What is the history of European action and aid in the Palestinian Territories?

According to the OECD database, from 2012 to 2016, 45% of the total funds spent on the Palestinian Territories came from European donors (Wildeman, 2018). Having adopted a direct state-building role towards the Palestinian Authority since the Oslo Accords, the EU is trying to position itself as a central link in the completion of a two-state solution, connecting its efforts in conflict resolution to substantial development assistance. While the European Community’s first financial assistance to the Palestinians dates back to 1971, and the European Council’s 1980 Venice Declaration recognises the Palestinians’ “legitimate rights” to existence and security (Muzu, 2010), since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU has been committed to financially supporting the peace process (Al-Fattal, 2010). In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) born in 1995, the post of EU Special Representative in the Middle East was created in November 1996 to give a presence, visibility and political impetus in the region to the EU’s efforts to contribute to a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Al-Fattal, 2010).

These post-Oslo developments were accompanied by declarations setting out the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Berlin Declaration of March 1999 affirmed the desire for the establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel, a settlement of the situation in Jerusalem and a just and agreed solution to the Palestinian refugee question. These positions were complemented by the 2002 Seville Declaration, in which the EU stressed that the 1967 borders proposed by the UN (symbolised by the Green Line) should be the basis for a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement (Bouris, 2014). In line with these statements, the EU is trying to be involved in the negotiations beyond its economic role, as in the Sharm el-Sheikh II meeting in October 2000, trying to limit the violence at the time of the second intifada. In the same vein, the EU participates in the Middle East Quartet, created in June 2002. With the European Security and Defence Policy, the creation of EUPOL COPPS at the end of 2005 was allowed, a mission to support the reform of the Palestinian security sector (Al-Fattal, 2010).

Since then, with the exception of the period of Hamas rule of the Palestinian Authority, the EU’s political position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not significantly changed. The EU is positioning itself as the warden of the two-state solution and the Oslo agreements, denouncing both the authoritarian excesses of the Palestinian Authority and the violations of international law by the Israelis, including its settlement policy. Beyond funding to the Palestinian Authority, the EU also assists projects in East Jerusalem to support the Palestinian community and public institutions in the city, and to preserve its Arab cultural heritage. The vast majority of EU aid is channelled through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which has been providing aid to states around the Mediterranean since 2008. Of the 16 countries included in the Southern Partnership, the Palestinian Territories currently receive between 15 and 20% of the funds spent, making them the main recipients of this aid, along with Morocco.

But if the EU’s aid toward the Palestinians is articulated by the Joint European Strategy in Support of Palestine, the situation of failure in which the peace process finds itself more than 25 years after the Oslo agreements – and the difficult economic conditions for the Palestinians- illustrate the limits of European action. Many non-governmental organisations (Oxfam, 2007), criticise the action – or inaction – of European donors, who, by contributing to a prejudicial status quo, are partly ethically responsible for the current situation. As an actor with substantial financial and political weight, the European Union has encountered several limits in the implementation of its aid to the Palestinian Territories, and in particular in the way it is linked to the policy conducted regarding the conflict.

Anatomy of a failure, European conditioning against the tide?

Aid as an obstacle to the reunification of Palestinian factions: Officially, European aid to the Palestinian Authority is untied – not directly conditioned – in order to allow greater efficiency. However, from a political point of view, this support implies the validation of guarantees by the Palestinian Authority. It is thus placed within the framework of the Quartet and its demands, requiring the commitment of the Palestinian government to the principle of non-violence, the recognition of Israel and the acceptance of existing agreements and obligations, including security cooperation with the Israeli services (Hinnebusch, 2003). This conditionality deliberately favours moderate Palestinian actors, potential “partners for peace”, while side-lining Hamas. In the context of the 2006 elections won by Hamas, the demands made led the EU to participate in the international boycott of the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. Such a move also made it more difficult for the Palestinians to achieve a political reconciliation between the main factions, essential in negotiating a two-state solution with a sole legitimate actor representing all the Palestinians. The collapse of the national unity government and the war in Gaza, leading to the situation of territorial division that persists to this day, were partly caused by this inability of the Palestinian factions to agree on the demands of the international community and the EU. By fuelling the internal Palestinian split, by participating in setting preconditions for inter-Palestinian negotiations, the EU is directly sacrificing its objectives of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it considers the current ruling actors within the Palestinian Authority as the only credible ones to achieve the objective of a two-state solution (EU Commission Insider, 2020), a position that does not allow for any progress towards unblocking the current situation.

A Helpless Aid in the Face of Violations of International Law from Israel: The EU’s practical inability to link its aid or partnerships to strong demands is also reflected in the EU’s relations with Israel. The latter, through its continuous policy of occupation and settlement, violates international law and contradicts the Oslo agreements it has signed. Through the recurrent destruction of infrastructure built by development and humanitarian actors, often financed by the European Union itself, Israel contribute to the destruction of the possibility of a two-state solution and to prevent Palestinian economic development (Shikaki, 2019). While the EU has repeatedly insisted that all settlement activity is illegal under international law, endangers the two-state solution and undermines the prospects for a lasting peace, it is abundantly clear that it will not punish Israel or deny it the benefits it offers through their agreements. Despite Israel’s behaviour, the EU has signed more than a dozen bilateral agreements with Israel, complementing the comprehensive association agreement signed in 1995, in areas such as police cooperation (2018), development (2018), aviation (2013) and agriculture (2012). The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting for a third of its total exports. And while most agreements are conditional on respect for “common values”, including respect for human rights and international humanitarian law or fundamental freedoms, Israel’s repeated violations of some of these values have not led the EU to suspend these agreements as it has the right to do (Dajani and Lovatt, 2017). As a result, the EU is contributing to an Israeli sense of impunity for the occupation, preventing the establishment of safeguards that would allow Israel to continue its occupation.

The EU’s weakness towards the attitudes of its allies and the political under-utilisation of its foreign aid and partnerships, whether for the Palestinian Authority or Israel, clearly limits its weight in the political resolution of the conflict. While this weakness is multifactorial and can be explained by the links forged between the EU and these different actors, it is also justified internally by the functioning of a multilateral organisation that has to deal with divergent opinions, and does not favour taking a clear-cut position.

The EU, between the complex construction of its policy and divergent national positions.

Many of the 27 EU Member States have different histories, cultures and foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. When dealing with an issue as divisive as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, agreeing on a common position that would allow the economic weight of aid to be used to carry political weight can seem complex. Thus, while the majority of EU members share a set of convictions in favour of a two-state solution, defining “a strategy to make it happen” and agreeing on the steps to be taken seems much more complex. Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations from 1999 to 2004, explained that “it is easier to go from A to Z than from A to B.” (Le More, 2010). This problem can be highlighted beyond the issue of the peace process and reflects the complex institutional structure of the EU. For example, almost all decisions regarding the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy have to be taken unanimously. Within this framework, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is supposed to bring the European states together on various aspects of their external action. However, although the High Representative represents them within the Quartet, this role remains institutionally weak and incapable of completely replacing the states in international negotiations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

With regard to relations with Israel and Palestine, the differences in positions between EU states are clearly visible and explains the lack of political will to use politically European aid. As example, Ireland appears to be the most active in criticising Israel today, relying on the numerous studies creating parallels between its relations with Northern Ireland and the situation between Israel and the Palestinian Territories (The Economist, 2017). On another side, France appears to be the country most committed to international peace efforts today, while conversely Hungary is the state that is most energetic in blocking joint EU statements criticising Israel. These divisions between EU member states, combined with other factors, negatively affect the European willingness and ability to take action towards Israel or towards a Palestinian reconciliation. These are fostered by the Israeli government’s active policies to drive a wedge between EU member states, undermine EU unity on the issue and paralyse European decision-making (Asseburg and Goren, 2017). As an example, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s relations with the illiberal governments of Central and Eastern Europe contribute to this fragmentation. Similarly, the Holocaust and the history of antisemitism in Europe make many EU member states, most notably Germany, uncomfortable toward any position criticising Israeli policies, which Netanyahu plays on by equating any opposition to his policies with antisemitic posturing (Cypel, 2020).

What role for Europeans in Israel and the Palestinian Territories?

