Join us for interactive presentations, hear critical stances on Europe’s reactionary foreign policy and relation to Russian-backed separatism in Eastern Europe and discuss Russian-backed separatism, the role of de-facto states in the war against Ukraine, and the EU’s reactionary policy towards separatism in its backyard.

The event will kick off with a presentation by Nikolaus von Twickel (Zentrum Liberale Moderne) on the Donetsk and Luhansk so-called ‘People’s Republics’ – how did they come to be, and how were they instrumentalized for the war against Ukraine.
Continuing, PhD candidate Keith Harrington (Maynooth University) will present a much older case: Transnistria. How does such an isolated place persist over time despite all odds? Why is Transnistria different than other de-facto states? Is Transnistria really the next front of Russian aggression?
Following these presentations, we will hear two critical analyses of European policy toward Russian-backed separatism over the years by Prof. Andrey Makarychev (University of Tartu).

Following all blocks, we will have a Q&A session. Presentations and Discussion in English.
We look forward to learning and discussing with you on June 25th at 14:00 in person at the Gesellschaft für Europabildung – Petersburger Straße 94, 10247 Berlin – (U-Frankfurter Tor).

Registration via E-Mail only at lance.bradley@ciss.eu
Location: Gesellschaft für Europabildung, Petersburger Straße 94, 10247 Berlin (U-Frankfurter Tor)

What’s in it for you? 

We offer you the chance to have your paper published on our think tank’s website and we will promote your article on our social media channels.

Interested? 

Please send your submission (in English or German) to CISS’s regional directors for Eastern Europe to Central Asia at: lance.bradley@ciss.eu or lea.siebel@ciss.eu

Deadline:

01.10.2021

Please see this flyer for further information. Article submissions are accepted on a rolling basis until October 1, 2021. For any questions please send an email CISS’s Regional Director for Eastern Europe to Central Asia to Lance Bradley or Lea Siebel at lance.bradley@ciss.eu or lea.siebel@ciss.eu

These two interconnected factors make it difficult for the EU to make sense of the new status quo. While the influence of Moscow serves very little purpose but to help the ruling regime stay in power, the support of the Chinese state is quite real across the board. There have been no major Russian companies or state capital moving into Serbia (with the exception of the gas sector, which can also be seen as not being an investment, but a payment to Moscow for its support over Kosovo, whereby Serbia’s gas industry was handed over far below the market value). China, on the other hand, is creating jobs in an economy plagued by underemployment. Former major industrial centers like Smederevo and Bor have provided China with both access to strategic resources on EU’s doorstep (steel, copper, and possibly gold in Bor), and also a channel for influencing broader European (if not EU per se) foreign politics. A kind of a wider co-opting of individual European countries through various channels is already seen in Serbia. President Aleksandar Vučić has gone as far as to say that Serbia condemns any attempt to put the “unity of PR China and the results of your [Xi Jinping’s] policies, which are firmly grounded in peace and stability, at risk.” This is likely a reflection of EU’s own internal lack of unity on dealing with China, leaving space for individual EU and non-EU countries to formulate their own approaches. In fact, Serbia has four foreign policy pillars, one of them being China. On the issue of Hong Kong, however, Serbia did not release a policy standing, possibly out of fear of being too misaligned with the EU.

Although the Chinese influence in Serbia is not pivotal yet, the EU will have to find a way of countering it in a meaningful way. The old ways of dealing with the Russian factor in Belgrade through bureaucratic initiatives will likely yield limited results. Statements of “strong condemnation” on Russia’s malicious efforts in the Western Balkans issued by MPs of the European Parliament or the formation of the Western Balkans StratCom task force (with a budget of only 1.1 million euros annually to combat misinformation) lack visible actions in the field, while the promise of full membership is perceived as just that – a promise. Chinese state capital, on the other hand, is taking the pressure off of the social welfare institutions and is arguably making EU’s efforts to foster rule of law in candidate countries more difficult, disincentivizing reforms. Funds from Beijing lead to a physical presence and are simply more visible to citizens than the EU’s own mechanisms. Finally, because investments derive from state capital, the potential of corruptive schemes with the regime is high, further solidifying the presence of corruption locally.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

References

Telegraf.rs. 2020. “Za Srbiju je Tajvan sastavni deo Kine”: Vučić uputio pismo Si Đinpingu. Telegraf. https://www.telegraf.rs/vesti/politika/3142023-za-srbiju-je-tajvan-sastavni-deo-kine-vucic-uputio-pismo-si-djinpingu. Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Mortera-Martinez, Camino. 2018. What is Europe Doing to Fight Disinformation? Centre for European Freedom. https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2018/what-europe-doing-fight-disinformation. Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Europost. 2019. EP urges action against fake news and foreign electoral interference. Europost. https://europost.eu/en/a/view/ep-urges-action-against-fake-news-and-foreign-electoral-interference-26434. Accessed: 17 March 2020.

