The idea to establish a UN Parliament has been debated in policy circles for many years. The proposal is to establish a parliamentary body next to the UN General Assembly – as a pragmatic step toward a potential world parliament. Such a new body could democratize global governance by representing the world’s citizens, while being a motor for a more peaceful, sustainable, and socially just world order.

But there are many questions up to debate: What should such a body look like? How do we ensure just representation? What powers should a UN Parliament have?

We want to debate these questions with you. Around fifty students from Germany, Europe and around the world will take on the roles of national ambassadors in order to debate and negotiate the possible statutes of a parliamentary assembly at the United Nations. Those statues will then prepare the Model UN Parliaments in the coming years, when the actual world parliament will be simulated. Moreover, the program comprises workshops and a high-profile final event including a panel discussion in Berlin.

We want you to be part of this new, innovative Model UN project! You will be able to participate in a professional MUN with a topical focus on global democracy, co-creating the statutes of a new body. In this way, you will not only practice your debating and negotiation skills, but also dive deep into legal and political matters. This will be a truly extraordinary experience. The event is jointly organized by CISS and the Campaign for a UN Parliament.

Interested? Let’s debate global democracy!

Albert Einstein was right, when he said: “We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them.” Facing our massive challenges on the global level, this quote is more relevant today than ever. We need to ask ourselves: What is the thinking that has produced these overwhelming challenges? How do we have to change our thinking to get closer to sustainable solutions?

1. We will not solve problems with the thinking that produced them

The situation is unsettling: The civil war in Syria is driving more and more refugees into Europe. The lack of opportunity in parts of Africa is forcing many to abandon their homes. Climate change is turning into more than just a threat for islands in the Pacific. It has reached North America and is currently causing the worst drought of recorded history in California forcing Governor Brown to declare a state of emergency to manage the water shortage. The Pentagon has acknowledged climate change as an imminent threat to national security. And to the day almost 900 million people suffer from hunger, which is both a moral scandal and a future security threat.

But it’s not just humanitarian crises and climate change that pose threats to the national securities of the global community. The states pose threats to each other, and sometimes even to themselves. Russia is trying to recreate the bygone glory of the Soviet era by showing off its nuclear muscles. The US is happily meddling with matters in Ukraine and spying on allies the president has called “friends.” China is said to be behind massive cyber attacks on the US and Germany. And Germany is unable to prevent its weapon industry from illegally spreading weapons in crisis regions.

Many of our current issues today have been amounting for decades. In 1984 former German chancellor Willy Brandt said: “In our modern world, mass hunger, economic stagnation, environmental catastrophe, political instability, and terrorism cannot be quarantined within national borders.” In failing to recognize a fully globalized, transnational reality, old-style foreign policy with its nationalist principles is contributing to the problems, and not solving them. This is especially tragic, since this living generation is arguably one of the most important political generations of human history. We need new ideas!

2. Distrust and fear are the frontrunners of war waging dynamics

Chancellor Brandt said in 1971: “The future will not be championed by those who cling to the past.” But that doesn’t mean we can abandon proven techniques altogether. We need to find answers to the questions: Which are proven ideas that deserve our protection and enhancement? And what are bygone techniques that need to be cut loose for us to develop and embrace new ones? What is it that drives the most powerful states to turn aggressive like the United States in recent history? Will there ever be something like state sovereignty for the weaker states, or will it always be the privilege of the mighty? Distrust and fear currently seem to be the frontrunners of war waging dynamics, even more so than the fight for profit and resources. At the core of the pubescent relationship of large nation states to their own power lies a dilemma of the modern state order: The most powerful nations states are too big to submit, but too small to solve the problems of the global age.