The need for European unity to act in the face of repeated Israeli violations of international law and to seize the political dividends of development aid to the Palestinian Territories seems impossible to achieve in the current context. However, a minimum consensus might be sufficient for the EU to be more present at the diplomatic level and to assert a credible position at the international level. In the same way that the EU was able to react very quickly to condemn the “Deal of the Century” peace plan proposed by Donald Trump at the beginning of 2020, several actions and evolutions in the EU’s positions are possible. They are a current necessity for Europeans, in order to really take action and revive the two-state solution.

Thus, the alignment of European positions with international law, notably by demanding that Israel respect its obligations as an occupying power with regard to International Humanitarian Law is a first essential step to be taken. Associating these demands with real threats of triggering procedures for suspending or reviewing existing trade agreements could already put a new pressure on Israel, without leading to an internal revolution in the EU. Similarly, adopting tougher guidelines at the European level to prohibit linkage between public funds and Israeli settlement-linked activities or entities would be a strong signal.  Expelling those from the commercial partnership agreements would also be in line with the current EU position, translating into acts the condemnations already issued. For the Union itself, unlocking such a capacity could prove promising in terms of foreign policy, giving it the means to realise its new desire to carry more weight at the geopolitical level, as well as fostering it credibility toward foreign actors, an asset in any political or commercial negotiation.

With regard to the Palestinians, the tightening of the conditions for the allocation of international aid to the Palestinian Authority would help placing more pressure on it toward the fulfilment of democratic perquisites, including the holding of elections. At the same time, a refocus of its aid on sovereignty building and on strengthening civil society movements would help foster the aid’s political effectiveness. Meanwhile, the opening of channels for discussions and negotiation with Hamas would be a major step towards Palestinian reconciliation, as well as acknowledging that ending violence could be done only by welcoming all actors of the conflict to the same table. These options, which have been regularly proposed for several years (Witney, 2014), would also help to strengthen the EU’s image and credibility in its stated objectives of respecting human rights and promoting democracy. By pushing toward a Palestinian political renewal, the EU would help fulfilling a prerequisite for a potential resolution of the conflict. At the heart of a period of tension such as the current one, those measures would also allow the EU to be placed at the heart of the political discussions in the region, allowing it to financially and politically deter the different actors’ warmongering.

Finally, beyond the Union, it is also the responsibility of its Member States, and first and foremost France and Germany, to take the measure of the situation and leverage their international weight to act and to make a real plea for a new direction. Free from the multilateral constraints inherent to the EU, they are able both to react faster and enact more ambitious foreign policies, inciting the EU to follow the direction that would be taken. But while the tools and the options are now on the table, the political willingness to use them and to take significant steps on such a polarizing issue in the states’ public opinions remains to be proven.

References:

Al-Fattal R. (2010) The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Territory, Jerusalem: PASSIA, Pp.11-32

Asseburg M. and Goren N. (2019), “Divided and Divisive: Europeans, Israel and Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking”, MITVIM, SWP and PAX , Pp. 16-21. Retrieved from : https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/Asseburg_PAX_REPORT_Divided_Divisive.pdf

Bouris D. (2014) The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories, New York City: Routledge Editions, Pp.52-55

Cypel S. (2020) The State of Israel against the Jews, La Découverte, [in French]

Dajani O. and Lovatt H. (2017) “Rethinking Oslo: How Europe Can Promote Peace in Israel-Palestine”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from : https://ecfr.eu/publication/rethinking_oslo_how_europe_can_promote_peace_in_israel_palestine_7219/

EU Commission Insider (2020): Interview of the author with a European Commission Official, “the PA, the EU’s “only interlocutor” in Palestine vis-à-vis “organizations that resort to violence in their means of operation“”

Hinnebusch R. (2003) The International politics of the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East, Pp.289-294

Le More A. (2010) International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo, New York City: Routledge editions, Pp.92-96

Muzu C. (2010) European Union policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace process: the quicksands of politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Pp.23-44

Oxfam (2007) Poverty in Palestine: the human cost of the financial boycott, Oxfam Briefing Note. Retrieved from : https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/poverty-in-palestine-the-human-cost-of-the-financial-boycott-114566/

Shikaki K. (2019), “The Limits of European Influence in Palestine and Israel”, Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from: https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/79390

The Economist (2017) “A distant conflict resonates in Northern Ireland”. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/britain/2017/08/03/a-distant-conflict-resonates-in-northern-ireland

Wildeman J. (2018) “EU Development aid in the occupied Palestinian territory”, Global Affairs, Pp.10-11

Witney N. (2014) “Time to talk to Hamas”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_time_to_talk_to_hamas295/

The main policy change of the Fischler reform, implemented between 2005 and 2007,[vi] is the decoupling of direct support for farmers, meaning that the amount of payments that farmers receive is not dependent on their productivity anymore, but on the land they own.[vii] By this, production shall react more efficiently to market signals [viii] and use less resources as it allows greater farming flexibility.[ix] These direct payments were now called Single Farm Payments (SFP), as several types of payments, e.g. certain premiums for beef producers as the special premium for male cows, were aggregated to one payment per farm. In order to receive it, the farm has to fulfill certain environmental and animal protection standards, e.g. recipients must mothball 10% of their land – a cornerstone of the CAP called Cross Compliance. Additionally, the Fischler Reform undertook some adjustments of the market order, including a change of the milk quotas and lower intervention prices intended to reduce the production of cereals and milk. Another focus of the reform was the so-called Modulation, which describes the reallocation of means to the CAP’s second pillar of rural development in order to redistribute payments between and within MS. This included a Degression of payments meaning a decrease in agricultural assistance, starting from 2006, especially restricting on bigger farms.[x]

The general legal foundations of the CAP consist of regulations, which are directly applicable for all MS and do not need to be implemented.[xi] Germany consequently had to follow the changes of the Fischler Reform as they were all legally binding, but had the choice between different measures in order to achieve a defined goal in the cases of directives.[xii] MS did however have the opportunity to implement different systems of partial decoupling, which Germany did not use. Except for hops, tobacco and potato starch, Germany already decoupled all products and payments in 2005.[xiii] So, it has been shown that German legislature was modified in reaction to the Fischler Reform.

These legislative changes did not fail to meet the ambition of making farmers react more to market signals than with state incentives, but also influenced the farmer’s behaviors and production decisions. According to a study from 2001/2002, roughly 30% of the farmers stated that they would alter their mix of farm activities after decoupling, because they would not risk losing their direct payments, e.g. due to short-term losses in productivity. Another question arising is if farmers were to stop production, they would receive the SFPs anyway.[xiv] Some forecasted a fall in food production of 1-2%.[xv] This applies especially for beef production with a fall of 29%. In fact, according to the same survey approximately 40% of the farmers would leave at least some of their land idle.[xvi] We can thus note that by changing farmers behavior, decoupling did also influence food production in its quantity and mix.

These changes in the production mix were at least partly intended to reduce the product indicated benefit of some few agricultural products and therefore reduce the contortion of the product structure. For instance, milk and cereal production were intended to be reduced by lowering the intervention price.[xvii] The consequently falling milk prices and the flat-rate model which pools and reallocates for example milk premiums, affect the milk farms’ income negatively. Arable farms on the other hand can profit from this.[xviii] We can consequently identify direct income consequences of the reform for farmers.

Profiting from the reform are also organic farms, firstly from decoupling. As they are usually less productive than conventional farms, their income increased significantly and the income gap to conventional farms fell from 9% to 3%.[xix] Secondly the cross-compliance approach put more attention on sustainable land use and the protection of animals. Therefore, the Fischler Reform also contributed to environmental protection.

In what way the reform made an impact in social regards is questionable, but it is definitely existent.  Counting transfers per worker or farm, the CAP contributed to social cohesion.[xx] Due to Degression and Modulation inequalities between bigger and smaller farms, as well as between urban and rural areas, should be at least to some extent reduced. Other scholars argue that the negative impacts on milk farms vis-à-vis the income increase for arable farms tightened existing problems of distribution.[xxi]

Another result of decoupling is an increased capitalization in soil prices. Also, the leasing prices rose with every additional euro of decoupled direct payments by 32 cents.[xxii] In financial terms it has to be noted as well, that the reform provoked costs for the state and the federal states. Subventions and external costs of agrarian production of the state amount more than 29 Billion Euros per year,[xxiii] which marks an important percentage of the overall budget of the state and could otherwise be used for other policies.