Democracy Promotion is an expensive undertaking, and doing it effectively requires expertise and time. While democracy promotion efforts by the United States and European Union (EU) are well-documented and studied, small states engage in democracy promotion as well. Due to various limitations, if small states want to be effective democracy promoters, they often cannot take the same approach as large countries. To investigate this topic, this paper will use the case of Estonia’s bilateral democracy promotion. It will investigate the following question: As a small state, what strategic approach does Estonia take to bilateral democracy promotion?

This paper will begin by providing a very brief overview of the literature on small state diplomacy, and then examine the concept of ‘niche diplomacy’. It will then introduce Estonia as a small-state actor in development, humanitarian aid, and democracy promotion.  After that, the empirical section will make the central argument that Estonia takes a ‘niche diplomacy’ approach to democracy promotion, by focusing its efforts on the nexus between digital innovation and democracy. In making this argument, Estonia’s democracy promotion in Ukraine will be examined.

 1. Conceptual Framework

1.1. Small State Diplomacy

In the literature, there are different methods of measuring state size. Most authors use indicators such as population, territory size, and economic development (Clarke & Payne 1987). Softer measurements such as action capacity and vulnerability – both domestically and internationally –are used as well (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006). Small states can employ various tactics to increase their influence in international affairs. For example, studies have focused on the sizable influence of small states in the EU (Nasra 2011). While small states may be able to increase their influence in international organizations, in certain areas of foreign policy, such as bilateral democracy promotion, small states face tangible restrictions. Small states have limited financial resources, and democracy promotion is an expensive endeavour. Thus, it is valuable to investigate the strategies employed by small states to promote democracy abroad.

 1.2 Niche Diplomacy

One strategy in small-state diplomacy with applications for this paper is the strategy of ‘niche diplomacy.’ Niche diplomacy is the use of selectivity in foreign policy (Smith 1999). It is done through focusing efforts on specific areas or fields in which a state has “specialized interest and task-related experience” (Cooper 1997, p. 4). The logic is that small states do not have the resources to focus on every single issue in an effective way. Thus, to have the greatest impact, these states will direct their efforts towards fields where they have the most existing resources and “reputational qualifications” (Cooper 1997, p. 4). In pursuing this niche, small states may also form partnerships with non-state actors who have expertise in a particular field, such as the private sector, media organizations, or NGOs. This can be especially helpful if the state has a smaller sized public administration and foreign service (Jazbec 2010). The niche diplomacy approach has been applied to small states such as Qatar (Cooper & Momani 2011) and medium-sized countries such as South Africa (Van Wyk 2012), but not to democracy promotion.

1.3 Estonia in Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid

By any objective measure, Estonia is considered a small state. The most recent spending data is from 2017, in which Estonia spent 37.9 million Euros on development and humanitarian aid (0.17% of its gross national income), with 16.8 million spent through its contribution to the EU budget for the European Commission Development Cooperation Program, 18.3 million spent through bilateral cooperation, and the remaining 2.6 spent through the UN, World Bank, and other organizations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). The Estonian National Security Concept lists maintaining the strength and influence of democracy as a key objective, and the Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid Strategy lists supporting the promotion of democracy and human rights as a key development objective. The next section will analyze Estonia’s niche approach to democracy promotion in Ukraine.

2. Estonia’s Niche Democracy Promotion in Ukraine

Estonia and Ukraine both became independent in 1991, but their paths since then could not be more different. Estonia has been an EU and NATO member since 2004 and ranks tied for 23^rd on the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index, while Ukraine ranks 84^th on the EIU democracy index. As a small state, Estonia is working with a limited budget and limited resources in Ukraine. To have a greater impact, the country focuses largely on the policy field – or niche – in which it is reputable and successful: digital innovation and information and communication technology (ICT).

