First, the comprehensive nature of the SDGs makes it important to ensure policy coherence across different issue areas in the EU’s external actions. The most pressing topic for the EU in this respect is to reconcile its activities in the field of development on the one hand and migration and security on the other. There is no denying that parts of the EU’s current policies to restrict refugee influx from Africa in the Migration Partnership Framework are in tension with its longstanding commitment to promoting development through regional integration and the freedom of movement. Can the EU really afford subordinating long-term development to putative short-term security interests?

Second, the international development landscape is changing. Rising powers are exploring new models of South-South development cooperation. This is an opportunity for the EU to win new partners, but also a challenge because the new players have different approaches to development. Issues such as human rights and gender equality do not feature high on the Chinese agenda. As the BRICs connect their activism to demands for reforming old institutions, and have even created altogether new ones such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, both the normative underpinnings of development governance and its current institutional architecture are in question.

Third, the current anti-integrationist momentum and the internal legitimacy crisis impinge on the EU’s ability to ‘punch its weight’ externally, not only because it makes it harder to foster support for supranational solutions but also because it undermines what is arguably its main asset in bi- and multilateral interaction contexts: the ‘soft’ or ‘normative power’ so liberally invoked by EU supporters. The field of development is particularly sensitive to centrifugal tendencies because it is a policy area where the benefits of acting jointly may not be as evident as with, say, the common market. This means that the fight over policy priorities and resources will become even more challenging for development stakeholders than it already is.

How can the EU address these challenges? To strengthen policy coherence under the conditions of the current EU-sceptical climate, it should create informal mechanisms for coordination between EU institutions and member states on the one hand and across policy-fields on the other. The plans for joint policy-development in the new Development Consensus are a step in the right direction but need to be complemented by increased mainstreaming of development considerations into all areas of external action.

European policy-makers also need to communicate better the links between development and issues of ‘high politics’ to foster public support for its policies, while at the same time making sure a security logic doesn’t get to dominate cooperation with African countries. Development policies must not be diverted from their primary goal of improving the livelihood of individuals and communities. Analysts therefore must critically accompany the further development of the Migration Partnerships.

Finally, the EU and its member states should help build new international institutions and reform existing ones in a way that acknowledges the emerging powers’ demand for equal partnerships. It must finally put the rhetoric of mutual learning into practice. At the same time, the EU should stay committed to its own unique approach to development. Instead of entering a race to the bottom in terms of normative standards, it should confidently market the benefits of comprehensive development including good governance and human rights.

This article was published in June’s issue of the Diplomatic Magazine.

In 2017, the EU and ASEAN are celebrating 40 years of formal relations. Kilian Spandler, co-founder of CISS’s Impact Group EU-ASEAN Perspectives, used this occasion to take stock of a complicated relationship. In a contribution for The Diplomat, he writes that Southeast Asian countries have a historic chance to redefine their relations with Europe – but they are about to blow it.

For a long time, relations between the two organizations were highly asymmetrical. Even as the relationship expanded beyond the economic sphere and both sides committed to a partnership of mutual learning, EU policy-makers maintained the self-image of benign mentors for their Southeast Asian counterparts. “Ask those diplomats what exactly they would like to learn [from ASEAN], and the answer was usually vague or evasive”, Spandler writes.

It is a blessing for ASEAN, then, that the recent turbulences – pressure from populist and xenophobic reactions toward the increased immigration by displaced persons from outside the continent – are forcing the EU to look beyond its own nose for new political ideas. ASEAN finally seems to have found a unique selling point: its experience of dealing with the challenges of highly diverse societies. “Just like that, EU policymakers have become very interested in how countries like Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines managed to keep conflict between people of Malay, Sinic, and Indian ethnicity, Christian and Muslim belief, or indigenous and immigrant origin at bay”, Spandler writes. By actively advertising their experiences with socio-cultural heterogeneity as a model for the EU, ASEAN has started to cultivate its own ‘normative power’, which “brought the organization closer to the goal of an equal level playing field.”

However, Spandler notes that the reality in Southeast Asian societies is increasingly contradicting their politicians’ rhetoric of unity in diversity. Mounting intolerance and ethnically or religiously motivated violence in almost all ASEAN member countries are threatening the EU’s newfound appreciation of ASEAN as a source of inspiration. On this ground, Spandler calls on Southeast Asian leaders to send a clear message in support of pluralism: “ASEAN governments […] need to understand that they might be losing out on a big chance internationally if they continue to appease or promote the forces of division over reconciliation and tolerance at home.”