Especially future policies could be affected by the Fischler Reform too, because the change in support schemes influences farmers’ perception of themselves and their degree of dependency on state support. With decoupling and making SFPs dependent on compliance with certain standards, the payments were seen by farmers more and more as payments for providing services for the society than as a social policy. This could make future attempts to reduce payments difficult, because farmers would feel that they would lose payments for their produce.[xxiv] This shows that the reform also framed domestic beliefs and expectations and thereby influenced future policies.

Concluding we have shown that the Fischler Reform, and especially the decoupling of direct payments for farmers, were followed by direct changes in German legislature. These adjustments had impacts on different spheres of society. As such we have seen the impact on the quantity and mix of food production and the economic consequences for different kinds of farms, including the positive impact for organic farms and the impact on environmental protection. Furthermore, we discussed social consequences of the reform and illustrated its financial impact as well as the bearing of the Fischler Reform for future policies. By showing the strong domestic impact of the adjustments on the CAP made with just one single reform, the paper illustrated the enormous domestic impact that EU policies on agriculture have in all spheres of life. Maybe this can help us understand the strong reactions on the currently planned reform and serve as a basis for further analysis. What remains questionable is if the concentration on agriculture by EU policy is still up to date at all, or if EU expenditures should concentrate on other issues like the refugee crisis and other social issues. Maybe Brexit could now be the chance to implement such a new orientation and budget redistribution.

Endnotes

[i] Fridays for Future (2020): #VOTETHISCAPDOWN. Weblink: https://fridaysforfuture.de/votethiscapdown/, Accessed: 31.10.2020.

[ii] Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (n.d.): EU-Agrarpolitik. Weblink: https://www.bmel.de/DE/Landwirtschaft/Agrarpolitik/agrarpolitik_node.html, Accessed: 02.01.2020.

[iii] European Commission (n.d.): Die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik auf einen Blick. Weblink: https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/cap-glance_de#legalfoundations, Accessed: 03.01.2020.

[iv] Weiland, Sabine (2019): EU Common Agricultural Policy. Seminar: EU-Policymaking (not published).

[v] Massot, Albert (2019): Die Instrumente der GAP und ihre Reformen. Weblink: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/de/sheet/107/die-instrumente-der-gap-und-ihre-reformen, Accessed: 03.01.2020.

[vi] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. p. 9.

[vii] Tranter, R.B.; Swinbank A.; Woolridge A.J. et al. (2007): Implications for food production, land use and rural development of the European Union’s Single Farm Payment: Indications from a survey of farmers’ intentions in Germany, Portugal and the UK. In: Food Policy, Vol. 32, Issues 5-6. Elsevier Ltd. p. 656.

[viii] Sinabell, Franz; Schmid, Erwin (2003): Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU. WIFO Monatsberichte 6/2003. Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wien. pp. 425-427.

[ix] Tranter, R.B.; Swinbank A.; Woolridge A.J. et al. (2007): Implications for food production, land use and rural development of the European Union’s Single Farm Payment: Indications from a survey of farmers’ intentions in Germany, Portugal and the UK. In: Food Policy, Vol. 32, Issues 5-6. Elsevier Ltd. p. 656.

[x] Sinabell, Franz; Schmid, Erwin (2003): Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU. WIFO Monatsberichte 6/2003. Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wien. pp. 425-429.

[xi] Massot, Albert (2019): Die Instrumente der GAP und ihre Reformen. Weblink: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/de/sheet/107/die-instrumente-der-gap-und-ihre-reformen, Accessed: 03.01.2020.

[xii] European Commission (n.d. a): Types of EU law. Weblink: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/types-eu-law_en#types-of-eu-legal-acts, Accessed: 03.01.2020.

[xiii] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. pp. 10-11.

[xiv] Ebd. pp. 656-671.

[xv] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. p. II.

[xvi] Tranter, R.B.; Swinbank A.; Woolridge A.J. et al. (2007): Implications for food production, land use and rural development of the European Union’s Single Farm Payment: Indications from a survey of farmers’ intentions in Germany, Portugal and the UK. In: Food Policy, Vol. 32, Issues 5-6. Elsevier Ltd. pp. 656-671.

[xvii] Sinabell, Franz; Schmid, Erwin (2003): Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU. WIFO Monatsberichte 6/2003. Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wien. pp. 425-429.

[xviii] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. p. 12.

[xix] Offermann, F.; Sanders, J.; Nieberg, H. (2009): Auswirkungen der Entkopplung der Direktzahlungen auf den ökologischen Landbau in Deutschland. In: Tagesband 2 of the 10. Wissenschaftagung Ökologischer Landbau. Dr. Köster Verlag, Berlin. pp. 23-24.

[xx] Hansen, Heiko; Harsche, Johannes (2006): Die Förderung landwirtschaftlicher Erzeugnisse durch die europäische Agrarpolitik. Regionale Auswirkungen in Deutschland und Bestimmungsgründe. In: Unternehmen im Agrarbereich vor neuen Herausforderungen. Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues , Bd. 41, 2006. Ed. Bahrs, E.; Cramon-Taubadel, S.; Spiller, A. et al. Landwirtschaftsverlag GmbH, Münster. p. 480.

[xxi] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. p. 12.

[xxii] Feichtinger, Paul (2014): The Influence of the Common Agricultural Policy on Agricultural Land Prices. Technische Universität München, Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre – Umweltökonomie und Agrarpolitik, München. p. X.

[xxiii] Brandt, Hartmut (2004): Kosten und Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) in Deutschland. Oxfam Deutschland , Berlin. p. III.

[xxiv] Daugbjerg, Carsten; Tranter, Richard; Jones, Philip et al. (2005): The visibility of agricultural subsidies and market illusions in the Common Agricultural Policy: Some evidence from farmers’ views in Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom. In: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44, Issue 6. p. 764.

Während der Klimakonferenz der Vereinten Nationen in Madrid im Dezember 2019 veröffentlichten „Germanwatch“, das „Climate Action Network“ und das „New Climate Institute“ eine Rangfolge ihres Klimaschutzindexes (KSI). Darin wurden 57 Staaten anhand der Kategorien (1) Treibhausgase, (2) Erneuerbare Energien, (3) Energieverbrauch und (4) Umweltpolitik bewertet. Auf Rang 50 des KSI rangiert Polen. Damit ist es das am schlechtesten bewertete Mitglied der Europäischen Union (EU) und steht so der ambitionierten Klimapolitik der EU konträr gegenüber (Germanwatch, Climate Action Network, NewClimate Intitute 2019). Die folgende Analyse widmet sich der Untersuchung der Klimapolitik Polens und beleuchtet anhand dessen die Stellung der EU für Polen.

Zu Beginn wird die geschichtliche und gegenwärtige Bedeutung der Kohleindustrie in Polen aufgezeigt. Anschließend werden die klimapolitischen Verflechtungen zwischen der EU und Polen betrachtet, bevor abschließend die daraus resultierende Sichtweise Polens auf die EU erläutert wird.