Estonia’s expertise and competence in digital innovation and ICT have been well-documented, and it focuses on this niche field with its democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine. Supporting the development of democracy and state structures through assisting Ukraine in implementing e-governance and ICT solutions in public administration is an explicitly stated goal of Estonia’s development efforts in Ukraine (Government of the Republic of Estonia 2016). Furthermore, its 2019 strategic document issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on cooperation with Ukraine states that in strengthening democracy and state structures, “e-governance and the implementation of ICT solutions have an essential role” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019, p. 6). To pursue this goal in Ukraine, Estonia partners with several non-government organizations that have expertise in this field.

The Estonian government funds multiple projects in Ukraine focusing on this niche. This included projects in partnership with the Estonian non-profit think tank e-Governance Academy. The projects include using technology to improve advocacy capacity building, e-Governance capacity building at the local and national level, and the introduction of ICT solutions in public administration. Estonia has also funded projects implemented by the Praxis Centre for Policy Studies which has assisted Ukraine with the implementation of an e-Heath system, and also funded a project implemented by the International Centre for Defence and Security which created a strategic plan for implementing regional ICT governance. Estonia funds a partnership between the Estonian School of Diplomacy and the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, where the former runs capacity building programs in cybersecurity, e-governance, and ICT. It also funds a partnership between Tallinn University of Technology and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine to develop a master’s study program on e-governance in Ukraine.

Estonia has organized study trips, in which officials from the Ukrainian government have visited Estonia to learn about e-government and digital democracy, and Estonia has provided an expert evaluation of Ukraine’s e-government concept. Furthermore, a memorandum of cooperation was signed between the two countries which calls for cooperation in digital development, and more specifically in “implementing digital innovations, building e-mobile governance, and developing e-democracy” (Office of the President of Ukraine 2019).

Conclusion

This paper has argued that Estonia takes a niche diplomacy approach to its democracy promotion efforts through its focus on the nexus between digital innovation and democracy in Ukraine. A niche approach to democracy promotion may not be useful every time. To use the Estonian example, a country may need far more fundamental assistance and not be ready to focus on digital issues and e-government. But in cases where the specific niche is needed, a smaller country may be able to carve out a unique role for itself and be the go-to country on a specific issue.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of CISS or its members.

Bibliography

Clarke, Colin and Tony Payne. Politics, security and development in small states. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

Cooper, Andrew F. “Niche diplomacy: a conceptual overview.” In Niche Diplomacy, pp. 1-24. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1997.

Cooper, Andrew F., and Bessma Momani. “Qatar and expanded contours of small state diplomacy.” The International Spectator 46, no. 3 (2011): 113-128.

Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2018,” 2018, accessed December 15^th, 2019. https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index

E-governance Academy, “Projects: Ukraine,” 2019, accessed December 19^th 2019. https://ega.ee/projects/

Estonia Development Cooperation, “Estonian Aid in Ukraine 2019,” 2019. Accessed December 17^th 2019. https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/contenteditors/press/bilateral_projects_2019_ukraine.pdf

Government of the Republic Of Estonia, “National Security Concept,” 2017, accessed December 16^th 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echosite/files/national_security_concept_2017_legal_basis.pdf

Government of the Republic Of Estonia, “The Strategy for Estonian Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid,” 2016: p. 4, accessed December 18^th 2019 , https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/development-cooperation/2016_2020_arengukava_eng_kodulehele_0.pdf

Heller, Nathan, “Estonia, the Digital Republic” last modified December 11 2017. Accessed December 15^th 2019. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic

Jazbec, Milan. “Small states and diplomacy: An indispensable, though much diversified relation.” Administrative Culture 11, no. 1 (2010): 66-83.

Lamoreaux, Jeremy W., and David J. Galbreath. “The Baltic States as ‘small states’: Negotiating the ‘East’by engaging the ‘West’.” Journal of Baltic studies 39, no. 1 (2008): 1-14., Tom. “Small states, great power? Gaining influence through intrinsic, derivative, and collective power.” International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2016): 185-205.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Overview of Estonian Development Cooperation,” last modified 26 July 2018, accessed December 17^th 2019, https://vm.ee/en/overview-estonian-development-cooperation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Principles of Development Cooperation between Estonia and Ukraine 2019, 2019, accessed December 16^th 2019. https://vm.ee/sites/default/files/contenteditors/press/ukraina_akt_lahtealused_2019_eng_0.pdf

Nasra, Skander. “Governance in EU foreign policy: exploring small state influence.” Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 2 (2011): 164-180., Helen “Ukranian Delegration visits Estonia to learn About E-Government,” June 12 2019. Accessed December 20^th 2019. https://cointelegraph.com/news/ukrainian-delegation-visits-estonia-to-learn-about-e-government

Office of the President of Ukraine: Official Website, “Memorandum of cooperation in the field of digital transformation was signed in presence of the Presidents of Ukraine and Estonia,” 26 November 2019. Accessed December 17^th 2019, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-prisutnosti-prezidentiv-ukrayini-ta-estoniyi-pidpisano-mem-58585

Thorhallsson, Baldur, and Anders Wivel. “Small states in the European Union: what do we know and what would we like to know?.” Cambridge review of international affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 651-668.

Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie. “Nuclear diplomacy as niche diplomacy: South Africa’s post-apartheid relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2012): 179-200.

The architecture of the building complex built in 1837 is impressive to say the least. Moreover, we had the opportunity to see smaller rooms in which Russian leaders meet with German representatives just as Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel for example.

Afterwards, our talk with the three young Russian diplomats was held in the beautiful concert hall.  Being able to talk to officials who just graduated and started their first station of the journey at an embassy enabled us to get a glimpse on ways to enter the diplomatic world in Russia. The political discussion was not as controversial as some of us may have expected. Both sides stated their respective position on recent socio-economic events as represented in the media and therefore did not offer many novel perspectives. However, it was delightful to have a direct dialogue. Furthermore, CISS has been invited to potentially visit again one day and is looking forward to further discuss the different perspectives in the future.

Forging an alliance with another state is one of the premier strategies in a state’s arsenal to advance its political interests. Although the importance of alliances in international relations is widely accepted, political scientists disagree on how to explain the reasons and mechanisms of alliance formation. Hence, the debate about Sino-Russian relations attracts a lot of attention from academics and policy-makers around the world.

Russia and China are two rising powers with a great geopolitical weight in the international system and their partnership constitutes a constant topic of analysis. Since 2000, these two major powers have undergone dramatic domestic changes: China, at present, is the world’s second-largest economy and has succeeded in economic and military modernization after nearly four decades since its first opening to the world economy. On the other hand, Russia is trying to cope with the challenges its economy faces (stagnation, heavy dependence on energy resource exports, lack of innovation) and to regain the glory of the old superpower. To make matters worse, Russia’s economy has suffered a big blow after the trade sanctions imposed by the US and the European Union in response to the annexation of the Crimea and its policy towards Ukraine.

Sino-Russian co-operation takes place on many levels from joint military exercises, trade agreements, arms sales and the establishment of new multilateral institutions (such as the BRICS New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB) to a broad consensus on issues in international relations. However, the two powers haven’t formed an actual alliance that could fundamentally alter the distribution of power in the international system.

When evaluating the bilateral relationship between China and Russia, it can be either characterized as an Axis of Convenience (i.e. a partnership driven by selected and mostly economic short-term interests and not an alliance based on common beliefs, ideas or goals) or a fast maturing relationship.

Despite of the recent trade war of the USA against China, China and Russia have not yet decided to go one step further and establish a political and military alliance. The reason for this is that they have different aspirations when envisioning the international system. Seemingly, they share the rejection of a unipolar international system where the USA acts as the global hegemon, and are seeking closer ties in order to create a counterweight to the U.S. primacy. But so far, neither of them seems ready to directly challenge the current status quo.

China aims to become a regional hegemon in the Far East and to control its neighboring countries hoping for a bipolar system formation with the USA as its ‘opponent’, whereas Russia considers a multipolar system formation by having an active role in the shaping of global politics.

So far, the two great powers are practicing their steps together in the rehearsal room but they are certainly far from presenting a routine partner dance in the big gala of the International System.

Western broadcasting corporations continuously raise concerns over the tools and methods that RT uses, urging the EU and US media to counter the Russian “bullhorn”. One of the first attempts to contain this machine happened in the UK in 2016 when the state-owned NatWest (National Westminster Bank) froze the network’s accounts for several days. The continental response was a pinch more emotional: French President Macron called for a “fake news” ban that would sanction news outlets spreading disinformation, including RT and Sputnik. In November 2017, the United States Department of Justice officially ordered RT America to register as a “foreign agent”. RT’s response to the move followed quickly with the headlines, such as “Meet ‘foreign agent’: Americans in America covering American news for Americans”, sarcastically mocking the hype around the network. Meanwhile in Moscow, Western accusations are presented to the domestic public as little victories if not as tangible examples of the channel’s effective operations abroad.