The international governance system created after World War II under a nationalist paradigm has cemented this dilemma. This is especially visible in the UN Security Council. The Allies in WWII plus China dominate the council today and use their veto powers to block most of each other’s initiatives. Important long term issues don’t even make it to the agenda, because the council is already failing at finding remedy to the most immediate pressing day-to-day issues. So what can we do? Just give up? Surely not. Cynical resignation might be an option for frustrated Hippies who don’t see their dreams realized and have given up faith in a more cooperative, more peaceful world. For tomorrow’s generation, this isn’t an option. So what’s the alternative? Let’s get creative and find new solutions for old problems. And: Let’s re-invent proven solutions for new realities. This applies, for instance, to the grand dame of political theory: good ol’ democracy.

3. Global realities demand global solutions

The thought is simple: The political system must work where the truly decisive decisions are made. For the playground and the city museum, it’s the city council. For sales tax issues, it’s the state legislature. For major infrastructure or military projects, it’s Congress. In Europe you also have the supranational European Parliament dealing with trade issues and economic policy. The European Parliament finds a kindred spirit in other regional parliaments like the Pan-African Parliament. And the UN General Assembly provides at least some indirect representation of the people on the global level. But none of these delegates are elected by the people. They’re all chosen by the national governments. Now it’s time for the next step in the evolution of our political systems. It is time for a real world parliament!

This parliament should be established in the federative spirit of Thomas Jefferson’s writing on the political structures of the United States: “Who can limit the extent to which the federative principle may operate effectively? The larger our association, the less will it be shaken by local passions; and in any view, is it not better that the opposite bank of the Mississippi should be settled by our own brethren and children, than by strangers of another family? With which shall we be most likely to live in harmony and friendly intercourse?” And as George Monbiot wrote in The Guardian in 2007: “The best way to give the poor a real voice is through a world parliament.” A global parliament would ensure, he says, that the voices of the poor world would no longer be “ventriloquised by Bob Geldof and Bono and the leaders of the G8.” The people would be able to speak for themselves.

4. The self-proclaimed “realists” will look very old very soon

In times of popular anti-government sentiment, some will oppose the idea as even more government. But be careful and don’t take your opposition to federal taxes out on this proposal. Global governance institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, G20 and others have become rather impactful institutions. A World Parliament provides us all with more representation in realm of all these global institutions! Others will think of this world parliament as a “nice, but unrealistic idea.” If you think of yourself as very reasonable and realistic when you patronize the idea – take a look at what the Today Show thought about the internet in 1994 (”What is the internet, anyway?”) or explore why the German Kaiser Wilhelm II believed in the horse and thought of the automobile as a “short-lived fashion trend.”

If you find pleasure in naive realism there, you will also enjoy quotations by German politicians, who expressed their “rejection of the thoughtless and illusionary talk of reunification” just a few months before the German reunification. Albert Einstein also provides amusement with the claim that there had not been the slightest hint “that nuclear power will ever be usable.” My point is clear: History is full of examples in which even the brightest of thinkers have celebrated themselves as great “realists” in their most blatant denial of reality. All of them looked very old very fast.

The private sector has shown the public sector how to create cooperative structures at the global level. It has demonstrated that we can use the interdependent reality of the global age not just for exploitation, but for the common good – if we do it right. Unfortunately, the public sector has been sound asleep to this leap in social engineering. Some nation states have fallen back into antiquated nationalism because of internal struggles. This nationalism is not just outdated and without ambition. Given the scale of our problems on this planet, it is dangerous and reactionary. We have to realize that our political lack of vision has thrust us into a rather apocalyptical scenario. When we talk about climate change, we’re now talking about nothing less than the existence of human civilization as we know it.

5. We don’t need crazy new ideas for this – we have all it takes

We as a human race have thousands of years of experience with the refinement of the democratic ideal. We’re well equipped to lift this old idea to new heights. But to do this, we’ ll have to face a few very uncomfortable questions: How can it be that a country like the United States with 318 million inhabitants ended up light years ahead of a country like India with about 1.3 billion inhabitants in political weight in the global arena? We know the technical answers to how it happened historically. But we never really had good answers to how it can be justified morally. This creates a tension: When I compared the political impact of a young person in India with the political impact of a young person in the United States today, I realized how privileged we really are, despite the dysfunction of Congress and our justified complaints about it.