2. Die Klimapolitik Polens

a) Etablierung der Kohleenergie als Hauptenergiequelle Polens

Nach dem Ende des 2. Weltkriegs wurde Polen, im Zuge einer umfassenden Industrialisierung der kommunistischen Regierung, zu einer Planwirtschaft aufgebaut. Der wichtigste Energieträger zu dieser Zeit war die Kohle. (Szabo, Fabok 2020: 5). Im Jahr 1989 kam es zu einem politischen und wirtschaftlichen Systemwechsel, wobei das System der Marktwirtschaft etabliert wurde (Institute of Environmental Protection – National Research Institute 2018: 6). Aufgrund der mangelnden klimapolitischen Maßnahmen vor 1989, erbte Polen nach der Transformation veraltete Technologien und somit auch ausgeprägte Umweltverschmutzungen (Marcinkiewicz, Tosun 2015: 2). Mit der neuen Wirtschaftsordnung gelang es nach 1989, vor allem im Sektor der Energieerzeugung und in der Industrie, signifikante Fortschritte bei der Energieeffizienz und der Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen zu erreichen. Diese Erfolge konnten dazu beitragen, die Umweltverschmutzung zu reduzieren (Institute of Environmental Protection – National Research Institute 2018: 6). Dennoch etablierte sich die Kohle als Hauptenergiequelle Polens (Szabo, Fabok 2020: 5). Die systembedingten klimapolitischen Änderungen reichten jedoch nicht für einen EU-Beitritt aus, weshalb die Reduktionsanstrengungen, bis zum Beitritt im Jahr 2004, weiter erhöht werden mussten. Seitdem hat Polen Probleme die Klimaschutzstandards der EU umzusetzen. Der Staat gibt der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Vorrang vor dem Klimaschutz (Marcinkiewicz, Tosun 2015: 2). Die geschichtlichen Hintergründe und die in der Bevölkerung etablierte Annahme, dass Polen auf Kohle errichtet worden sei, stärkt zudem die umwelt- und klimaschädliche Kohleindustrie (Szabo, Fabok 2020: 5). Nach Angaben des polnischen „Institute for Environmental Research“ wurde im Jahr 2018 79% der Elektrizität Polens durch Kohleverstromung erzeugt. (Institute of Environmental Protection – National Research Institute 2018: 17). Zusätzlich sind zwischen der Kohleindustrie und der polnischen Regierung bis heute intensive Verbindungen zu erkennen, welche bereits seit dem kommunistischen System bestehen. Vier der fünf dominierenden Kohlebergbauunternehmen sind entweder vollständig oder teilweise im Besitz des polnischen Staates, der daher großes Eigeninteresse an deren Erhaltung und Förderung hat. Ein häufig aufkommendes Argument für das Festhalten an der Kohleenergie ist der Schutz der Energiesicherheit Polens. Aufgrund des großen Kohlevorkommens hat Polen eine geringe Energieabhängigkeit (28,6%). Ein Abwenden von der Kohleindustrie würde wohl eine erhöhte Energieabhängigkeit von Russland bedeuten. Aufgrund geschichtlicher Ereignisse ist ein solch unausgeglichenes Machtverhältnis zwischen Russland und Polen sowohl für die polnische Regierung als auch für die Bevölkerung nicht vorstellbar. Die hohe Energieunabhängigkeit soll sich daher in Zukunft nicht verändern. Zusätzlich sind die über 240 Bergbaugewerkschaften traditionell sehr einflussreich und genießen auch in der Bevölkerung großes Ansehen. Problematisch für die polnische Regierung ist allerdings die abnehmende Rentabilität der Kohleindustrie: Allein im Jahr 2014 verlor diese mehr als 380 Millionen Euro und sammelt so steigende Schulden an. Mehr noch – Investitionen in veraltete Kraftwerke werden zunehmend notwendig, was neue Kosten verursacht. Dennoch überwiegt der hohe soziale Stellenwert, denn tausende Arbeitsplätze und teilweise sogar ganze Regionen sind von der Kohleindustrie abhängig. Aus diesen Gründen wird die polnische Regierung auch in Zukunft, mithilfe von Modernisierungen und dem Bau neuer Kohlekraftwerke, Kohle, als Hauptenergieträger Polens, fördern. Die Instandhaltung der Kohleindustrie wird auch durch EU-Fördermittel, welche eigentlich für klimaschonende Maßnahmen vorgesehen sind, unterstützt. Im Sinne einer solchen Energiepolitik wird die Implementierung nachhaltiger Erneuerbarer Energien bewusst gehemmt. Aufgrund Polens hoher Abhängigkeit von der Kohle würde ein Kohleausstieg die Transformation des gesamten Energiesystems nach sich ziehen. Diese gravierenden Veränderungen versucht die polnische Regierung zu vermeiden (Szabo, Fabok 2020: 5ff.).

b) Die polnische Klimapolitik in der EU

Die polnische Klimapolitik ist eng mit der Klimapolitik der EU verflochten. (Marcinkiewicz, Tosun 2015: 2). Die EU setzte sich das Ziel ihre Treibhausgasemissionen bis zum Jahr 2030, im Vergleich zum Basisjahr 1990, um mindestens 40% zu senken. Zur Erreichung dieses EU-Ziels verpflichtete sich Polen seine Treibhausgasemissionen in den Sektoren, die nicht vom Emissionshandelssystem (EU-EHS) abgedeckt werden, bis 2030, im Vergleich zum Jahr 2005, um 7% zu senken (EU 2018: 26ff.). Mit dem von der Europäischen Kommission vorgeschlagenen „European Green Deal“ verschärft die EU ihre Zielsetzung.  Bis 2030 sollen nun 50% der EU-Emissionen eingespart werden und 2050 die Klimaneutralität erreicht werden. (Europäische Kommission 2019). Während Polen das Ziel einer 40% Senkung innerhalb der EU akzeptierte[1], lehnte die polnische Regierung den Kommissionsvorschlag zum „Green Deal“ ab und forderte, das Klimaneutralitätsziel auf 2070 zu verschieben. Als Konsequenz entschied die EU, Polen vorerst vom „Green Deal“ auszunehmen, sprach der polnischen Regierung allerdings eine Bedenkzeit, für einen nachträglichen Beitritt, bis . (Hasselbach 2019).

Diese Ablehnung zunehmender Klimaschutzmaßnahmen entspricht der klimapolitischen Linie Polens. Die Regierung positioniert sich sowohl im eigenen Land als auch auf EU-Ebene klar gegen klimapolitische Maßnahmen und ist daher somit selber die größte Barriere für eine kohlenstoffarme Wirtschaft in Polen. Die Visegrád-Gruppe (V4), deren Mitglieder Polen, Tschechien, Slowakei und Ungarn sind, stehen der Klimapolitik der EU kritisch gegenüber und besitzen großen Einfluss auf europäische klimapolitische Entscheidungen. Verantwortlich für die ablehnende Haltung Polens gegenüber der EU-Klimapolitik ist, dass sie selber nicht von einer klimaschonenden Transformation profitieren würden. Innerhalb der EU ist Polen somit der größte Gegner von europäischen Klimaschutzverpflichtungen. Gleichzeitig hat die polnische Regierung die überwiegend regierungsfreundliche polnische Medienlandschaft hinter sich vereint. Sie porträtieren ambitionierten Klimaschutz häufig als Versuch der EU, Polens industrielles System von Grund auf neu gestalten zu wollen. Diesen Umständen nach beschränkt sich Polens Klimapolitik vor allem darauf, lediglich den Mindeststandards der EU-Klimapolitik nachzukommen. Dabei ist zu erkennen, dass bei der Umsetzung dieser Mindestanforderungen große Mängel vorhanden sind (Schwartzkopff, Schulz 2019: 2ff.). Dementsprechend kommt das polnische Umweltministerium 2019 zum Ergebnis, dass Polen das 7%-Reduktionsziel in den Nicht-EU-EHS Sektoren bis 2030 voraussichtlich nicht erreichen wird (Ministry of Climate 2019: 45).

3. Die Bedeutung der EU für Polen

Die EU hat nicht nur in der Klimapolitik, sondern auch in vielen weiteren Politikbereichen maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Politik Polens. Die EU unterstützt Polen mit großzügigen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Leistungen. Somit gehört Polen zu den größten Empfängern finanzieller EU-Mittel (Netto-Empfänger). Die polnische Bevölkerung ist sich dieser Vorteile bewusst und daher pro-europäisch eingestellt (Schwartzkopff, Schulz 2019: 9ff.). Trotz all dem steht die polnische Regierung der EU ablehnend gegenüber. Diese Skepsis ergibt sich aus einem Küber die Werte der EU. Die EU stellt Die nationalkonservative polnische Regierung, welche zunehmend autoritäre Merkmale aufweist, stimmt mit den Werten der EU aus in vielen Punkten nicht mehr überein und fühlt sich durch deren steigenden Einfluss zunehmend in ihrer Souveränität bedroht. Dies ist der Grund, weshalb die polnische Regierung die EU in eine reine Wirtschafts- und Sicherheitsunion umwandeln möchte. (Schwartzkopff, Schulz 2019: 20). Die aktuelle nationalkonservative Regierung stellt traditionelle Werte der polnischen Geschichte in den Vordergrund, wobei die Kohleindustrie und der Bergbau untrennbar mit der polnischen Geschichte verbunden sind. Aus Sicht der polnischen Regierung werden durch die europäische Klimaschutzpolitik nicht nur das bestehende wirtschafts- und energiepolitische System Polens bedroht, sondern indirekt auch die traditionellen polnischen Werte und die Geschichte Polens. Die polnische Regierung empfindet die Klimapolitik der EU daher als unrechtmäßigen Eingriff in ihre Souveränität. Obwohl diese Haltung sowohl im eigenen Land als auch in der EU stark kritisiert wird, versucht die Regierung wenigstens die Mindestanforderungen der europäischen Klimapolitik zu erfüllen. So kann Polen weiterhin von der EU profitieren, ohne grundlegende systemische Änderungen an der Klimapolitik vorzunehmen. Die polnische Klimapolitik ist somit repräsentativ für die Wahrnehmung der EU aus Sicht der polnischen Regierung. Obwohl diese die EU als Werteunion ablehnt, profitiert sie zu sehr von den sozialen und finanziellen Leistungen der EU, um sich ernsthaft von ihr abzuwenden. Diese „Toleranzpolitik“ Polens gegenüber der EU stellt für die polnische Regierung eine geeignete Kompromisslösung dar. Für die EU ist dies allerdings eine Demonstration ihrer mangelnden politischen Durchsetzungsfähigkeit.