Read the full article on TheDiplomat.

The events, conducted in cooperation with the European Institute for Asian Studies, were the culmination of CISS’s 3rd EU-ASEAN Perspectives Dialogue (EUAP III). The EUAP Dialogues bring together young researchers and experts from ASEAN and the EU countries. During the third edition, young practitioners and researchers from both regions discussed challenges for gender equality based on their diverse personal experiences and expertise. The fruits of their work can be read in their recently published Policy Paper, which addresses three main dimensions: education and culture, political participation and economic empowerment.

During a three-day visit of an EUAP III delegation to Brussels, the participants presented the results to a young audience in a Citizen Café, an interactive discussion format. Organized around four major themes, the participants of the Café engaged in lively discussions on female political empowerment, gender sensitive education, women in the economy and men’s engagement in the fight for gender equality. Later on the same day, CISS organized a panel debate to which the wider public was invited. The highlight of this panel debate was Secretary-General Helga Schmid’s opening speech, in which she addressed global challenges to gender equality and argued that the EU and ASEAN should not only see themselves as partners in trade, but also as allies in the promotion of social and human rights values.

Gender equality? Now is the right time for action

Schmid agreed with the authors of the EUAP policy paper that the current situation of persistent gender inequality around the world reveals a pressing need for dedicated action. For too long, she said, gender equality has been overlooked or pushed aside for the benefit of other policy areas like trade, external relations or security issues. However, constant and fast-growing economies have benefitted only one part of the world’s population while putting vulnerable groups like migrants, especially female ones, at a disadvantage.

The discrimination of women is still a feature of everyday life in Europe and Southeast Asia, where women lack access to information, justice and education. This, in turn, widens the economic gender gap. As a consequence, Schmid claimed, on a worldwide scale about 47% of economic talents are not used adequately – a gigantic waste of potential, according to her.

The Secretary-General also referred to women’s situation in war zones, where they are often denied adequate protection. For this reason, she called for a greater consideration of gender aspects and approaches in peace and security policies. As a possible solution, Schmid proposed a higher participation of women in key decision-making positions which could have the advantage of bringing new perspectives and ideas into political negotiations and bargaining processes.

With a view to the interregional cooperation advocated by the EUAP participants, Schmid noted that the EU and its External Action Service (EEAS) are constantly mainstreaming gender equality in all of their actions and relations with foreign partners. For this, the EU has just recently adopted a new framework for its Gender Agenda. Gender equality plays a crucial role in the EU’s human rights’ work also vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. For example, the EU has invited representatives of ASEAN human rights bodies to Brussels. This study trip contributed largely to the establishment of an official Policy Dialogue on Human Rights between ASEAN and the EU in 2015. Even though the measures taken are certainly a good step into the right direction, Schmid warned that recent initiatives and actions were still conducted at a slow pace and there still remained a lot to do in the future. For this purpose, she said, more region-to-region cooperation and the inclusion of civil society will be needed. In particular, policy-makers should give young people a louder voice to raise their ideas and visions.

So, what needs to be done?

Schmid’s remarks kicked off a panel discussion which engaged a diverse group of high-level academics, civil society representatives and policy experts from Southeast Asia and Europe. The speakers included Graziella Piga, Expert at the Gender Facility which provides guidance and support to the EU’s Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Laurel Henning, Co-Founder of the social media campaign #EUPanelWatch, Phrommes Bhaholpolbhayuhasena, Chargé d’Affaires at the Royal Thai Embassy / Mission of Thailand to the European Union, and Marisna Yulianti, participant of EUAP III.

There was a general consent that the EU had provided a good foundation by making a big effort in adopting various legal and policy frameworks. Nevertheless, there must be a clear differentiation between the adoption and the practical implementation of commitments. The lack of successful implementation indicates a lack of political will in certain EU Member States. This again proves that a lot of follow-up work still needs to be done.

In this context, Laurel Henning, co-founder of the campaign #EUPanelWatch and recently listed as one of the most influential women in Brussels, presented the work of her organisation and explained why it was often considered to be a “nightmare” for many politicians. The campaign monitors the degree of female participation in public panel discussions in Brussels. Showcasing compelling data on the persistent underrepresentation of women in political debate, she emphasized the need for more awareness-raising and discussions dealing with gender equality.