I had to face a tough question: Am I really for democracy? Or am I only for democracy when I’m in the powerful seat and can set up systems to then “generously” represent the poor without giving up the privileged position I enjoy? For me to be truly for democracy, I would have to embrace letting go of at least some of the power. But that’s not as easy as I would like it to be. As humans we all struggle to let go of the power to dominate others. But I think, we ought to try, because we all gain from some courage in that regard. I believe, we know the solution for many of the biggest challenges of our time: democratically accountable global cooperation of the communal process we call governance. We don’t need crazy new ideas for this. The simple application of the tried and tested democratic principles we know will go a long way.

The support for such proposals is growing. The World Federalist Movement and its Institute for Global Policy is working out ideas. The UNPA Campaign was founded and the Global Week of Action for a World Parliament created. Currently these campaigns are still driven by politicians, nobel laureates, professors and activists. But events like the People’s Climate March, which brought together over 400,000 people to march for innovative climate policies and environmental protection, show that the time to spread the word has come.

6. We’re not at the end of democracy, we’re just getting started

Often it takes times of political uncertainty to drive the creative evolution of political systems. This was the case after WWII. Under no circumstances did the people want to get dragged into another world war, especially not in times of nuclear weaponry. Albert Einstein famously commented: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” Einstein was convinced: “As long as sovereign states continue to have separate armaments and armament secrets, new world wars will be inevitable.” That’s why Einstein went even further than a mere parliamentary assembly: “In my opinion the only salvation for civilization and the human race lies in the creation of a world government, with security of nations founded upon law.”

Many won’t be happy with Einstein’s faith in institutions. I myself take issue with the quasi-religious quality of his quote. But nonetheless we should take his warning seriously. I don’t think he means to be annoyingly moralistic. I think, he wanted to stimulate creative thinking to help solve some of the most pressing issues of our times. And we’re in need of that today. It is clear that the effort to save what we call human civilization is neither miraculous magic, nor a utopian daydream. It is courageous craft and common sense. That’s why Chancellor Brandt could say in the midst of the protests of the late 60s: “We want to dare more democracy!” His call is more relevant than ever, because as the world parliament ideas show: “We aren’t at the end of democracy, we’re just getting started.”

The article has been co-published on the German website of the Huffington Post.

1. The CSDP has Lost Momentum Despite an Overwhelming Case for It

The case for an increased European role within the area of defence cooperation has been compelling ever since the Common Security and Defence Policy’s (CSDP) inception at the turn of the century. At first, it was an effort to reshape the transatlantic relationship from a state of European dependency and outsourcing of responsibility to the US to a more balanced partnership (Howorth, 2007). This has become more urgent in recent years as the US is concentrating on the strategic challenges in East Asia. As a result, US protection has increasingly become only a last resort for European security, not the first port of call. Territorial defence for EU member states is still realized either on a national basis or through collective defence within NATO, whereas the CSDP remains essentially a cooperation framework for joint foreign missions and the improvement of military capabilities. Nonetheless, the US today welcomes pretty much any European contribution to its own defences and global security, regardless of the institutional arrangements chosen (Biscop, 2015).

Thus, EU member states need to invest in credible military capabilities. Yet, in an age of austerity and a volatile economic situation, the additional funds available are at best limited. Hence, more efficient spending through coordination and cooperation at the European level has been mandated for many years in order to reduce the enormous waste of resources through national duplication.

Yet overcoming ingrained interests and habits within the national armed forces and the arms industry establishment has turned out to be a stumbling block in a policy area, into which most leaders were not willing to invest serious political capital. As a result, the momentum created around the turn of the millennium in CSDP has waned considerably. Cooperation remains nonetheless sporadic and mostly does not provide the efficiencies which would be possible through proper coordination at the European level within the CSDP framework (Solana, 2015, p.2). If the current trend is to be reverted, a real game changer is needed..

