Vergleich z.B. zur Arabischen Liga – ein sehr effektiver regionaler Kooperationsmechanismus. Das darf aber nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass wir es mit einem lebhaften intra-regionalen Wettbewerb zu tun haben, bei dem Saudi- Arabien für sich selbst die Führungsrolle beansprucht.“

Die Führungsrolle Saudi-Arabiens kam ja auch bei der Blockade von Katar zwischen 2017 und 2021 zum Vorschein. Mittlerweile hat sich das Verhältnis weitgehend normalisiert, ein Team aus Saudi-Arabien ist letztlich zur WM angereist, der saudi- arabische Kronprinz war ebenso anwesend. Doch damals wurden die Grenzen geschlossen, viele diplomatische Beziehungen zu anderen arabischen Staaten ausgesetzt. Begründet wurde dieser Schritt vor allem mit der angeblichen katarischen Unterstützung von islamischem Terrorismus.

Welche Gründe hatten schließlich zur Aufhebung der Blockade geführt?

„Die vollständige Blockade des Landes durch das sogenannte Quartett (angeführt von SaudiArabien, gefolgt von Bahrain, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) und Ägypten) scheiterte kläglich an seiner (von Beginn an) unrealistischen Zielsetzung. Katar konnte sich dem Würgegriff seiner Nachbarn erfolgreich entziehen und dem Handelsembargo trotzen. Nach vier Jahren erkannten die Anrainer Katars, dass der regionalpolitische Kollateralschaden einer dauerhaften Blockade höher ist, als der einer Verständigung. Dennoch, ich wage zu behaupten, die Nationalmannschaft von Saudi-Arabien wäre auch während eines Boykotts angetreten und zwar analog zu Katar 2019 bei den asiatischen Fußballmeisterschaften in den VAE. Katar schmiss die Gastgeber im Halbfinale mit 4:0 aus dem Turnier. Am Ende schreibt der Fußball die besten Geschichten.“

Dabei war diese Fußballmeisterschaft auch im Westen stark umstritten und vielen ein Dorn im Auge. Zum einen sollen tausende Gastarbeiter, die in prekären Verhältnissen auf den Baustellen für die WM gearbeitet haben, gestorben sein. Von drei- bis fünfzehntausend Toten ist Schätzungen zufolge die Rede. Zum anderen die schwerwiegenden Eingriffe in LGBTQIA+-Rechte: Nach Artikel 201 des Strafgesetzbuchs aus dem Jahr 1971 werden gleichgeschlechtliche sexuelle Handlungen mit bis zu fünf Jahren Freiheitsstrafe, mitunter sogar der Todesstrafe, bestraft. In Erinnerung blieb lebhaft die Skandalaussage des katarischen WM- Botschafters, „Schwulsein sei ein geistiger Schaden”. Schließlich ist das Land auch mit Blick auf die Frauenrechtslage weit von der Gleichberechtigung entfernt. So bedürfen Frauen beispielsweise einer Erlaubnis des männlichen Vormunds, wenn sie heiraten oder in einem öffentlichen Job arbeiten wollen. Sie sind damit abhängig von ihren männlichen Familienmitgliedern. Nach dem Kritikhagel an der Menschenrechtslage, kündigte Katar einige Änderungen im Vorfeld der WM an.

Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber, gibt es jetzt, einige Monate später, spürbare nachhaltige Verbesserungen oder waren diese Änderungen nur ein Trugbild, wie zuvor vielerorts befürchtet?

„Im Vorfeld der WM wurden Menschenrechte massiv verletzt. Katar ist dabei kein Einzelfall, sondern reiht sich ein in eine lange Liste an autokratisch regierten Ländern, in denen aktuell 70 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung leben. Dennoch hat die kritische Debatte über Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Katar in den vergangenen Jahren Veränderungen mit sich gebracht und dem Regime ein gewisses Maß an Reformbereitschaft abgerungen, die zu einigen graduellen Verbesserungen führte (z.B. Abschaffung des Kafala-Systems**). Gleichzeitig müssen wir jedoch auch ehrlich anerkennen, wo Kritik und politischer Aktivismus leider nicht zu positiven Ergebnissen geführt haben. Die europäischen Solidaritätsbekundungen mit den LGBTQIA+ Communities im Nahen Osten sind wichtig, jedoch schlussfolgern Aktivist*innen aus der Region, dass sie sich nicht als konstruktiv erwiesen haben. Im Gegenteil führten sie zu einer Exponierung der vormals unter dem Radar laufenden LGBTQIA+-Räume, sodass sich die Situation für die Community und ihre Mitstreiter*innen zusätzlich verschlechtert hat. Es gibt viel Raum für konstruktive Debatten, aber wir dürfen diese nicht ohne die lokalen Aktivist*innen führen.“

Die Kritik bleibt bestehen, trotzdem unterhält Katar weiter die traditionell guten Beziehungen zu Europa und USA. Auf der einen Seite steht das im November 2022 geschlossene Gaslieferungsabkommen mit Deutschland, auf der anderen die Kritik an dem WM-Standort seitens mehrerer deutschen Bundesminister. Auf der einen Seite der US-amerikanische Militärstützpunkt in Katar, auf der anderen der Unterschlupf der Taliban nur wenige Kilometer weiter, den Katar ihnen jahrelang gewährt. Und das trotz ihres seit Dekaden andauernden Ringens mit den Amerikanern um die Vorherrschaft in Afghanistan.