Indeed, the fearmongering around RT is largely playing into the network’s hands whose main strategy is to debunk the views and commonplace statements of what they call “liberal establishment”. Instead, RT claims to show an alternative perspective on world affairs in order to counter the “Anglo-Saxon information hegemony”. RT was conceived in 2005 in the midst of an unprecedented economic growth period of the country due to the strong oil price. First generation RT journalists, although informed by the network’s aim to promote Russia’s point of view, had rather optimistic views on their role as independent journalists. This also reflects in RT’s quirky setup as a ‘hybrid’ between a state TV channel and a network that claims to be an independent news broadcaster with many of its international employees having little relation to Russia.

One of the main tasks of RT’s early-career ‘journalists of defence’ was to monitor the output of CNN and the BBC, to take notes on the broadcasting style and strategies that would soon be borrowed and re-directed back at the rival channels. A drastic change happened after the revolution in Ukraine that forced the network to switch from a rather ‘laid back’ reporting to hard-line persuasion. Developed out of the Soviet tradition of kontpropaganda (counter-propaganda), RT aims at carefully answering its opponents with the purpose to disprove accusations and delegitimise rivals; the key genre here is satire. This consistent mockery and the ubiquitous negation of any allegation towards Russia hardly indicates a consistent strategy for promoting influence abroad but rather reveals the country as being on the defensive.

Although it at times seems that all the world’s eyes are on Russia, what surprisingly gets overlooked is that the country’s return to Soviet propaganda techniques and the fixation on the collective ‘West’ as a hostile and hegemonic force demonstrates an ideological vacuum. The collective image of the West serves as an orientation point for Russia’s national identity, with the elite discourses being constructed around the understanding that liberal norms are at once an ideal to strive for and a threat against which the country needs to protect itself from.

This article was published in September’s issue (2018) of the Diplomatic Magazine.

Four years on since Euromaidan, corruption is still a major problem in Kiev. Despite this, Ukraine has undergone fundamental changes since 2014. A stronger and more confident civil society is working tirelessly to uncover and prevent corruption in the capital and the regions.

The Anti-Corruption Walk in February 2018 with Rebecca Harms (MEP)

One example is ‘Anti-Corruption Walks Kyiv’, a project run by CISS and the Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. The initiative came from a Ukrainian-German youth exchange in 2017 and saw the development of an alternative concept for city tours. Inspired by the Berlin ‘LobbyControl’ tours and the anti-corruption tours in Bogotá and Mexico City, researchers and activists take small groups on guided tours through Kiev in Ukrainian or English. The specific mechanisms of corruption are explained using factual case studies and stories. The tours help people to better understand corruption and anti-corruption measures.

Participants are taken to some of the most important memorials of corruption. One of these is the Parkowy Business Centre, better known by locals as ‘Yanukovich’s helipad’. To shorten his commute, the former president had a helicopter landing pad, complete with business center, constructed in 2010 on a perfect hillside not far from the parliament in the middle of a protected UNESCO world heritage site. Yanukovich only landed there a few times, but the official after show party of the Eurovision Song Contest was held here in May 2017. Yanukovich’s cronies who control the building through a series of shell companies netted 50,000 USD from the state budget for this party. Only after enormous public pressure was the building nationalised without further ado at the end of 2017. An investigation into the precise circumstances of the construction has not yet been announced.

‘Yanukovich’s helipad’ is a stop on the anti-corruption tour and symbolises the corruptness of the former regime. At the same time, the case shows how hard the new government is working to clean up old corruption. On the positive side, the tours also demonstrate the progress being made in the fight against corruption. This includes the creation of a new independent investigative authority, digital asset declarations by politicians and civil servants, and a digital platform for public procurement (ProZorro).

Many citizens, tourists, and experts have already taken the regular tours. For example, Rebecca Harms, Member of the European Parliament, went on a tour at the end of February 2018. The project has attracted strong media interest in Ukraine.

In 2018, Ukrainian and German activists plan to develop tours for Ukrainian schoolchildren and students and also expand to Odessa, Kharkiv, and Lviv. Despite the slow progress, many activists are far from ready to give up on the fight against corruption.

This article was published in April’s issue of the Diplomatic Magazine.

This year’s trip is part of the “Memory as a Tool of Change” project series. It was supported by the Yugra State University and funded by the Federal Foreign Office.

The collected edition was published as part of CISS’s ‘Memory as a tool of change – Forgotten Places in Siberia’ Impact Group.