2. Ukraine – A Possible Game Changer and Catalyst

Russia has pursued territorial annexation and military interventions in Ukraine, frequently violated EU member states’ air spaces and has repeatedly threatened nuclear bombardment of EU capitals in case a missile shield should be installed (Milne, 2015). Such a denunciation of the post-Cold War European security architecture constitutes a game changer with potentially similar strategic repercussion as 9/11 turned out to have a decade earlier.

At first, the evolving conflict over Ukraine caught the EU completely off guard, however (Haukkala, 2015). After an initial paralysis following the invasion and annexation of Crimea, the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) reawakened with resolve following the unfolding fighting in the Donbas region and the death of 213 EU citizens when a commercial airplane was shot down. The EU imposed political and economic sanctions on Russia, and member states were actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. Yet the security aspect of the CFSP, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – in particular the option of launching civilian and military missions abroad – was conspicuous by its absence. Ukrainian calls for an EU police mission in the Donbas were not even seriously considered (Ukrainian EU Mission, 2015). In contrast, Russia’s challenge to the European security order caused NATO quickly to resume its original role of territorial defence. As NATO was winding down two decades of out-of-area engagement, the Wales summit in September 2014 drew up new defence plans for its hitherto virtually demilitarised Eastern members. President Obama emphatically reassured the Estonians in September 2014 that every member state could count on NATO’s collective defence guarantee (Obama, 2014).

At first sight, it looks like NATO once again made the race and CSDP is drawing the shorter straw. Although territorial defence is indeed the prerogative of NATO, I argue that enhanced capabilities realized within the CSDP framework would nonetheless contribute towards territorial defence. Thus, CSDP should be a logical part of the ‘Western’ reply to the Ukrainian conflict. There is a significant overlap in the type of swiftly deployable resources needed for CSDP missions and those mentioned in the NATO Readiness Action Plan to counter any possible Russian threats against NATO’s (and the EU’s) Eastern members (NATO, 2014a, point 5).

Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has on balance reinforced rather than altered the long-term trend in Washington of focusing on Asia and urging the Europeans to take on a larger role on their home turf (Meyer, 2011, p. 683). On the diplomatic front, the Obama administration has already largely conceded negotiations with Russia on the Ukrainian case to the Europeans. Former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates (2011) warned that US protection was ultimately linked to adequate contributions by the Europeans. European military capabilities and a political willingness to use them are hence crucial not only for the role as security provider in the wider region, but also for their own territorial defence. The staunchly pro-US Eastern EU and NATO members have taken this message on board. In the wake of the Ukraine crisis, Estonia and Poland have for instance made quick progress towards the 2% defence target (Bender, 2015). At the same time, the air defence of the Baltic states is effectively outsourced to other European NATO members (NATO, 2014b). This sends a powerful message of transatlantic solidarity without freeriding and could pave the way for a new and less dogmatic understanding of CSDP, especially as most EU members are in NATO as well.

3. The Case for a Renewed Effort for CSDP

NATO members committed themselves at the Wales summit in 2014, once again, to spend 2% of GDP on defence. This goal is supposed to be achieved by 2024 and would represent a substantial increase in the amount that most EU members (EDA, 2013) currently spend on their armed forces. For some member states it would constitute a doubling of expenditure. The level of spending would thus again be on the levels in the second half of the 1990’s. However, this level did not enable the Europeans back then to intervene effectively on their own in the Balkans, a major reason for the very establishment of CSDP (Bickerton, 2011, p. 8). Moreover, anything short of massive increase in national defence budgets would probably still fail to offset the increasing costs of sophisticated modern arms, especially the so-called strategic enablers (Solana, 2015, p. 12). Yet to raise taxes and debts or cut social expenditure substantially seems under the current circumstances politically more difficult than to overcome resistance to change within the defence sector. Hence, a real commitment to make EU member states’ armed forces more capable by coordinating scarce resources more efficiently is the only option available (Biscop, 2013, p. 1126).