Inwiefern passt das zusammen?

„Ich sehe da keinen großen Widerspruch. Katar inszeniert sich seit den 1990er Jahren in einer regionalpolitischen Vermittlerrolle und hat in zahlreichen Konflikten der Region mit unterschiedlichem Erfolg vermittelt. Allerdings bekam das Bild des neutralen Vermittlers im Nachgang zu den arabischen Umbrüchen ab 2011 tiefe Kratzer, da die Außenpolitik mitsamt dem Medienkonglomerat von al-Jazeera sehr klar Partei ergriff und unter anderem die Präsidentschaft Mursi in Ägypten aus dem Lager der Muslimbruderschaft politisch und finanziell unterstützte.“

Letzteres war wohl auch mitursächlich für die Beziehungskrise mit Saudi-Arabien, das die Muslimbruderschaft 2014 auch als terroristische Organisation eingestuft hatte. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die katarische Herrscherdynastie Al-Thani, seit 1822 an der Macht, durch geschickte Außenpolitik und dem versierten Einsatz von sogenannter Soft Power, ihre Machtstellung in der Region deutlich verbessern konnte. Das geopolitische Kalkül könnte darauf ausgelegt sein, sich unentbehrlich zu machen, womöglich auch als Schutz vor dem erheblich größeren Nachbarn Saudi-Arabien, das als Regionalmacht die Führungsrolle für sich beansprucht. Historisch gesehen wäre auch die Angst vor einem Einmarsch jedenfalls nicht gänzlich unbegründet, wie der irakische Überfall auf Kuwait 1990 zeigt.

Um Katar auf der Weltbühne besser zu positionieren, wird der natürliche Ressourcenreichtum des Landes (drittgrößte Erdgas- und neuntgrößte Erdöl- Vorkommen der Welt) aktiv für milliardenschwere Investitionen rund um den Globus verwendet, außerdem werden außenpolitische Partnerschaften ausgebaut. Die luxuriöse Ausrichtung der WM in Doha reiht sich dabei nahtlos als ein weiterer Baustein dieser Soft Power-Strategie ein. Und wie das neue Gaslieferungsabkommen mit Deutschland zeigt, ist die Aufmerksamkeit des Westens für die Probleme der Menschen in Katar nur von kurzlebiger Natur. Am Ende stehen die eigenen politische Interessen im Vordergrund.

Bester Dank gilt Prof. Dr. Demmelhuber für die ausführliche Beantwortung der Fragen und damit die interessante Beleuchtung dieses Themas!

*Anm. der Redaktion: Das Motto wird Pierre de Coubertin (1863-1937), dem Initiator der Olympischen Spiele der Neuzeit, zugeschrieben.

**Anm. der Redaktion: Nach dem Kafala-System wurden den vielen Arbeiter*innen vorwiegend asiatischer Herkunft ihre Reisepässe als Bedingung für die  Einreise einbezogen. Damit wurden ihre Ausreise und potenzielle Jobwechsel erschwert. Offiziell wurde das System 2015 abgeschafft.

Quellen: Die Nachweise katarischer Anteile bei den aufgelisteten Unternehmen sind einsehbar auf den entsprechenden Websites (zuletzt abgerufen am 11.04.2023), im Einzelnen unter:

www.volkswagenag.com/de/InvestorRelations/shares/shareholder-structure.html

www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/company/ir/share/shareholder-structure.html

www.rwe.com/en/investor-relations/rwe-share/share-at-a-glance/shareholder-structure/

www.heathrow.com/company/about-heathrow

www.about.sainsburys.co.uk/investors/major-shareholders

www.lseg.com/en/investor-relations/significant-shareholders

As a young think tank, we want to open a dialogue between young people from diverse backgrounds. Your submission should deal with the above-mentioned topics. Analyses (ca. 1,500 words) and opinion pieces (ca. 500 words) on current affairs should engage critically with past and current movements. After a peer-reviewing process with CISS’s regional division (can take up to 6-8 weeks), a series of successful articles will be published on CISS’s website.

Please see the guidelines attached for further information. Article submissions are accepted on a rolling basis until October 1, 2021. Send your submission (English or German) in Microsoft Word Format to CISS’s Regional Co-Director for the MENA region Lena Gomer, at lena.gomer@ciss.eu.

What is the history of European action and aid in the Palestinian Territories?

According to the OECD database, from 2012 to 2016, 45% of the total funds spent on the Palestinian Territories came from European donors (Wildeman, 2018). Having adopted a direct state-building role towards the Palestinian Authority since the Oslo Accords, the EU is trying to position itself as a central link in the completion of a two-state solution, connecting its efforts in conflict resolution to substantial development assistance. While the European Community’s first financial assistance to the Palestinians dates back to 1971, and the European Council’s 1980 Venice Declaration recognises the Palestinians’ “legitimate rights” to existence and security (Muzu, 2010), since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU has been committed to financially supporting the peace process (Al-Fattal, 2010). In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) born in 1995, the post of EU Special Representative in the Middle East was created in November 1996 to give a presence, visibility and political impetus in the region to the EU’s efforts to contribute to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Al-Fattal, 2010).