The panellists highlighted that people often had a wrong image of what feminism is and what feminists actually do. It is not only about “rebelling on streets” and “burning bras”, but rather about removing the exclusive focus on women and about making the male population realize that feminism is not opposed to men in general. The general stereotyped ideas of how men and women have to be are harmful to both sexes. Therefore, the speakers recognized a demand for more male participation and inclusion in the combat for gender equality, which in turn would be beneficial for the whole society in general and for men in particular.

After the official panel debate, the floor was opened to the public, which engaged in a vivid discussion. During this exchange, guests stressed the relevance of education as one dimension that needed more attention. Gender-sensitizing should be mainstreamed in school and even pre-school curricula of children, thus making them understand that particular professions are not exclusively reserved for a certain sex. However, the recommendations also included considerations for cultural sensitivity, traditions and mentalities which might not always be in favour of a straight-forward promotion of gender equality.

The two events reinforced the claim by the young EUAP experts that there is a lot to be gained from continued dialogue and cooperation on gender issues between the EU and ASEAN. Using the insights gained from the debates, the participants are now continuing their analyses and advocacy, for example during the Regional Consultation on Gender Equality and Political Empowerment of Women on the sidelines of the 2016 Bali Democracy Forum.

The Syrian tragedy has exposed the shortcomings of the EU’s asylum policy. The newly agreed-upon rules will not help to cure the system’s birth defects. What the EU needs is real burden-sharing – or at least more competencies for the Commission.

A destination of hope

As the Syrian civil war keeps raging, more and more people flee the country. The UNHCR expects that, by the end of the year, 3.4 million Syrians will have left their home to escape large scale violence and misery. Although the vast majority have found provisional shelter in neighbouring countries, many move on to Europe. Their experiences show that, despite its long-standing commitment to establish a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the EU is still far from a unified approach in the protection of displaced persons.

National opposition and unequal burden-sharing

Some states, particularly Germany and Sweden, have taken a comparatively liberal approach in accepting Syrian refugees. When the German government started to fly in 5000 Syrians, mostly from Lebanon, for ‘temporary protection’ in mid-September, some hoped that this would stimulate similar commitments by other member states and, ideally, a common European response.

They have been disappointed. To the contrary, a number of member states continue to adopt a restrictive policy, with visa restrictions for Syrian nationals and acceptance rates close to zero. The situation is particularly severe in Greece, which is dealing with an extremely high inflow while at the same time having to fight domestic economic crisis. Non-governmental organisations report that many Syrian asylum seekers are refused entry or put into detention upon arrival. If they manage to apply for protection, their eligibility is often insufficiently checked.

Earlier this year, the EU Parliament has endorsed amendments to the CEAS which seek to further homogenize reception procedures and enhance the rights of refugees. But even if these amendments are rapidly translated into national law, the legislation is unlikely to provide for a unified policy due to two fundamental birth defects.

The first is the failure of the current system to establish an effective burden-sharing mechanism. Under the Dublin II regulation, the member state of first entry is the one responsible for processing an applicant’s case. So far, the project-based financial aid from diverse EU funds has not eliminated the incentives for border states to deny asylum seekers access to regular procedures, particularly in situations of massive inflow.

The second shortcoming is the persistent dominance of national actors in the implementation of the common asylum policy. The Temporary Protection Directive in effect provides the possibility of emergency relocation within the EU in cases of “mass influx”, which would be a useful instrument to deal with situations such as the Syrian crisis. However, the authority to invoke the Directive lies with the member states, and even if this is successfully done, participation is entirely voluntary. Under the conditions of unequal burden-sharing, free-riding of member states that are less affected by the inflow is encouraged, so it is hardly surprising that the Directive has not been applied since its enactment in 2001.

Two options to change the fate of millions

Obviously, the two problems are closely interconnected. As a consequence, the EU has two options to make the CEAS work: The first option would be to grant the Commission the right to apply the Temporary Protection Directive independently from the member states, and to determine who has to accept how many asylum seekers in a binding way. This is more of a workaround for emergency situations, and it would leave the underlying structural problems untouched.

The more fundamental alternative would be to dump Dublin II altogether and establish a fixed quota system, based on indicators such as population and economic performance, for the distribution of responsibility for asylum claims. The ‘allocation’ has to take place before the actual processing of the applications because in countries like Greece, one of the main problems is getting access to the regular asylum procedures in the first place.