A serious commitment to a coordinating role of European Defence Agency (EDA) in procurement matters paired with the political go ahead for the necessary cross-national consolidation and specialisation of the European defence industrial complex would be more promising in order to be taken seriously by Russia. As only six member states have a sizeable arms industry (Balis and Heidenkamp, 2014, p. 1), it should be a manageable task to reorganize it without putting any of these countries at a severe disadvantage. The result will be more adequate equipment for the forces at a better price. The ongoing efforts by the European Commission to beef up the low research and development (R&D) share in European defence expenditure by encouraging dual-use projects will add to that. “A New Deal for European Defence” proposed that civilian research funds could also benefit defence R&D (EU Commission, 2013). The same applies for the proposed internal market for armaments, which would speed up further cross-country consolidation and specialisation to enable the companies to stay at the cutting edge of technological developments (Balis and Heidenkamp, 2014, pp. 2-5).

4. CSDP and Its Potential to Revive the Entire European Project

A renewed effort at seriously implementing CSDP, the EU’s “weakest link” (Solana, 2015, p.1), has the potential to revive the European project as a whole (Bickerton, 2011, p. 2). Public support for the European project has suffered greatly in the wake of the financial and debt crisis (Eurobarometer, 2014). The success of Eurosceptic parties at the elections to the European parliament in 2014 serves as a case in point (European Parliament, 2014). Furthermore, the economic hardship in countries like Greece is about to undermine a common stand in the EU on sanctions on Russia and hence CFSP itself. The controversies concerning the planned sale of French helicopter carriers to Russia also demonstrate the danger an unconsolidated arms industry dependent on exports poses to CFSP. Yet polls also indicate that increased military cooperation still has a rather high support throughout the EU. This potential ought to be used and success in the field could help to recreate a sense of purpose of the European project in the eyes of Europe’s citizens.

Bibliography

‘What do we know about weapons trade with conflict regions?’ To gain insight into this up-to-date question, CISS staged an essay competition and invited Lukas Hafner, student of political science and author of the winning contribution ‘Determinants of Arms Exports Decision-Making’, to discuss with leading experts in the field of arms proliferation at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich. Fellow panelists and keynote speakers at the event were Siemon Wezeman, senior researcher with the Arms and Military Expenditure Programme of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and Jan Grebe, researcher on arms exports controls at Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). The panel was chaired by Prof Dr Paul W. Thurner, professor for Empirical Political Research and Policy Analysis at LMU Munich, who runs a research project on mapping global arms trade networks. 95 people in the audience followed CISS’s invitation and witnessed two insightful keynote speeches followed by a lively debate.

Siemon Wezeman presented an overview on recent trends in international arms transfers based on data collected by SIPRI (see slides). After a massive drop of weapons proliferation after the Cold War, total global arms exports have been increasing again since the early 2000s (see figure below). The main importers of military equipment in recent years have been South East Asian countries, in particular due to an arms race between China and its neighbours. Increased demand has also been coming from the Middle East and Latin America. Siemon Wezeman emphasized that SIPRI’s goal is to provide data and trigger debates about trends in arms trade but not to make value judgements. Still, he pointed out that the economic significance of weapons exports is persistently being exaggerated as arms exports merely amount to 0.4% of total volume in global trade.