These post-Oslo developments were accompanied by declarations setting out the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Berlin Declaration of March 1999 affirmed the desire for the establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel, a settlement of the situation in Jerusalem and a just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee question. These positions were complemented by the 2002 Seville Declaration, in which the EU stressed that the 1967 borders proposed by the UN (symbolised by the Green Line) should be the basis for a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement (Bouris, 2014). In line with these statements, the EU is trying to be involved in the negotiations beyond its economic role, as in the Sharm el-Sheikh II meeting in October 2000, trying to limit the violence at the time of the second intifada. In the same vein, the EU participates in the Middle East Quartet, created in June 2002. With the European Security and Defence Policy, the creation of EUPOL COPPS at the end of 2005 was allowed, a mission to support the reform of the Palestinian security sector (Al-Fattal, 2010).

Since then, with the exception of the period of Hamas rule of the Palestinian Authority, the EU’s political position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not significantly changed. The EU is positioning itself as the warden of the two-state solution and the Oslo agreements, denouncing both the authoritarian excesses of the Palestinian Authority and the violations of international law by the Israelis, including its settlement policy. Beyond funding to the Palestinian Authority, the EU also assists projects in East Jerusalem to support the Palestinian community and public institutions in the city, and to preserve its Arab cultural heritage. The vast majority of EU aid is channelled through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which has been providing aid to states around the Mediterranean since 2008. Of the 16 countries included in the Southern Partnership, the Palestinian Territories currently receive between 15 and 20% of the funds spent, making them the main recipients of this aid, along with Morocco.

But if the EU’s aid toward the Palestinians is articulated by the Joint European Strategy in Support of Palestine, the situation of failure in which the peace process finds itself more than 25 years after the Oslo agreements – and the difficult economic conditions for the Palestinians- illustrate the limits of European action. Many non-governmental organisations (Oxfam, 2007), criticise the action – or inaction – of European donors, who, by contributing to a prejudicial status quo, are partly ethically responsible for the current situation. As an actor with substantial financial and political weight, the European Union has encountered several limits in the implementation of its aid to the Palestinian Territories, and in particular in the way it is linked to the policy conducted regarding the conflict.

Anatomy of a failure, European conditioning against the tide?

Aid as an obstacle to the reunification of Palestinian factions: Officially, European aid to the Palestinian Authority is untied – not directly conditioned – in order to allow greater efficiency. However, from a political point of view, this support implies the validation of guarantees by the Palestinian Authority. It is thus placed within the framework of the Quartet and its demands, requiring the commitment of the Palestinian government to the principle of non-violence, the recognition of Israel and the acceptance of existing agreements and obligations, including security cooperation with the Israeli services (Hinnebusch, 2003). This conditionality deliberately favours moderate Palestinian actors, potential “partners for peace”, while side-lining Hamas. In the context of the 2006 elections won by Hamas, the demands made led the EU to participate in the international boycott of the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. Such a move also made it more difficult for the Palestinians to achieve a political reconciliation between the main factions, essential in negotiating a two-state solution with a sole legitimate actor representing all the Palestinians. The collapse of the national unity government and the war in Gaza, leading to the situation of territorial division that persists to this day, were partly caused by this inability of the Palestinian factions to agree on the demands of the international community and the EU. By fuelling the internal Palestinian split, by participating in setting preconditions for inter-Palestinian negotiations, the EU is directly sacrificing its objectives of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it considers the current ruling actors within the Palestinian Authority as the only credible ones to achieve the objective of a two-state solution (EU Commission Insider, 2020), a position that does not allow for any progress towards unblocking the current situation.

A Helpless Aid in the Face of Violations of International Law from Israel: The EU’s practical inability to link its aid or partnerships to strong demands is also reflected in the EU’s relations with Israel. The latter, through its continuous policy of occupation and settlement, violates international law and contradicts the Oslo agreements it has signed. Through the recurrent destruction of infrastructure built by development and humanitarian actors, often financed by the European Union itself, Israel contribute to the destruction of the possibility of a two-state solution and to prevent Palestinian economic development (Shikaki, 2019). While the EU has repeatedly insisted that all settlement activity is illegal under international law, endangers the two-state solution and undermines the prospects for a lasting peace, it is abundantly clear that it will not punish Israel or deny it the benefits it offers through their agreements. Despite Israel’s behaviour, the EU has signed more than a dozen bilateral agreements with Israel, complementing the comprehensive association agreement signed in 1995, in areas such as police cooperation (2018), development (2018), aviation (2013) and agriculture (2012). The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for a third of its total exports. And while most agreements are conditional on respect for “common values”, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law or fundamental freedoms, Israel’s repeated violations of some of these values have not led the EU to suspend these agreements as it has the right to do (Dajani and Lovatt, 2017). As a result, the EU is contributing to an Israeli sense of impunity for the occupation, preventing the establishment of safeguards that would allow Israel to continue its occupation.

The EU’s weakness towards the attitudes of its allies and the political under-utilisation of its foreign aid and partnerships, whether for the Palestinian Authority or Israel, clearly limits its weight in the political resolution of the conflict. While this weakness is multifactorial and can be explained by the links forged between the EU and these different actors, it is also justified internally by the functioning of a multilateral organisation that has to deal with divergent opinions, and does not favour taking a clear-cut position.