Both of these options are ambitious. But the Syrian tragedy should remind European leaders that those who have the most to lose in negotiations about asylum policy are not those who conduct them.

by Kilian Spandler

The author is Assistant Director of CISS’s South and East Asia regional group and a PhD student in International Relations at Tübingen University, Germany. In his dissertation, he is analysing stability and change in the regional institutions of Europe and Southeast Asia.

This contribution is published in cooperation with the online debate magazine “The European”. Read the >> [original article] and more contributions to the >> [debate] on “The European”.

1. Background and Recent Developments

The Korean name “Dokdo” and the Japanese “Takeshima” both refer to a small pair of islets in the Sea of Japan (or, as the Koreans call it, East Sea) that are surrounded by several small rocks. Both parties claim the territory, which is since 1954 effectively controlled by South Korea. Seoul bases its claims on what it sees as historical accounts of Korean authority over Dokdo dating back to the 18^th century, while Japan disputes this interpretation and points to its incorporation of Takeshima in 1905, some 5 years before the colonization of Korea. The islands, Tokyo argues, have not been included in the territories to be returned to its former colonies after the end of imperial Japan under the provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951.

The most recent escalation of the conflict took place in August this year, when South Korean president Lee Myung-bak paid a surprise visit to Dokdo and nationalists organized a swim to the island to commemorate the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan. Tokyo responded by recalling its ambassador from Seoul. In September, South Korea underlined its determination to defend Dokdo by conducting military drills that simulated the repulsion of enemy forces from its surrounding waters.

Location of the Dokdo/Takeshima island (English-Franco name “Liancourt Rocks) in the Sea of Japan/East Sea).

2. IR schools and the conflict

Why make such a big deal about a tiny patch of land? It is the interplay of several factors that is hampering moves towards a political solution of this seemingly small-scale conflict. IR theory’s main strands can help us identify these factors.

a) Realism

Realism and Neo-Realism stress the need of states to rely on self-help to guarantee their own security in an anarchic international system. Conflicts in the international system result from antagonistic security interests and shifts in the balance of power[1]. With a view to the South Korea-Japan tensions, it’s important to keep in mind that East Asia is currently undergoing profound changes in its regional power configuration. Both South Korea and Japan have benefited a great deal from the stability induced by American hegemony during the Cold War, but as China is rising, a lot of questions remain to be answered: What role is China going to play in the new regional order? In the worst-case-scenario of a war with China, will the U.S. stand by its security guarantees towards Japan and South Korea respectively? Exactly how much burden sharing is Washington going to expect from its Pacific partners? Is there going to be an arms race among the Northeast Asian countries?

The uncertainty about the regional power constellation makes it imperative for both countries to spread their risks and avoid overdependency on external actors. South Korea and Japan, both poor in domestic energy resources, are competing over power sources to decrease dependence on imports from Russia and elsewhere. Both governments are keen on securing access to the potential large methane hydrate reserves in the area surrounding the islands. The same applies for the rich fishing grounds and the strategic importance of the marine territory.

b) Liberalism/Institutionalism

The Liberal school in IR is made up of two strands. Neo-liberal Institutionalism holds that institutions such as international organizations or regimes can help states gain from cooperation by lowering insecurity over other states’ behavior. It is apparent that there is a lack of strong regional or global institutions that could help overcome the differences between South Korea and Japan. The Japanese government has repeatedly proposed to take the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), most recently after the August 2012 saber rattling, but Seoul has refused to do so, insisting in official statements that South Korean sovereignty over Dokdo isn’t contested at all. The ICJ cannot forcibly subject a state to its jurisdiction without its consent, so it cannot contribute to problem-solving. On the regional level, APEC, ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit (EAS) – the main institutions supporting East Asia’s institutional architecture – have so far basically ignored the issue. The EAS states have held an ASEAN Expanded Maritime Forum in October 2012, but this is basically a dialogue among senior officials and non-government delegates (a so-called “track 1.5 dialogue”), not a high-level institution. Consequenty, it doesn’t have a mandate in conflict-resolution.