Jan Grebe drew the attention towards the changing structure of arms trade in Europe and particularly Germany (see slides). He found that in Germany – still the third largest arms exporter in the world – three current trends are visible: First, the federal government has delivered on its promises to increase transparency about export decisions. However, while this makes it easier to have timely discussions on weapons proliferation, it does not solve the existing structural deficit that merely the financial volume of deals is published but no details about the basis of decision-making and the actual persons or organizations that receive military goods. Second, despite repeated declarations of the German government to restrict arms exports, policy implementation is going in circles. Main reason is that proponents and opponents are talking past each other: The former stress the internal side and argue with the negative impact of export restrictions on the German economy, whereas the latter argue externally and see the negative impact on conflict regions. Third, the military support of the Kurdish Peshmerga is evidence that German export policies are no longer primarily determined by economic rationales but turn into a tool for security policy.

The keynote speeches gave rise to a lively discussion among the panellists and the audience. The discussion touched upon reasons for (non)compliance with export regulations. Lukas Hafner argued that an increasing transparency on arms exports would empower national and transnational interest groups monitoring the compliance of nation states, which in turn would likely lead policy makers to further restrict exports. On the other hand, it was stressed that the market power of exporters like Germany and their ability to control the dissemination of the latest military technologies has sharply decreased in recent years. The rise of newcomers from emerging market economies thus lead to a more and more demand side dominated market, which increases competition and thus poses a potential threat to non-proliferation. Additionally, the experts underlined the European dimension of weapon proliferation: The production of military supplies is ‘Europeanized’ because production chains are integrated across borders. Additionally, the European Commission pushes constantly towards a bigger European arms market. Overall, the discussion emphasized the role of science to gain new insights on the consequences of arms trade. With the data made available by, amongst others, SIPRI and BICC, scientists are in a good position to assess more systematically the underlying structures of arms trade in order to contribute to an evidence-based peace science.

Foreign policy-making in the Bundestag

As pointed out by Mr Wilk, there is no doubt that the main actors of German foreign policy-making are institutions of the executive branch, i.e. the Foreign Ministry and the Chancellery. Nevertheless, the Bundestag disposes of several points of influence. Most importantly, it holds the power of parliamentary reservation, e.g. for the ten military missions with German forces currently running: If the German government intends to send military forces abroad, it depends on the Bundestag’s consent. Further, the parliament is in disposal of control functions over the government’s external activities and has a say in EU related issues. Finally, a means to exercise long-term oriented soft power in Germany’s international relations are parliamentary friendship groups. Without being tied to the requirements of the diplomatic protocol, these friendship groups have certain discretion for agenda-setting and can engage with opposition groups or NGOs. In this, the Bundestag’s foreign policy-making complements the activities of the executive branch.

The ASEAN Parliamentary Friendship Group

The ASEAN Parliamentary Friendship Group is the largest among currently 54 friendship groups. As explained by Mrs Polsfuß, it disposes of three main instruments: first, the organization of visits and exchange programmes with parliamentarians from partner countries, which usually take place twice per legislature; second, meetings with ASEAN ambassadors and NGO activists in Germany; and third, the publication of press releases about topical events in ASEAN countries in order to influence the German public opinion. Due to its informal nature as well as its limited budget and staff, it has to contend itself with giving political impulses through personal communication but has no capacity to back its initiatives on a day-to-day basis.

Concerning political conflicts in the partner region, the Friendship Group remains neutral but is supportive to general values. Despite being a multi-party group, Dr Gambke emphasized that its work rests on a broad political consensus among the German MPs about the ASEAN region. With 50 members from all parties represented in the Bundestag, it sees its main task in the promotion of parliamentary structures. More specific topics dealt with in the last legislature include the promotion of minority rights in all ASEAN countries over land grabbing in Cambodia and Laos or palm oil production and environmental issues in Malaysia.

In line with general European policies towards ASEAN, the Friendship Group does not target the ASEANs as a group but concentrates on bilateral relations with individual member states. Dr Gambke argued that this tendency was mainly due to organizational decisions made on the ASEAN side. He reacted positively towards suggestions from the participants to foster inner-ASEAN cooperation and dialogue using the Friendship Group’s agenda-setting power, although he expects a range of difficulties that would be associated with an implementation of this plan.