The EU, between the complex construction of its policy and divergent national positions.

Many of the 27 EU Member States have different histories, cultures and foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. When dealing with an issue as divisive as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, agreeing on a common position that would allow the economic weight of aid to be used to carry political weight can seem complex. Thus, while the majority of EU members share a set of convictions in favour of a two-state solution, defining “a strategy to make it happen” and agreeing on the steps to be taken seems much more complex. Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations from 1999 to 2004, explained that “it is easier to go from A to Z than from A to B.” (Le More, 2010). This problem can be highlighted beyond the issue of the peace process and reflects the complex institutional structure of the EU. For example, almost all decisions regarding the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy have to be taken unanimously. Within this framework, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is supposed to bring the European states together on various aspects of their external action. However, although the High Representative represents them within the Quartet, this role remains institutionally weak and incapable of completely replacing the states in international negotiations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

With regard to relations with Israel and Palestine, the differences in positions between EU states are clearly visible and explains the lack of political will to use politically European aid. As example, Ireland appears to be the most active in criticising Israel today, relying on the numerous studies creating parallels between its relations with Northern Ireland and the situation between Israel and the Palestinian Territories (The Economist, 2017). On another side, France appears to be the country most committed to international peace efforts today, while conversely Hungary is the state that is most energetic in blocking joint EU statements criticising Israel. These divisions between EU member states, combined with other factors, negatively affect the European willingness and ability to take action towards Israel or towards a Palestinian reconciliation. These are fostered by the Israeli government’s active policies to drive a wedge between EU member states, undermine EU unity on the issue and paralyse European decision-making (Asseburg and Goren, 2017). As an example, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s relations with the illiberal governments of Central and Eastern Europe contribute to this fragmentation. Similarly, the Holocaust and the history of antisemitism in Europe make many EU member states, most notably Germany, uncomfortable toward any position criticising Israeli policies, which Netanyahu plays on by equating any opposition to his policies with antisemitic posturing (Cypel, 2020).

What role for Europeans in Israel and the Palestinian Territories?

The need for European unity to act in the face of repeated Israeli violations of international law and to seize the political dividends of development aid to the Palestinian Territories seems impossible to achieve in the current context. However, a minimum consensus might be sufficient for the EU to be more present at the diplomatic level and to assert a credible position at the international level. In the same way that the EU was able to react very quickly to condemn the “Deal of the Century” peace plan proposed by Donald Trump at the beginning of 2020, several actions and evolutions in the EU’s positions are possible. They are a current necessity for Europeans, in order to really take action and revive the two-state solution.

Thus, the alignment of European positions with international law, notably by demanding that Israel respect its obligations as an occupying power with regard to International Humanitarian Law is a first essential step to be taken. Associating these demands with real threats of triggering procedures for suspending or reviewing existing trade agreements could already put a new pressure on Israel, without leading to an internal revolution in the EU. Similarly, adopting tougher guidelines at the European level to prohibit linkage between public funds and Israeli settlement-linked activities or entities would be a strong signal.  Expelling those from the commercial partnership agreements would also be in line with the current EU position, translating into acts the condemnations already issued. For the Union itself, unlocking such a capacity could prove promising in terms of foreign policy, giving it the means to realise its new desire to carry more weight at the geopolitical level, as well as fostering it credibility toward foreign actors, an asset in any political or commercial negotiation.

With regard to the Palestinians, the tightening of the conditions for the allocation of international aid to the Palestinian Authority would help placing more pressure on it toward the fulfilment of democratic perquisites, including the holding of elections. At the same time, a refocus of its aid on sovereignty building and on strengthening civil society movements would help foster the aid’s political effectiveness. Meanwhile, the opening of channels for discussions and negotiation with Hamas would be a major step towards Palestinian reconciliation, as well as acknowledging that ending violence could be done only by welcoming all actors of the conflict to the same table. These options, which have been regularly proposed for several years (Witney, 2014), would also help to strengthen the EU’s image and credibility in its stated objectives of respecting human rights and promoting democracy. By pushing toward a Palestinian political renewal, the EU would help fulfilling a prerequisite for a potential resolution of the conflict. At the heart of a period of tension such as the current one, those measures would also allow the EU to be placed at the heart of the political discussions in the region, allowing it to financially and politically deter the different actors’ warmongering.

Finally, beyond the Union, it is also the responsibility of its Member States, and first and foremost France and Germany, to take the measure of the situation and leverage their international weight to act and to make a real plea for a new direction. Free from the multilateral constraints inherent to the EU, they are able both to react faster and enact more ambitious foreign policies, inciting the EU to follow the direction that would be taken. But while the tools and the options are now on the table, the political willingness to use them and to take significant steps on such a polarizing issue in the states’ public opinions remains to be proven.