4. Fazit

Anhand des Rückblicks auf die geschichtlichen und aktuellen Gegebenheiten der polnischen Klimapolitik wurde die ambivalente Beziehung Polens zur EU untersucht. Die Analyse zeigt, dass in naher Zukunft nicht mit einer Transformation der polnischen Klimapolitik zu rechnen ist. Diese klimapolitische ablehnende Haltung wird, im Hinblick auf die ambitionierten Klimaschutzziele der EU, in Zukunft verstärkt für Diskussionen, Konflikte und ein deutlich abgekühltes Verhältnis der politischen Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Polen führen.

5. Literaturverzeichnis

European Commission 2019: Annex to the Communication on the European Green Deal, [online] https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication-annex-roadmap_en.pdf

Europäische Union: VERORDNUNG (EU) 2018/842 DES EUROPÄISCHEN PARLAMENTS UND DES RATES vom 30. Mai 2018 zur Festlegung verbindlicher nationaler Jahresziele für die Reduzierung der Treibhausgasemissionen im Zeitraum 2021 bis 2030 als Beitrag zu Klimaschutzmaßnahmen zwecks Erfüllung der Verpflichtungen aus dem Übereinkommen von Paris sowie zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 525/2013, ABl. L 156 vom 19.06.2018, S. 26 – 42

Germanwatch, NewClimate Institute, Climate Action Network 2019: Majority of countries

show decline in emissions: Climate Change Performance Index sees opportunity for turning point, [online] https://www.climate-change-performance-index.org/sites/default/files/documents/ccpi_2020_international_press_release.pdf

Hasselbach, Christoph 2019: Zustimmung zum Green Deal – ohne Polen, in: Deutsche Welle, [online] https://www.dw.com/de/zustimmung-zum-green-deal-ohne-polen/a-51651201 [22.05.2020]

Institute of Environmental Protection – National Research Institute 2018: Actions and challenges for climate protection in Poland – brief overview, [online] https://cop24.gov.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/files/2._Brief_overview.pdf

Marcinkiewicz, Kamil / Tosun Jale 2015: Contesting climate change: mapping the political debate in Poland, in: East European Politics, Bd. 3, 2. Aufl., 2015, [online] http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2015.1022648

Ministry of Climate 2019: The 2030 National Environmental Policy, [online] https://bip.mos.gov.pl/strategie-plany-programy/polityka-ekologiczna-panstwa-2030-strategia-rozwoju-w-obszarze-srodowiska-i-gospodarki-wodnej/

Schwartzkopff, Julian / Schulz, Sabrina 2017: Climate & Energy Snapshot: Poland, [online] https://www.e3g.org/docs/Climate_energy_snaphot_PL_updated_2.pdf

Szabo, John / Fabok Marton 2020: Infrastructures and state building: Comparing the energy politics of the European Commission with the governments of Hungary and Poland, in: Energy Policy, Bd. 138, 3. Aufl., [online] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111253

[1] Die jetzige Regierung Polens kritisiert auch dieses Ziel scharf und drängt auf neue Verhandlungen, ist aber an die Zielvorgabe, die durch die vorangegangene Regierung verhandelt wurde, gebunden. (Schwartzkopff/ Schulz, 2019: 19)

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

The EPPO is a new European Institution, which will make observations about fraud and corruption in Member States like the OLAF did before. However, it will have greater power, because as its name says, the institution will have the authority to prosecute.

This new institution changes the sharing of power between the European institutions. While the OLAF made observations for the European Commission, the EPPO works independently from the Commission, whose role is weakened. On the other hand, the European Parliament’s role – which is the only institution whose representatives are elected directly by the European citizens – is growing (e.g.: co-decision with the Council of the EU)

What is the perspective of the Hungarian government and the opposition on this subject?

According to the Hungarian Government, the most important issue is that this institution could provoke a crisis of national sovereignty. The Government sees the Hungarian Prosecutor’s Office’s work as sufficient to deal with the Hungarian cases. The Hungarian Minister of Justice, Judit Varga stated in 2019 that joining the EPPO would be unconstitutional.

The Hungarian opposition parties have a different point of view on this subject. The European Parliament’s MP, Anna Donáth (Renew Europe) has recently said on Hungarian television, that if Brussels gave resources to Member States, it should also have the possibility to control and review the usage of the latter by the governments. That is why her political group, Renew Europe, proposes that resource donors (e.g.: Cohesion Fund) should have a say in the EPPO.

Anna Donáth’s narrative fits into the European perspective: every European citizen has the right to know how their tax-money has been spent in the different member states. If the European Union can guarantee transparency, and if the EPPO can show results from its work in the foreseeable future, citizens will trust European Institutions more, and will therefore trust the EPPO.

Undoubtfully, this issue will remain a theme of political debate between the Hungarian government and the opposition parties in the future. It has made the cleavage between the different European perspectives more apparent than ever, between the ones who support the national sovereignty and refuse any closer union, and the others who believe in the power of an “ever closer union”.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

Is it truly possible to form a co-dependent syndicate out of internationally independent States? Can a group of sovereign states achieve a unification which incorporates pure democracy and impenetrable solidarity? From a background which consists of colonization and bloodshed over the acquisition of territory, the post-World War system produced a breakthrough in the areas of trade liberalization and international treaty-making. Among these advancements was the European Coal and Steel Community; an effort to secure peace between victors and vanquished after World War Two, which would eventually blossom into the complex institutional structure of today’s European Union (EU). After adopting a common currency, responding as a unit to terrorist threats and international human rights violations, surviving more than one global economic crisis and tackling the extant global pandemic, democracy and unity within the Union are concepts which somehow remain surrounded by a semblance of scepticism. The present writer will proceed to outline the digressing perceptions of democracy within the Union by analysing the current state of affairs of the EU migration policy.

The issue of democratic deficit has been appraised by the Von der Leyen Commission, under which a new push for European democracy is anticipated. This will be characterized by a Conference on the Future of Europe which allows citizens to actively participate in decision-making, an improvement of the lead candidate system and modes for transparency and closer-cooperation (Von der Leyen, 2019, p.19). Albeit the fact that these goals harbour the possibility of a democratically sounder European Union, there is evidence that the Member States’ perspectivism of democracy differs vastly.

2. Democracy in Context

“In a democracy, important public decisions on questions of law and policy depend, directly or indirectly, upon public opinion formally expressed by citizens of the community, the vast bulk of whom have equal political rights.” (Weale, 1999, p.14) Accordingly, the focus must be on constructing a migration policy which somewhat represents the collective EU-opinion, because migration affects all actors within the Union. Dahl developed two basic dimensions of democracy; competitiveness of decision-making and political participation (Dahl, 1989, p.221.). As expressed by John Stuart Mill, this enables large democracies to “limit the sovereignty of the individual over himself” (Mill, 1859, p. 140.). In the EU, Article 2 of the TEU recognizes democracy as a key value of the Union and links it to principles such as respect for human and minority rights, and rule of law. Therefore, migration policy must be developed in an atmosphere of compromise and tolerance, and decisions must be made to protect the rights of all concerned parties. There must be an incorporation of direct democracy exercised through the surveyance of public opinion (Dalton et. al, 2001, p.142), because citizens who elect government representatives should not subsequently have to remain voiceless for the remainder of their term in office.