The current relations of Germany and the EU to the ASEAN countries

In an open discussion, the CISS delegation raised a range of questions about the relations of Germany and the EU to the ASEAN countries. There was a consensus that ASEAN countries are not attributed a high importance among German and European policy makers, especially compared to BRICs, the US and the MENA region. Asked about the reasons for this, Dr Gambke pointed out that ASEAN is very difficult to understand for Europeans due its heterogeneity both in political and economic terms. ASEAN not only assembles countries with both high and low accounts in democratic standards, but also unites some of the world’s richest states like Singapore with some of the poorest ones like Myanmar. Mr Wilk emphasized that the EU faces a lack of coherence in its strategic approaches to other world regions, which is particularly obvious in its contradictory behaviour towards ASEAN.

A further point of discussion was the way MPs from the ASEAN states perceive the EU. Dr Gambke had observed a tendency to be critical about the European way of regional integration especially due to the euro crisis. ASEAN MPs are not overly responsive to attempts to promote the EU’s as an important partner to engage with. Against some participants’ expectations, ASEAN parliamentarians hardly ask for advice or best practice examples to foster regional integration. Exchange about institutional aspects of the legislative branch is a rare case and exclusively focuses on the national, not the regional level. Dr Gambke raised the expectation that interest for cooperation with EU level representatives might increase when actual exchange among the ASEAN’s legislatives develops.

Finally, the discussion revealed a significant discrepancy between political engagement and private sector involvement. Dr Gambke argued that German small and medium-sized businesses have demonstrated remarkable flexibility in adapting to the rising importance of the ASEAN region, which is reflected in the high amount of foreign direct investments in the ASEAN countries. The German ‘Mittelstand’ even exercises a remarkable social function because its investments tend not to look for mere short-term profit but support long-term development. Dr Gambke concluded that in this sense, the political level in Germany and Europe lags behind private enterprise with regard to the ASEAN region.

by Steffen Murau for the CISS Impact Group “EU-ASEAN Perspectives”

1. Iran in the structure of the International System

Dr Zahrani argued that Iran’s role in a global context is best to be analyzed and understood by focusing on the systemic level of analysis. He pointed out that from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran’s international behaviour was mainly dominated by the bipolar structure of the international system.

Prior to the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran was allied with the United States (U.S.) and part of its “Twin Pillar Policy” towards the Middle East: In order to contain Soviet influence in the region and to stabilize its own local power structure, the U.S. used Saudi Arabia and Iran as close strategic partners. After the Islamic revolution, however, Iran’s foreign policy had to navigate carefully between the communist and the capitalist block. As Dr Zahrani argued, the revolution was only successful because U.S. policymakers had completely overseen the revolutionary atmosphere in Iran. Thus, the success of the revolution can be considered the biggest failure of U.S. intelligence in history.

2. Identity crises in Iran and the U.S.

According to Dr Zahrani, Iran’s current state of affairs is dominated by two identity crises, the first being the Islamic revolution itself (as an internal factor) and the second being the collapse of the bipolar international system with the breakdown of the Soviet Union (as external factor). Both these identity crises taken together were decisive reasons why Iran was no longer able to clearly define its interests in foreign policy, at least for all strategic questions that are less fundamental than issues such as territorial integrity. This problem is still prevalent today. In its foreign policy, Iran lacks a consistent hierarchy of norms and is continuously wavering between strategies which are either motivated by geostrategic considerations or the Islamic ideology.

Complementarily, the end of the Cold War had also caused an identity crisis in the U.S.: It was no longer possible to formulate an adequate threat perception guiding international security policy and justifying the national budget system. Only after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government was able to identify a new enemy, namely Al-Qaeda and “international terrorism”. This was the opportunity for neoconservatives to strengthen the power of government (especially in the realm of security policy) and to implement their political ideas. Already in 1992, prominent members of the Bush administration had published the so-called “Rumsfeld Commission Report”, which should become authoritative for their future policies. They argued that in the context of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), “absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence” and claimed that conventional standards of rationality would not apply for (religious) extremists, since they would use WMDs regardless of consequences if only they had them. This provided the ground for the U.S.-doctrine of preemptive strikes.