References:

Al-Fattal R. (2010) The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory, Jerusalem: PASSIA, Pp.11-32

Asseburg M. and Goren N. (2019), “Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking”, MITVIM, SWP and PAX , Pp. 16-21. Retrieved from : https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Asseburg_PAX_REPORT_Divided_Divisive.pdf

Bouris D. (2014) The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories, New York City: Routledge Editions, Pp.52-55

Cypel S. (2020) The State of Israel against the Jews, La Découverte, [in French]

Dajani O. and Lovatt H. (2017) “Rethinking Oslo: How Europe Can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from : https://ecfr.eu/publication/rethinking_oslo_how_europe_can_promote_peace_in_israel_palestine_7219/

EU Commission Insider (2020): Interview of the author with a European Commission Official, “the PA, the EU’s “only interlocutor” in Palestine vis-à-vis “organizations that resort to violence in their means of operation“”

Hinnebusch R. (2003) The International politics of the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, Pp.289-294

Le More A. (2010) International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo, New York City: Routledge editions, Pp.92-96

Muzu C. (2010) European Union policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process: the quicksands of politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Pp.23-44

Oxfam (2007) Poverty in Palestine: the human cost of the financial boycott, Oxfam Briefing Note. Retrieved from : https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/poverty-in-palestine-the-human-cost-of-the-financial-boycott-114566/

Shikaki K. (2019), “The Limits of European Influence in Palestine and Israel”, Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from: https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/79390

The Economist (2017) “A distant conflict resonates in Northern Ireland”. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/britain/2017/08/03/a-distant-conflict-resonates-in-northern-ireland

Wildeman J. (2018) “EU Development aid in the occupied Palestinian territory”, Global Affairs, Pp.10-11

Witney N. (2014) “Time to talk to Hamas”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_time_to_talk_to_hamas295/

CISS is looking to revisit existing African narratives. As a young think tank, we want to open a dialogue between young voices to envision future perspectives. Your submission should deal with under-explored topics, reflect on existing debates and propose new paths. Analyses (ca. 1,500 words) and opinion pieces (ca. 500 words) on current affairs should engage critically with narratives on Africa.

Send us your article that can explore politics and society but can also draw on economic questions or international law. There are no limits regarding the focus of your work – as long as it centers around the above-mentioned theme. After a peer-reviewing process with CISS’s regional division (can take up to 6-8 weeks), a series of successful articles will be published on CISS’s website. In addition, Revisiting African Narratives will be part of a broader CISS project with online events and further content over the course of 2021.

Please see the guidelines attached for further information. Article submissions are accepted on a rolling basis until June 1, 2021. Send your submission (English or German) in Microsoft Word Format to CISS’s Regional Director for Sub-Saharan Africa Gelila Enbaye, at gelila.enbaye@ciss.eu.

Hasankeyf is said to be 12,000 years old and is therefore one of the oldest continuously inhabited settlements in the world. It meets nine of UNESCO’s selection criteria, but the Turkish government did not apply for recognition. This is not an oversight, but a policy with cultural, geopolitical and strategic dimensions. The construction of the Ilisu Dam, along with other dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, bars the Kurdish PKK party from interacting with the local population. It creates severe water shortages further downstream in Iraq, where the fishing industry, crops and fresh drinking water supplies rely heavily on the rivers, putting thousands of lives at risk. This constitutes part of Erdogan’s wider vision of regional hegemony, which can also be observed in other recent interactions with neighbouring Syria, Iraq and Greece. Hasankeyf, inhabited mostly by Kurds and Arabs indigenous to the region, as well as archaeological sites, which include an 800-year old bathhouse, an Ayyubid mosque, an ancient citadel, a bridge built in 1116 AD and several Neolithic caves, are memorials of a civilisation that do not fit into Erdogan’s vision of an ethnically and culturally homogenous Turkey.

To an outside observer, it may look like the government has a well-intentioned plan for Hasankeyf, which lies in Turkey’s poorest and most underdeveloped region. However, through my interactions with the local inhabitants, it became abundantly clear to me, that Erdogan’s plans were not only met with suspicion, but with an active resistance inherited through generations of trauma. The ancient artefacts have been transported to a nearby location and the inhabitants have been forcibly relocated to a newly built town, made up of rows of identical houses. However, not all of the residents of Hasankeyf were eligible for the government’s housing scheme and many have therefore become displaced.

Hasankeyf is a symptom of policy in Turkey’s Southeast, that ignores the dignity and erases the culture and heritage of the local population in favour of regional hegemony. Today, Hasankeyf is lost.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

Morocco’s ties with West Africa go back to centuries and started through trade which has also always been a way to spread Islam to West Africa as well as Sufism . Until now, members of Tijaniya Tariqa (Tijaniya Path), one of the main schools of Sufism that is present in West Africa, visit the tomb of its founder Ahmed Tijani in Fes, Morocco in a pilgrimage like visit. In the 80s and as a response to its withdrawal from the African Union, Morocco has strengthened its religious connection with West African countries notably Senegal and the Ivory Coast.

A New Religious Strategy for West Africa

However, recently, Morocco has started a new religious strategy in West Africa that goes with its new vision about the role Morocco can play on the continent. The religious diplomacy is based on the King as Amir Al Muminin (Commander of the Faithful) and spiritual leader, new institutions, and using nonstate actors . For example, since becoming the King of Morocco in 1999, Mohammed the Sixth has paid more than 50 visits to 29 African countries. During these visits, he led Friday prayers, met with religious leaders, and gave away the Quran, the holy book. Those visits and the way he was received by the people of those Muslim majority countries hint at the transnational spiritual authority of the King.