3. Beyond the 2015 Migrant Crisis

In 2015, almost two million migrants entered Europe, seeking asylum from unsafe conditions in their countries of origin (BBC News, 2016).  This sparked a crisis which necessitated years of migration policy reform. The Union was divided not only in the varying degrees to which Member States were affected but in their independent responses to the crisis. Among some of the most memorable; German Chancellor Angela Merkel pledged Germany’s support and offer of temporary residence to refugees in her famous “Wir schaffen das!” speech, despite resistance from multiple fronts. Contrarily, there were reports in Hungary of the deliberate starvation and detention of migrants (UN News, 2019). Italy, being a main entry point for refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea, widened its government deficit in an attempt to finance the entry of migrants.

The national migration policies which were hastily adopted often clashed with EU law standards, for example with the common visa requirement and free movement of the Schengen area. These events exhibited the need for greater solidarity and democracy within the decision-making structures of the Union. Five years later, the Union has been able to birth a response to its migration situation. The EU stance on immigration is characterized by resettlement programmes, enhanced border controls and security, and visa policy reforms. These policies- although making strides on the international scene- are struggling to remedy the democratic inadequacies of the 2015 crisis.

Germany

Germany has recently enhanced its open-door policy, and passed a new Skilled Immigration Act, the “Fachkräftezuwanderungsgesetz” in March 2020 (Sanderson, 2020). This provides an easier channel for migrants with professional or non-academic training from non-EU countries to work in Germany and seeks to lessen the priority given to EU nationals in fields where there is a strong demand. The Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) found in a survey that 44 percent of Germany’s working-age population favoured a higher intake of skilled migrants and 21 percent advocated for a reduction thereof (Leifels, 2019, p.1).

An analysis of these facts reveals that democracy in Germany is viewed as a reflection of general public consensus gathered from past responses to similar topics, and is a reflection of national values. This is because the general proclivity towards migrants is evident in German policy, as is the partial disdain towards their presence. For example, the pressures from far-right actors in the government led to the controversial German Orderly Return Law (Geordnete-Rückkehr-Gesetz), catering for a sped-up deportation process and bolstered police presence on the nation’s borders to deter asylum seekers. German democracy is strongly rooted in the preservation of human rights, and this evidenced in its continued receptiveness towards migrants since 2015. While the EU is being criticized for decreasing its Mediterranean rescue efforts, German cities have petitioned to take in more refugees in January 2020, despite the existing EU distribution system (Davis, 2020). Consequently, the political attitude of Germany towards migration reveals a unique aspect of its democracy: it incorporates the public opinion, and places at its apex the conservation of human rights.

Hungary

After the crisis shook Europe, the European Union set up a mandatory refugee redistribution system which was rejected by the Hungarian government (Juhász et al., 2015, p.15). The response of Hungary varied greatly from the German disposition. There are reports of the deliberate starvation of asylum seekers in detention, and refusal to allow the transit through Hungary of migrants seeking asylum in Germany and other European Countries (UN News, 2019). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee has appealed to the European Court of Human Rights and won several appeals against the Hungarian government for using starvation as a deterrent (Mrav, Amiel, 2020). Special Rapporteur for the United Nations, Mr. Felipe González Morales reported the prevalence of government-run campaigns associating migrants with security threats such as terrorism (UN News, 2019). This mode of shaping the public opinion suggests that democracy in Hungary is perceived as the will of the people as determined by authoritative precedent and interventions.

In May 2020, the Hungarian government closed border container camps after the European Court of Justice ruled that migrants were being held unlawfully. However, under the leadership of right-wing Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the government released a statement saying the act of the Union was risky and harmful to Europe’s security. Orban, on several occasions, has expressed his desire to transform the country into an “illiberal state”, and this clearly presents a distinct form of democracy. Participation and rule of EU law are not main concerns of Hungarian democracy. Contrary to J.S. Mill’s theory, Hungary does not seek limit its powers over itself, but to expand them in a nationalistic environment.

Italy

Italy’s public opinion figures over history have revealed it to be a ‘fertile ground for far-right politics’ for decades (Gattinara, 2017, p.324). Moreover, there has been popularity of anti-refugee campaigning which, similar to Hungary, may have influenced public opinion. Public opinion suggests that Italians are oriented towards the Hungarian disposition, however, government actions have suggested otherwise. After being disproportionately overwhelmed by the COVID-19 pandemic, Italians have passed a new policy to regularise undocumented migrants working in agriculture, as part of a financial stimulus package approved by the coalition government (Reidy, 2020). Moreover, Italy has been working closely with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to improve the policies and support of asylum seekers, and alleviate the financial burden as part of the EASO’s Italy Operating Plan for 2020. As a result, it appears as though Italy’s democracy is not particularly shaped by the public opinion, and similar to Germany, is closely linked to the protection of human rights. Italy has always valued the ability of the Union to work together to share the burden of the migration crisis, and this reveals a unique aspect of solidarity within its democratic framework.

The chaos ensuing from the European migration situation is indicative of a dearth of unity within the Union. Despite the existing EU-wide asylum policy, the divergence among national policies fuels the continuing malaise in its effectiveness. A functional democracy should lead to effective decision-making, and this has not entirely been the case in the EU. In cases where a centralized opinion is extracted and an EU law is passed, some dissenters abscond from implementation. A possible plan of action is an internal re-alignment of the concept of democracy within the EU, characterized by internal workshops and discussions. These could revamp the commitment of all Member States to the objectives of the Union and ensure that all Members, who made the independent decision to accede to the Union, are ever-willing to assimilate their national values to the Union objectives.

Unless all Union members harmonize approaches to distribution, asylum laws, border security and resource commitments, the growing disunity and fragmentation may seriously impede European Integration (Kyriakopoulos, 2019). As elucidated by the European Commission, this effort must be complemented by transparency and public involvement. This way, should future crises arise, the Union would be better able to issue a united response in a prompt and efficient manner. Europe, with its economic and political power, indeed has the tools to become “the world’s beating heart of solidarity”, as beautifully espoused by President von der Leyen herself.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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The veto issue, however, has barred High Representatives from Ashton over Mogherini to Borrell from leading the way for a united European foreign policy approach by blocking or delaying decisions, for example EU sanctions against Venezuela or statements on major international developments. Hardly as a surprise, policymakers (most recently in 2019 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her mission statement to Joseph Borrell) are pointing at the decision mechanism in the Council’s foreign minister setup to be (partly) swapped for the standard EU qualified majority voting rule as a solution.

This approach is doomed to fail. Let us remember why majority voting on foreign policy has not been there yet. The answer – high politics – has already been given. Why would proud nation states voluntarily give up their power over their most sacred field of action? This is where the EU’s foreign policy dog is biting its own unanimity tail. The European Commission ambitiously proposed to move to qualified majority in some distinct fields. Member states will not fall for this trick.

Instead, advocates for a united EU foreign policy should change their course and draw their attention to Article 238 (2) TFEU: according to this paragraph, the Council must meet a higher threshold of 72 percent of member states to reach a qualified majority decision if a proposal was not tabled by the Commission or the High Representative. This threshold may be the only chance for those dreaming of truly European diplomacy. Member states will never accept the regular qualified majority voting for the CFSP. To spell this out more clearly: with qualified majority, decisions could be taken against the combined political weight of either Germany, France and Spain; or thirteen member states just short of a third of the EU`s population.

They might, however, agree on the fact that not every single member state, no matter how big or small, should be able to block the rest of the whole bloc. The existing super-qualified majority rule provides a feasible balance, allowing member states to effectively keep hold of their political power over EU diplomacy while being freed from the restraint of the current veto right regime. The abstention clause of Article 31 (2) TEU would still allow member states to not actively execute decisions. In order to narrow the window of decision, the blocking minority should be cut down from four to three states for CFSP decisions. The basic idea of this proposal might be the only chance for EU diplomacy to become the global power that policymakers want it to be.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

Two dividing lines are shaping the European landscape. On the one hand, there is the East – West divide. It is political. The West portraits itself as the harbor of liberalism and tolerance and fears the East might become illiberal and authoritarian, whereas the East regards itself as reasonable and Western politicians as dreamers detached from reality. The growing significance of the Visegrad Group supports this claim. This conflict alone could tear apart the European Union.