As to Dr Zahrani, Iran supported the U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11, especially by assisting in the regime change in Afghanistan. In doing so, Iran hoped for an amelioration of the bilateral relationship. Instead, Iran found itself as a member of the “Axis of Evil”. Consequently, it had to consider itself to be one of the next most prominent enemies of the U.S.: Iran was and still is said to fulfill all criteria that constitute a threat for international stability according to the “Strategic Triangle”, which was defined by Henry Kissinger and comprises being a rogue state, aiming at the production of WMD and allegedly supporting terrorism.

3. The civilian character of Iran’s nuclear program

As concerns Iran’s nuclear program, Dr Zahrani insisted that its purpose was merely civilian. He rejected the perspective that Iran could achieve greater national security by being pulled into a nuclear arms race and pretending sufficiently high second strike capability. The possibility to achieve this point would only be a chimera, let alone if the point exists at all. He concluded that for the Iranian government it was rational to aim at a civilian use of nuclear energy in order to address the economic needs of the people; yet it would not be rational to aim at nuclear armament. Furthermore, he argued that it was a crucial aspect of the Islamic Republic of Iran (I.R.I.) to be committed to a concept of “moral warfare”, which encompasses the renunciation of WMDs as they do not discriminate between civilians and non-civilians.

To prove this point, however, is difficult in an international environment that not only is dominated by mutual mistrust but also does not consider absence of evidence to be evidence of absence and subliminally accuses a country to potentially act in an “irrational” way. Based on this analysis, Dr Zahrani expects tensions to continue and Iran to remain an isolated country in the international system. He anticipates the international sanctions to persist, although they only affect the population, since the government is used to them for more than thirty years and knows very well how to circumvent them. Nevertheless, he considers an Israeli attack on Iran to be unlikely: It will only take place if the U.S. assures full military assistance in advance, which it is currently unwilling to do, independently of the results of the upcoming presidential elections.

4. Iran and current developments in the Middle East

Dr Zahrani pointed out that the conflict between Iran and the U.S. is not necessarily ideological. He emphasized the historical narrative that ideologically the Iranian revolution was mainly directed against Soviet communism, not Western-style liberal democracy, at least in the beginning. In his eyes, struggles about the ideological dimension of Islam play a role only for Iran’s policies towards the region, as it is the intention of I.R.I. to influence and inspire an Islamic audience on a non-governmental level.

According to his conviction, the U.S. approach to the Egyptian revolution in 2011 was based on experiences from the Iranian revolution: In contrast to what happened in Iran 32 years ago, the U.S. government prevented the Egyptian army from de-legitimizing itself during the protests and is following a policy of rather accepting Islamist movements to govern than fighting against them. This policy is based on the expectation that Islamist movements which used to be ideologically motivated during their time in opposition will become more pragmatic as soon as they are in power. This was the way to prevent the Egyptian revolution to become even more Islamist in nature.

Finally, he predicted a long continuation of the war in Syria and affirmed Iran’s intention to take a neutral position in the conflict. However, he argued that if an international intervention forces Iran to take sides, it will choose to support the government by President Al-Assad. Given the overall situation in the Middle East with more and more players involved, he expects the regional security system to become even more complex.

by Steffen Murau

Steffen Murau studied Polictical Science, Economics, Philosophy and Law at the University of Munich, the Université Libre de Bruxelles and at the University of Alexandria. Occasion of Dr Zahrani’s speech was a German-Iranian Fall School which was jointly organized by the Center for Global Politics at Freie Universität Berlin and the School of International Relations Tehran.