The other strand of Liberalism (maybe best called preference-oriented liberalism, following Andrew Moravcsik’s (1997) seminal article) looks into the political systems of the states, stressing the influence of domestic political structures and dynamics on state behavior. Being based on democratically elected governments, the foreign policies of Japan and South Korea are subject to the dynamics of public formation of opinion. Elections are imminent in both countries, and their outcome will have an influence on their future relations with each other. If Japanese opposition leader Shinzo Abe should return as prime minister, the relationship could suffer from his nationalist symbolic politics the same way they did during his first term (2006-07). Only recently, Abe visited the controversial Yasukuni shrine that is believed to house, among others, the souls of Japanese war criminals. In South Korea, conservative president Lee Myung-bak is under pressure from left-wing nationalists who see him as a successor of the elite that collaborated with the Japanese colonial rulers. To appease the left, Lee needs to take a tough stance against Japan. It is hard to determine to what extend the governments are drivers of or hostages to these forces, but it is clear that a nationalist, antagonistic foreign policy on either side would further obstruct a solution to the conflict.

c) Social Constructivism

Constructivist theories stress that in international relations, identities and interests are not exogenously given but constituted in a social process influenced heavily by norms, values and historical experience. Almost 70 years after the end of Japanese 35-year long colonial rule over Korea, the legacy of the past still bears heavy on the two countries’ relations. Although there have been efforts to overcome differences, such as the Joint History Research Committee established in 2001, diverging interpretations of the colonial era prevail, stirring controversy over issues such as forced labor and the so-called “comfort women”. Reconciliation is complicated by Japan’s failure to come to terms with its own past. As a consequence, threat perceptions among South Koreans of the former colonial power are still substantial.

The diverging interpretations of the past result in differing framings of the conflict. As Roh Moo-hyun, then president of South Korea, put it in a speech in 2006, for Koreans Dokdo is “a symbol  for the complete recovery of sovereignty [and] a touchstone of the extent to which Japan recognizes its past history” (Moh-hyun 2006). The Japanese challenge to the status of Dokdo/Takeshima is therefore seen as a threat to national integrity and independence, and the defense of the islands is a question of historical justice. Meanwhile, in Japan the issue is more viewed in legalistic terms, stressing the entitlement to what’s rightfully the state’s own property (hence, Tokyo’s proposal to refer to the ICJ). The lack in mutual trust and the different interpretations of the conflict make it hard to find common ground in negotiations.

3. Conclusion

As the previous section shows, the factors fueling the dispute are substantial and profound, which makes it hard to believe that a solution is at hand in the foreseeable future. But the conflict is not just about exogenous power dynamics, which leaves the governments with two options to deal with the row. The first option is to create mutual trust by working in several areas: building robust regional institutions, cooperating in coming to terms with their common past, and resisting the temptations of nationalistic policies. These are long-term tasks that require patience and determination. The other option would be to continue the current approach and accept that the conflict will flare up again from time to time. It’s an option that could work, and I’m not proposing we have to brace ourselves for a South Korean-Japanese war. There are several factors that work against a military escalation, such as the countries’ strong economic interdependence, the U.S.’ pressure for détente, and a strong pacifist majority in Japan. One of the core concepts of the liberal school, the democratic peace theory, suggests the countries are unlikely to go to war with each other because they are both liberal democracies. But to rely exclusively on these counterforces is a long shot given the strong regional dynamics that are so hard to predict. Simply carrying on is the riskier option, but, unfortunately, it’s also the easier one.

1. Introduction

When Burma’s[1] new constitution was adopted in a controversial referendum in 2008, few were optimistic about the chances of democratic transition in the country that was, at that time, a quasi-pariah. The privileges granted to the military seemed to be too extensive to allow for far-reaching reforms. Over the last months however, democratization became more and more real. President Thein Sein’s government has released political prisoners and partly lifted media restrictions. And in April this year the world watched as Aung San Suu Kyi, who had spent 15 years of her life under house arrest, led the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD) to a landslide victory in the parliamentary by-elections.

While much remains to be done, these events indicate that after half a century of military rule, Myanmar seems to be on the right track. A great deal of the reform agenda of the junta’s supreme executive body, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has been attributed to the impact of economic sanctions and political isolation by the West. By contrast, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, has often been criticized for taking too soft a stance with the regime, thus encouraging it to continue its often brutal handling of political opposition and put off reforms.

As I argue in this contribution, these accounts are not entirely fair. In fact, ASEAN has to be given credit for substantially contributing to a political climate that is favorable of Burmese democratization. In particular, three elements of ASEAN’s Burma policy proved to be more effective than is usually acknowledged: the concept of constructive engagement, moderate diplomatic pressure and criticism, and the creation of institutional incentives to policy change.

