This has a considerable impact on the flexibility of the sanction regimes, as the example of Myanmar/Burma clearly shows. Here, the ease of some US sanctions took four years longer than the EU’s removal of all its sanctions. Unlike the EU which prefers targeted sanctions to limit the effects on the immediate producers of the wrong behaviour, the US sanctions are generally broader in scope. Thus, US sanctions tend to be more comprehensive than the EU ones, for instance, while the EU targets 38 organisations related to the East Ukraine conflict the US`s sanctions list encompasses 428. Finally, EU sanctions and regulations are only binding to EU related entities and persons, whereas US secondary sanctions have extraterritorial effects. As a result, the US is also expecting non-US citizens and companies to comply with them and threatens them with punishments range from massive penalties to prohibition of access to US markets.

This final aspect is worth a detailed examination because the EU created a regulatory measure named “Blocking Regulation” (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96) to offset these extraterritorial effects of US sanctions on EU entities.

The Blocking Regulation was initially adopted in 1996 to provide protection against and counteracts the effects of the extra-territorial application of the laws specified in the Annex of this Regulation. So, this EU regulation was designed as a countermeasure to the US measures targeting Iran, Libya and Cuba, which were harming EU interests. Recently, after the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and the re-imposition of previously suspended sanctions, the European Commission amended the annex of the Blocking Regulation. On August 7th 2018, this updated regulation becomes effective. As stated in Article 5 of the Regulation, no EU entity “shall comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary or other intermediary person, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including requests of foreign courts, based on or resulting, directly or indirectly, from the laws specified in the Annex or from actions based thereon or resulting therefrom”. It applies to EU nationals, EU residents and companies incorporated in one of the EU Member States.

Article 4 proclaims that any foreign court judgment covered by the regulation is not enforceable before the courts of the EU and Article 6 allows companies to “recover any damages” arising from US sanctions. Non-compliance with the EU Blocking Regulation will result in penalties.  Against this backdrop, EU companies are facing the chose to either get a punishment in the US for non-compliance with US sanctions or violating the Blocking Regulation and risk a fine in the EU.

In brief, the EU Blocking Regulation is an attempt to position the EU as an independent actor on the realm of sanction policy and its adoption sends a political message to the US government. But at the same time, it displays the limitations of the EU’s scope of action vis-à-vis the US.

This article was published in February’s (2019) issue of the Diplomatic Magazine.

The scientific definition and concept of diaspora are not clear, however, and can vary depending on the research angle. Nevertheless, there are three main features. Diaspora can be viewed as the result of lasting migration, whereby the migrants arriving in a host country largely retain their ethnic-cultural identity and develop an idealised image of their homeland. At the same time, it is mostly associated with the formation of diaspora organisations within the host country which contribute both to retaining a collective identity, as well as to consolidating the ease with which their own groups can be politically mobilised. The latter encompasses the potential to influence political actors both at home and within the host country.

The observation that government activities relating to their diaspora communities have intensified appears to gain a new dimension within this context. It increasingly adds a political component to the continual general expectation that diaspora members and migrants contribute to the economic development of their home country, for instance by transferring money.

Home countries use foreign policy strategies which can be summarised using the term “diaspora diplomacy”. These strategies can vary, both in their manifestation and in their degree of legitimacy. A considerably problematic understanding must, however, be emphasised at this point. Its primary objective is to generate loyalty towards the home country and ultimately convert it into political influence by propagating particular nationalistic and religious narratives, as well as by means of certain practices, such as organising cultural festivities or holding elections abroad. This concept based on engendering loyalty consequently results in exporting the friend-enemy scheme of the home country’s political discourse, culminating in efforts to protect “loyal” diaspora members from the influence of political dissidents. The outcome of such idealism is the increased use of security measures in dealing with diaspora, for example the surveillance of political dissidents abroad.

It is advisable that countries like Germany, which have a large number of different diaspora communities, devote more attention to the policy of diaspora diplomacy, both on a political and academic level.

This article was published in November’s issue (2018) of the Diplomatic Magazine.