In this short article though, I want to focus on another dividing line. The economic North – South divide. The South consisting of all major European economies at the coast of the Mediterranean, while the North comprises of the Germanic and Scandinavian countries. Both sides follow completely different monetary policies trying to (ab)use the European Institutions, in this case especially the European Central Bank (ECB), for their agenda. The more economically stable North prefers a restrictive monetary policy reducing their debts, lowering inflation, and most importantly getting higher interest rates for their savings.

Contrary to that, the South advocates for expansionary monetary policy. Taking huge debts to boost their weaker economies still hit by the financial crisis of 2008. Of course, they want to pay as little as possible for their debts, or in other words: Low-interest rates. In between this juncture there is France. It cannot be clearly assigned to any side of the divide. However, with Macron arguing for a European transfer union, France heavily leans towards the South.

Bluntly said, through the ECB and their policy of quantitative easing the European South wants to print its way out of its economic weakness while the North fears that ultimately it will have to pay the bill. This is visible in the wake of the current pandemic. At the EU Corona Crisis Summit in July France put “Corona-Bonds” (joint European bonds that essentially mutualize debts) on the agenda. This proposal was at first dismissed by Germany and the “Frugal Four” (a coalition of Austria, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands demanding a responsible EU budget). The stalemate was only breakable after Germany put back its own interests and joined France and mediated compromises with the “Frugal Four”. This case perfectly proves the point Gerhard Schröder was making: A European Union with a divided France and Germany will be a divided European Union. The question is: How long will Germany play this game?

It is somewhat ironic, that the unifying idea of one monetary policy, one central bank, one currency might turn out to be the explosive that separates the union. To conclude, Angela Merkel often stated, that if the Euro fails, the European Union will fail. If this is more than just political rhetoric, the European institution of a joint currency managed by one central bank becomes anything but a vessel for unity.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

COVID-19 showed what solidarity means in the EU in times of crisis, and how much these states that worked together towards seemingly common goals, are really a group of individual national states with their own interests in mind. However, there is more behind the actions that these states took during this pandemic than first catches the eye. Their actions are rather symptomatic of a bigger missed opportunity of European integration. Spain and Italy have been hit the hardest by the coronavirus outbreaks. They have also suffered from an image problem inside the Union for quite some time.

The countries’ limited impact is visible in the European Commission and European Parliament, which are rather dominated by France and Germany. Additionally, many voices in Europe claim, that these states should work on their crumbling economies, or even leave the Union, so that they will not burden it with their financial troubles. Ironically it is Poland, and not the southern states like Italy, Spain, or Greece, that gains the most net financial support from the EU, when taking the balance between money received subtracted from contributions made into account. [1]

Other than that, there is a major impact in silencing of the justice system and press in Hungary and Poland, as well as Brexit, that has retreated into the background during this crisis. The European travel ban did not include England, despite its government’s stubborn denial to take preventive measures against the outbreak of the pandemic. This skewed view of reality has led to a problematic development in European relations. Solidarity for Italy was not shown by Germany, that stopped exporting medical equipment, but instead by China.

On the other side was the heavily debated economic stimulus package that Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark blocked for a long time to make sure that debts won’t be mutualized, so that the rich countries do not have to pay for the debts of the less wealthy countries. The discussion whether the stimulus bill should be implemented evolved around whether Spain, Italy, and Greece deserve the money. Even though Hungary is the main beneficiary of the bill, the decision whether Hungary should receive money was less controversial. Greece even managed to prevent a major outbreak of the virus, but that was not taken into consideration in the discussion whether it deserves stimulus money or not. Missed considerations like these show that the discourse evolving around the worth of the member states in the European Union does not seem to take human rights or democratic and liberal values into consideration. This is problematic in and of itself, since those are the principles the EU was founded on. Instead the discourse focusses on prejudices concerning the southern states.

Europe will never be fully unified and functioning if its members continue to look down on these states during every crisis, because the missing support will lead them down a road of a worse financial future and will, if it already hasn’t, sooner or later affect them politically. This might lead to an alienation of these countries from the EU or more generally from the international community and to an uprising of nationalist powers within these countries. These parties will receive support from societies that grow more and more hostile toward their European neighbors.

[1] Source: Buchholz, Katharina (2020): Infographic: Which Countries Are EU Contributors and Beneficiaries? Statista Infographics. Text available at: https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/ (last viewed 26.6.2020).

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

In March 2017, the European Commission issued a White Paper on the Future of Europe, outlining five scenarios for Europe by 2025. This triggered intense debates across the European Union (EU) regarding the direction and speed of integration that citizens and governments were prepared to pursue in order to foster ever closer ‘unity in diversity’. The concept of differentiated integration (DI) emerged as a solution for accommodating diversity within the EU, as it implies that individual countries – be they EU or non-EU countries – can have different levels of involvement in particular European policy fields, as well as different degrees of institutional engagement and participation (Laffan 2020). However, DI can also be seen as an approach that can foster cleavages between the more economically advanced, typically older EU member states, and the newer EU member states. Seeking to grasp a better understanding of how new member states perceive DI, we have undertaken a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Romanian decision-makers’ official communications between 2006-2020[1], regarding the future of EU integration. Through this paper, we argue that leaders in Romania are among the staunchest supporters of deeper and wider European integration, and are strongly against any development scenarios that are based on a two-speed, or two-tier EU, that would divide member states into different camps.

2.    Differentiated integration in the EU

The EU is a compound polity composed of parts, i.e. the member states and the collective, i.e. the actors at the supranational level which make up the EU’s institutional apparatus (Laffan 2019). The EU is a relatively thin governance system that has limited collective resources and capacities, and must leverage its member states’ capacities and engagement in order to function effectively as a polity and as a system of public policy. Contemporary studies of European integration share the assumption that DI helps the EU to adjust to the growing heterogeneity of its member states and to better respond to the contestation of its policies (Schimmelfennig & Schraff 2020).

However, DI can influence the EU’s input and output legitimacy at the domestic and European level in both positive and negative ways. On the one hand, by fostering projects that allow for the integration of the member states based on their respective needs, preferences and capacities through the Treaty mechanism of ‘enhanced cooperation’, the EU can overcome decision-making deadlocks and can increase its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. On the other hand, by allowing states to opt-in or out of certain policies, DI may foster distrust among the member states by precipitating negative economic and political externalities for countries that do not join an initiative for enhanced cooperation, by creating cleavages in the EU’s legal frameworks or by threatening the institutional integration of the common market (Witte 2018; Eriksen 2018).

Among the consequences of DI for the future of Europe, there may be a Europe of ‘different speeds’ (e.g. two-speed EU; multi-speed EU) and a Europe of ‘different end-points’ (e.g. two-tier EU; core Europe; Europe of concentric circles or of variable geometry; or Europe à la carte) (Stubb 1996). Depending on the level of economic development, but also on their historical, cultural and political features, EU member states may have a favourable position towards DI, or may radically oppose it. Through our study, we have discovered that one of the EU countries that strongly opposes a ‘different-speeds EU’, as well as a ‘different end-points EU’, is Romania. The next section explains why that is the case.

3.    Romania’s position regarding differentiated integration in the EU

Thirty years after the collapse of the communist regime and more than a decade since joining the EU in 2007, Romania is still struggling to consolidate its democracy and to become a fully-fledged EU member state by joining the Schengen area and the Eurozone. Through its EU accession agreements, Romania is legally obliged to join both areas as soon as the country fulfils the necessary technical requirements, and is hence not able to opt-out from these areas of European integration like other older EU member states have, such as Denmark in the case of the euro, and Ireland in the case of Schengen. While Eurozone accession has been delayed because of the country’s technical unpreparedness, Romania’s accession to the Schengen area has been repeatedly denied by the European Council on political grounds[2]. This has come to be seen by many Romanians as a symbol of the country’s status as a second-class member state in the EU and of the EU’s lack of trust in Romania’ capacities to protect the EU’s external borders.