Morocco’s new faith-based diplomacy uses religious and educational institutions as well. For example, the Mohamed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Mochidines (male clerics), and Morchidates (female clerics) to train African Imams on moderate Islam. Morocco has signed a treaty to train 500 Malian Imams in 2013, and now other African and some European countries are interested in training their Imams in Morocco as well . Besides institutions, non-state actors are also used by Morocco. For example, in 2016, Morocco launched the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulema (Muslim Scholars). The reasons of its creation “are set out in its preamble, based on the religious and cultural ties that bind together the Kingdom of Morocco and those of the African countries, and by virtue of what the current circumstances require in terms of finding a scope for cooperation between the Islamic scholars of Morocco and those of the African countries.”

The Goal of Morocco’s Religious Diplomacy

Morocco’s faith-based diplomacy has some objectives to achieve. First, it is a tool to counter extremism. After 9/11 and the bombing attacks in 2003 in Casablanca, Morocco has started to use the religious aspect in its efforts to fight extremism internally but also in the Sahel region. Morocco believes that the military approach alone may not be beneficial to deal with extremism and that the spiritual side is necessary.

Second, by having a formula to counter terrorism in the countries of West Africa, Morocco tries to influence the public in those countries as well as the governments through rising as a country of coexistence and moderate Islam, and thus, is seen positively.

Third, Morocco tries to rise as a regional power and as a potential partner to the United States and the European Union for the security issues in the region through its use of religious diplomacy as public diplomacy. Besides that, it can be a bridge between Africa and Europe. This importance can be used by Morocco as a bargaining chip to serve its national interest. The issue of Western Sahara is among the top priorities that Morocco’s faith-based diplomacy tries to score points in, especially after the challenges it faced with some EU countries who tried to challenge Morocco’s legitimacy to export products from the disputed area.

Thus, the ultimate goal of Morocco’s diplomacy in West Africa is to influence others and serve the national interest through rising as a regional power with a special formula to fight extremism.

The Challenges

It is still not clear whether Morocco’s efforts to use religion in its diplomacy has brought benefits to counter-terrorism. Moreover, Morocco’s religious diplomacy faces some external and internal challenges. Regarding the external challenges, there is a competition with other Muslim majority countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Algeria. Turkey presents itself as both an Islamic as well as a democratic country, while Saudi Arabia uses its monetary resources to advertise its Salafi version of Islam.

As for internal challenges, we may talk about youth unemployment in Morocco that can also lead to extremism because of the despair that unemployed young people can fall in. This unemployment is unlikely to get better due to the expected economic suffering in Morocco and the rest of the world is expected to face during and after this pandemic. Therefore, dealing with the post-Corona economic hardship and keep promoting religious diplomacy may not be an easy thing for Morocco.

Conclusion

Morocco has strengthened its faith-based diplomacy in West Africa which reveals new ambitions the country has to play in the continent. It bases its diplomacy on exporting its ‘moderate’ Islam to counter extremism. It aims at strengthening its place in the continent as a regional player and also be an irreplaceable partner in fighting extremism in the Sahel. Therefore, it can serve its national interest and especially the conflict over Western Sahara.

Morocco’s faith-based diplomacy is more likely to be further promoted in Africa as it strengthens its role in the continent. The historical ties -religious and economic- with West Africa help Morocco get a positive reception which may encourage Morocco to keep strengthening its diplomacy in this region of the continent. However, it is also expected that Morocco will face more competition from other Muslim majority countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Also, youth unemployment- which may lead to extremism- needs to be dealt with to give more credibility to Morocco’s religious diplomacy.

Bibliography

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Alaoui, Sarah. 2019. Morocco, commander of the (African) faithful? 8 April. Accès le 12 15, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/08/morocco-commander-of-the-african-faithful/.

Hmimnat, Salim. 2018. «‘Spiritual security’ as a (meta-)political strategy to compete over regional leadership: formation of Morocco’s transnational religious policy towards Africa.» The Journal of North African Studies.

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SILVA, THOMAS AWAZU PEREIRA DA. 2018. «Addressing the Youth.» Policy Center for New South 5-18.
2015. The Royal Initiative to Create the Mohammed VI Foundation of African Oulema. 13 July. https://www.fm6oa.org/en/introductory-paper-on-the-royal-initiative-for-the-creation-of-the-mohammed-vi-foundation-of-african-oulema/.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

Over the past weeks and through April 5th, the nation underwent a sterilization process to help restrict the spread of the virus using drones which spray sterilization agents all around the country. The drone technology, which is the size of an average dinner table, replaces human workers and thus, removes the risk of contracting the disease while on the streets and allows the employees to remain home. Furthermore, this initiative also dramatically cuts costs of paying workers and transporting them around the country but does still require human maintenance to operate the flying sterilizers in some very densely populated parts of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah. While this innovative technology is a massive initiative and step forward for the country, it brings up a question of if we will see drones replacing the average worker or “chore” in everyday society.

For example, can drones now cut my grass and do my landscaping?

Jordan’s labour market is characterized by a regular import and export of labour. According to the Jordanian Ministry of Labour, 288.000 Jordanians worked abroad in 2008. These workers are predominantly highly skilled, having finished secondary education or holding university degrees. A vast majority of the labour migrants from Jordan are young male adults who temporarily migrate to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In contrast, Jordan imports predominantly low-skilled migrant workers, mainly from Egypt, Syria and Iraq. These migrant workers provide a quarter of the labour force. Migrant workers are predominantly employed in manufacturing, construction, services and agriculture, jobs whose low wages and harsh working conditions are typically less attractive to native Jordanians.

Migrants, both to and from Jordan, leave their homes for a variety of reasons, pushed and pulled by both economic and social conditions. The unemployment rate in Jordan has been fluctuating around 15 percent for the past decades and a majority of the unemployed youth believed that no suitable jobs exist for them in Jordan. In contrast, the GCC countries offered many employment opportunities, due to a lack of labour resources. As a result of the high fertility rates in Jordan until the 1990s and a rising number of qualified workers from the Gulf countries themselves, the GCC can no longer absorb the excess of Jordanian work seekers. The problems of unemployment were also exacerbated by a mismatch between the skills of the people entering the workforce and market demands in Jordan. Thus, many Jordanian graduates still chose to migrate to the GCC countries, where wages are much higher.

The remittances that flow back to Jordan from emigrants have mixed micro- and macroeconomic impacts. The remittances make up around 23 percent of Jordan’s GDP today and the positive private effects of the remittance flows are relatively uncontested. The UNDP highlights the ability of these money transfers to eliminate poverty. On a macroeconomic level, remittances provide an important source of foreign exchange and have the potential to boost the economy. As remittances are, however, mainly spent on private consumption instead of productive investments and the effected sectors such as the construction sector meet the elevated demand for raw materials and labour through imports, only short-term economic growth is enabled. Furthermore, the newly created jobs are mainly low-skilled positions with small wages and mostly filled by migrant workers.
The potentially dangerous effects of a ‘brain drain’ through excessive labour migration, does not apply to Jordan. Jordan’s labour market is characterised by an oversupply of skilled, educated labour. Additionally, a majority of Jordan’s labour migrants leave the country only temporarily, returning to Jordan after a few years with an enhanced technical knowledge, diminishing the effects of a ‘brain drain’.

Despite the ambiguity of the effects of labour migration on a micro- and macroeconomic level, temporary labour migration has the potential to translate into sustainable development. The skills and know-how that migrant workers developed while working in other countries could be used to overcome the misalignment between the needs of Jordan’s economy and actions taken by diversifying the economy and expanding the private sector. This way the positive microeconomic development within private households due to remittance flows from migrant workers could pave the way for a sustainable macroeconomic development.

The article was previously published on the website of “Diplomatisches Magazin”, Issue 06/19 Labour Migration to and from Jordan – Blessing or Curse to the Local Economy.

Picture from Lukas Beer – Unsplash

“Here we drown Algerians” sign on Saint-Michel Bridge in Paris in 1961. Dozens of bodies were later pulled from the River Seine. .

Election season can be a circus at the best of times but in France it comes with a dose of controversy. Recent comments by presidential hopeful Emmanuel Macron referring to France’s colonialism in Algeria as a “crime against humanity” has caused uproar from one end and mediocre reactions from another.
In pandering to the Algerian vote, the subject of France’s colonialism has once again come to surface as a political card for opportunistic politicians warring for the win, and provoked the same recycled debates with little effectiveness or elicitation of credible solutions.

The politics of colonialism

37 years after Algeria declared independence, Paris finally voted in 1999 to recognise the Algerian war of independence for what it was and not simply “events of Algeria”, marking the beginning of a pattern of reluctant reforms encouraged by Algiers’ mild pressure.
A few years later, France decided that coming to grips with its colonial past needed a different tune- in February 2005 French parliament voted to pass a law in which France’s colonialism would be referred to as a “positive role.”
Unsurprisingly, the law was opposed by many politicians and historians but no more so than in Algeria where a storm was ignited by protestations.
This fervour however was not translated in the Algerian government’s response which was tame given the seriousness behind France’s whitewashing of its quasi-genocide. Foreign affairs minister Mohammed Bedjaouie summed up the disappointing reactionary mood by ignorantly reducing the law to a “Franco-French issue”, removing any advantage Algeria could gain in France’s changing political tide.

Despite this, the law was repealed a year later by President Jacques Chirac because “writing history is the job of the historians, not of the laws,”- a relevance lost by the use of its history long manipulated for contemporary opportunistic urgency.
Five years later was enough time it seemed for Algiers to make its next move in a game where France still maintained its domineering streak. Members of the National Liberation Front proposed a law to the National People’s Congress that would criminalise colonialism and create a special court to try war criminals.

The bill, however, never came to pass with many rejecting the bill, including those from the influential revolutionary family organisations, because “patriotism had become a business.” The attempt met the same fate as the request by some deputies in the mid-1990s, calling for France to compensate victims of its catastrophic Algerian nuclear tests in the 1960’s.
“Those who want to have compensation have only to do it individually,” the Minister of Parliament Relations at the time would comment- the country’s need for collective justice was viewed as an inconvenience the ruling elite would not benefit from if entertained. Following 40 years of denial, France’s parliament would later vote to compensate the victims in 2009- those long dead after serving France’s strategic interests reduced to statistics.