Despite this breach of trust, Romania remains keen to become a member of the Schengen area, as this is seen as a way of confirming Romania’s right to equal and fair treatment as a full member of the family of European democracies.  Our study confirms that “Romania clearly maintains its positive view towards deepening [integration within] the [European] Union, with all its successful policies and projects, especially the Internal Market, the Schengen Area and the Eurozone”,as former Prime Minister Sorin Grindeanu stated in March 2017, when he also reaffirmed “Romania’s support for a consolidated, unitary and inclusive Europe”^[3]. Moreover, Romanian leaders seem to perceive the Treaty mechanism of ‘enhanced cooperation’ as an integration mechanism that provides room for all the European states to act together eventually, as the door remains open for Member States to join enhanced cooperation programmes and activities when they are prepared. Successive Romanian governments’ support for enhanced cooperation can thus be seen as a preference for ‘more cooperation’ or for ‘doing much more together’ – as framed by the Commission in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, rather than meaning ‘moving ahead in small groups’, as foreseen in the Treaty on European Union.

This position is perhaps best explained by Romania’s pro-European electorate and decision-makers, as well as by the Romanian governments’ desire to be on an equal footing with older EU member states in the decision-making processes. However, given the country’s communist past and continuous struggle to catch-up with the Western European countries, any sort of European integration through different speeds or different end-points is strongly opposed, as it is perceived as a sign of European discrimination that would leave Romania in a ‘second-tier’ Europe.

On the one hand, the reluctance to accept a multi-speed Europe can be explained by a fear among Romanians of being left behind in the EU’s periphery, which among other things may be reminiscent of the Iron Curtain and how it once divided Europe. On the other hand, the preference for enhanced cooperation reflects not only the governments’ positive perception regarding EU integration, but also the high domestic demand for more integration, particularly with regard to the Schengen area and the Eurozone – two of the most tangible areas of European integration. The higher the degree of integration in the EU, the higher the perceived Romanian political influence in the EU would be, and the greater would be Romania’s access to the benefits of a fully-fledged EU membership.

In this regard, Romania’s President, Klaus Iohannis, has asserted on several occasions, including during European Council’s meetings, that a multi-speed Europe “could even lead to the splitting up of the European Union”, as it would be “more likely to amplify dissent between Member States, rather than to lead to closer cooperation”^[4]. Among the greatest risks perceived by Iohannis was that of separating Europe in two, with industrialised countries fearing the loss of their jobs to Eastern European workers on one side, and Eastern European countries fearing the loss of their citizens to Western European countries on the other.

This analysis also points to the fact that, if DI was unavoidable, Romania would seek to undertake the necessary measures to join the ‘core’ Europe, as it is arguably doing presently with respect to its accession to the Schengen area and to the Eurozone. Joining the Eurozone and the Schengen areas seem to be a common goal for both the current government and the opposition, and deeper integration in these two areas has consistently been considered a priority by Romanian decision-makers since 2007, when Romania became an EU Member State.

4.    Conclusions

Notwithstanding the series of crises that has hit the EU over recent years, the challenges to European integration did not result in any notable preference for opt-outs from the processes of European integration among Romania’s political leaders. Conversely, the Romanian governments and opposition alike continuously stress the need for deeper integration with the country’s European partners, but crucially, this ought to be on an equal footing, undifferentiated by concentric circles or different speeds, so as to prevent the Union from falling apart. It is important to note that this pro-European position seems to be independent of context and political ideology, as Romanian decision-makers from across the political spectrum share the same general aim of strengthening the European project and of supporting its evolution towards ever-closer union.

5.    References

Eriksen, Erik O. 2018. “Political Differentiation and the Problem of Dominance: Segmentation and Hegemony.” European Journal of Political Research 57(989–1008).

European Commission. 2017. White paper on the future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025. European Comission. Brussels, March 2017.

Laffan, B. (2019). How the EU27 came to be. Journal of common market studies, 57, 13-27.

Laffan, B. 2020. The Challenge of Integrating Diversity in the European Union. Published on 18 February 2020, accessible at: http://indiveu.eui.eu/2020/02/18/the-challenge-of-integrating-diversity-in-the-european-union/

Schimmelfennig, F. & Schraff, D. 2020. Does differentiated integration improve citizens’ assessment of the European Union? Published on 18 February 2020, accessible at: http://indiveu.eui.eu/2020/02/18/does-differentiated-integration-improve-citizens-assessment-of-the-european-union/

Stubb, Alexander C-G. 1996. “A Categorization of Differentiated Integration.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 34(2): 283–95.

Witte, Bruno de. 2018. “An Undivided Union? Differentiated Integration in Post-Brexit Times.” Common Market Law Review 55: 227–50.

^[1] This analysis was undertaken in the framework of the EU-funded InDivEU (Integrating Diversity in the European Union) project, whereby we analysed key speeches made by Romanian Heads of State and Prime Ministers, government programs as well as political debates held in the Romanian Parliament, between 2006-2020. The InDivEU Project has project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 822304. For more information see: http://indiveu.eui.eu/

[2] The Council’s decision to deny Romania’s right to join the Schengen area came in stark contrast to the European Commission’s comprehensive technical evaluation and recognition of the country’s full compliance with the Schengen accession criteria, issued in 2011. See, in particular, the report by the European deputy Carlos Coelho in which the following is indicated: “At this moment, both Romania and Bulgaria have proved that they are sufficiently prepared to apply all the provisions of the Schengen acquis in a satisfactory manner” in ‘Report on the draft Council decision on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania’, A7-0185/2011, 04/05/2011

[3] Original quote in Romanian: “România își menține clar poziția privind aprofundarea Uniunii, cu toate politicile și proiectele sale de succes, mai ales Piața Internă, Spațiul Schengen și zona Euro. Reconfirm susținerea României față de o Europă consolidată, unitară și inclusive.” Sorin Grindeanu, former Romanian Prime Minister, Social-Democratic Party, Meeting of the Party of European Socialists – Brussels, 09.03.2017.

[4] Original quote in Romanian: “ar putea chiar să ducă la scindarea Uniunii Europene”; “şi una, şi alta, sunt mai degrabă de natură să amplifice o disensiune între statele membre, în loc să ducă la o colaborare aprofundată.” Klaus Iohannis, Romanian Head of State, Press Conference, European Council informal meeting in Rome, 25.03.2017

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

40 years afterwards, Brandt’s act has more than just a merely historic significance. Though embedded within the modern framework of European institutions, the bilateral German-Polish relationship has noticeably deteriorated over the past few years. The PiS-party’s conservative policies and its planned judiciary reform in Poland as well as the German government’s comparatively progressive stance in climate and migration policy have resulted in mutual scepticism and distrust among decision-makers of the two countries.

This development is not just lamentable considering the historic chance for rapprochement which is being missed, but in particular because of the good reasons for a closer cooperation between the two countries.

Firstly, both countries can look back upon a deeply interlinked history and culture. The peaceful coexistence of Germans and Poles in Silesia, Poznán or Masuria is historically unique and should be a focal point in cultural cooperation. Similarly, the troubled relationship in more recent centuries requires thorough reappraisal beyond ceaseless quarrels over reparation demands. Germany and Poland may constructively foster societal interconnections by funding German-Polish economic partnerships as well as projects in culture and art promoting the bilateral relationship.

Apart from this, closer German-Polish cooperation bears the chance of cementing economic relations between the two nations. Germany remains to be the most important trading partner for Poland and thousands of people cross the border commuting to their workplace each day. Ambitious projects such as the development of the Szeczin metropolitan area or the German-Polish university in Frankfurt/Slubice would receive a decisive boost from sustaining underlying political structures.

A German-Polish partnership could likewise produce considerable progress for the mulitateral European political realm. It his highly relevant to consider that apart from Germany and Poland various Eastern European nations find themselves increasingly isolated amid the present embroilments in foreign affairs. Other nations might likewise be attracted by an alternative to the traditional US-Russia dichotomy in Europe. An illustrious German-Polish partnership would presumably not fail to resonate within the Baltic States, Czechia or Romania.

In an era of declining multilateralism both nations find themselves in a delicate geopolitical position. Confidence in the commitment of the United States to its traditional allies has been fundamentally shattered by the Trump‘s administration‘s capricious foreign policy. Britain and Russia have proven themselves to be unreliable partners for European countries, whereas French calls for EU reform and closer cooperation with Russia have bewildered many German and Polish observers. The task of creating integrative political superstructures for Eastern Europe is therefore left for the regional powers themselves to complete.

If both countries realise the rewards to be reapedby closer cooperation, the political differences between the two nation‘s governments can be bridged and result in a revival of multilateralism in Eastern Europe. Germany‘s government should take the initiative and, in doing so, continue what Willy Brandt first committed to 40 years ago.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.