The stances of the National Moudjahidine Organisation (NOM) and the Moudjahidine Ministry whose revolutionary foundational principles could be orchestrated to effective end have instead aided in reducing Algeria to a reactionary force. Even in instances when Algiers seemed forthright in its language, France’s response has been patronisingly simplistic.

When in 2006, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika declared that colonisation had brought the genocide of Algeria’s identity, language and traditions, the French foreign affairs minister responded that the two countries should adopt a respect “to establish a common future and overcome the sad pages,”- a conclusion that pitifully defines a discourse that has been left unchallenged to damaging end.

Reactionary Algeria

Macron’s comments essentially reflect a new polemic that highlight the highly political dichotomy of Frances colonial past. Macron is not alone in his restorative rhetoric; Benoit Hamon, another presidential candidate of the French Socialist Party stated that he would be open to the possibility of France apologising if elected but would not characterise colonisation as Macron has.

Little solace can be taken from his words that dance around a subject exploited to such an immoral extent that any positive consequence is now rendered inauthentic and unrealistic.
Macron’s words were certainly unprecedented for a French official however Algeria has once again shown its reactionary performance to be pitifully mediocre. Minister of the Moudjahidine, Tayeb Zitouni responded by reiterating that “France must assume its responsibilities towards Algeria.” Ahmed Ouyahia, director of cabinet for the presidency of the Republic, perhaps understood the opportunism behind Macron’s remarks as nothing more than “electoral speech.”

“He is only a candidate and wants to attract the French electorate of Algerian origin and obtain material support from the Algerian State for his campaign”, President of the Algerian National Front (FNA) rightfully commented.

For others, Macron’s comments are just stating the obvious. “How can we not consider… the exactions against isolated and defenceless populations during the Revolution [and] the large-scale massacres committed at the beginning of colonisation as crimes against humanity?” one party member explained.
“A law criminalising colonialism must not be proposed by any person, party or association. It must be a law of the Algerian Republic,” Tayeb El Houari of the Chouhada Children’s Organisation explains- an expectation many Algerians will not be anticipating to be actualised anytime soon.

Transitioning from colonial nostalgia and national amnesia

France’s colonial chapter may have ended but its carefully maintained interference has not. France’s colonial past is a factor that continually imposes itself at the stake of France’s presidential campaigns with hopefuls showcasing the necessary skillset that can disguise its imperialistic ambitions.

Sensationalist comments on colonialism seek to isolate it to the pages of history rather than an impeding presence that has permeated the societies of the once colonised and the coloniser. They fail to highlight the historical context of France’s discrimination and ghettoisation of millions of its Arab citizens. Nor do the comments seek to draw attention to the corrupt, omnipresent military power structure that has defined Algeria’s political apparatus since its independence — one that France has instead placated whilst supporting calls for democracy elsewhere.

The subject of colonialism has become a political puzzle and manipulated tool for politicians adapting their stances to the electorate they seek to lure instead of orchestrating effective dialogue in recognising their genocidal past removed from the belief of a “sharing of culture” or basis of enlightenment.

Decades later and little has moved on with relations remaining strained under the weight of guilt, betrayal, nostalgia and cynicism. However much measures are pledged to help build new pages in their shared history, little remains in addressing the lasting consequence of the 1962 Franco-Algerian split within the prejudiced heart of French society. For Franco-Algerians debating who to vote for, controversial statements however supporting do not remedy the continuing problems of the socio-economic climate they are so disadvantaged to.

In Algeria, more efforts are needed in creating an independent space that cross-examines historical accounts that places collective justice and national pride in its historic events at the forefront. Lack of pressure from the political class and historians mean the history of the national movement being subjected to criticism, analysis and debate is left within the confines of secrecy.

Even within the spheres of intellectualism, French historians have advanced further in writing and researching the war of independence than their Algerian counterparts. The political exploitation of contemporary history in Algeria and the national movement may explain the decade-long hesitations that have been reduced to opportunistic instances to legitimise cyclical political projects and serve political and economic interests.
Apologies from France stand only as isolated statements that contend a narrative that places Western hegemonic ambitions as the basis of so many its problems. An apology is unlikely to have a measurable effect, aside from drama points, in relieving Algerian sentiments, excusing governmental failures or reflecting contemporary issues in French society.

Ending France’s national amnesia that has perpetuated resentment, discord and hatred would be the first steps in understanding the foundations of its own failed social projects.
As long as positions that officialise apologies or politicise historic events are used as an ideological instrument for hegemonic ambitions, Algeria and France’s complex-bilateral relationship will remain nothing more than an artificial show based on a foundation of lies and deceit that serves no one but to legitimise the power of the ruling elite.

“Us” that is Mariam Kurshudyan, President of “4FEM Women’s Rights NGO” in Armenia, and Yair Rubin, founder and manager of “Face to Face”, an Israeli NGO for youth exchanges between Israel, Germany and Poland. In 2017, they met as participants of the Impact Group “Common Remembrance, Future Relations” and embarked on an insightful joint project to explore the life stories of second-generation Holocaust and Armenien Genocide survivors. Please follow this link to read their full article: 

Kurshudyan & Rubin (2018) – “When I was quite mature and had a child, I felt my father’s pain”: Comparing life stories, thoughts and opinions of second-generation Holocaust and Armenian Genocide survivors