2. Geo-strategy, norms, and divergent policy preferences – parameters of ASEAN’s Burma Policy

It has to be emphasized that the prospect of democratization was not the number one rationale behind ASEAN’s inclusion of Myanmar in 1997. Rather, it was economic and, even more important, geo-strategic considerations that convinced ASEAN leaders of the need to incorporate the country. The growing ties between China and the military leadership in Yangon[2] were perceived as a strategic threat by the leaders of the other Southeast Asian nations. Burma’s accession to ASEAN was supposed to balance this relationship with China. This strategic background provides the first parameter of ASEAN’s Burma policy: To avoid driving Burma into China’s arms or alienating Burma’s powerful northern ally, ASEAN has needed to refrain from excessive criticism of the regime.

The second factor informing ASEAN’s Burma policy is the organization’s normative framework. The so-called ASEAN Way emphasizes consensual decision-making, non-confrontational behavior and non-interference of the member states in each other’s internal affairs. In practice, the interpretation of these norms was never absolute when it came to dealing with Burma. Still, the ASEAN Way has limited the other ASEAN states’ possibilities to influence the country’s policies, making it extremely difficult to openly discuss internal developments in Burma, let alone to take collective measures in response. On the other hand, by sticking to these norms ASEAN was able to create a constructive environment for negotiations with Burma, emphasizing engagement and trust building over isolation and confrontation.

These restraints are increased by the third factor affecting ASEAN’s options with respect to Burma: the divergent policy preferences of its member states. The five founding members – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – have in the past been taken a relatively critical posture towards the regime so as to prevent the issue from damaging the organization’s image in the international community. In contrast, the Indochina states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, in fear of sooner or later becoming the subject of criticism themselves, have advocated a much more appeasing approach, invoking the principle of non-interference. With this heterogeneity of interests, it was quite hard for ASEAN to develop a coherent policy towards Myanmar.

2. Central elements of ASEAN’S Burma policy

As a consequence of these influences, ASEAN’s Burma policy since the country’s accession has been characterized by three elements:

First, the concept of constructive engagement favors political dialogue over confrontational and coercive measures such as diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and military intervention. Even in the face of severe violations of human rights during the Depayin massacre in 2003 and the bloody repression of the so-called Saffron Revolution of 2007, ASEAN leaders have repeatedly renounced sanctions as a means to pressurize the junta. Similarly, the suspension of Burmese membership in ASEAN was never a serious alternative for the other states. Instead, they tried to engage the regime in a dialogue over democratic reforms. The seven-point Roadmap to Democracy, presented by the Burmese military government SPDC[3] in 2003, served as a benchmark for these discussions. The ASEAN states accepted the military’s role in the transformation process and rejected prospects of sudden regime change, thus reassuring the military leadership that their mere existence was not at stake.

It’s true that in 2005, Burma was strongly urged by the other member states to abstain from the ASEAN chairmanship it would routinely have taken over the next year. But this pressure was not so much a sign of ASEAN voluntarily breaking with its constructive approach. Rather, it was the result of the EU and the U.S. making clear that their relations with ASEAN would severely be damaged if ASEAN didn’t toughen its stance on the regime.

Second, while reaffirming the principles of the ASEAN Way, officials of the other member states have increasingly used diplomatic pressure and criticism to influence the political situation in Burma. Compared to Western reactions, however, ASEAN’s official comments have been moderate. An exception is the statement issued by the ASEAN chair in response to the events of 2007, where the foreign ministers expressed their “revulsion” over the brutal crackdown on protesters[4]. In general, ASEAN tried to keep public criticism balanced and constructive, exerting “moral influence” over Burma’s leadership without isolating the country on the international stage. This moderate criticism is very much in line with the concept of constructive engagement.

Third, ASEAN has tried to create positive incentives with a view to consolidate Burma’s reform process. In particular, ASEAN used Myanmar’s upcoming chairmanship in 2013 as leverage in their call for further reforms. In the chairman’s statement of the 19^th ASEAN summit in November of last year, this connection was made quite clear by Southeast Asia’s leaders: “We further support [the] positive developments [in Myanmar], and their continued progress contributes to promote conditions conducive for our decision to accord Myanmar the Chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014.”

3. Adding carrots to the stick – ASEAN’s Burma policy re-assessed

It’s true that strategic and institutional restraints, together with the heterogeneous interests of its members have limited ASEAN’s leeway in dealing with its problem child. And it’s true that ASEAN has not achieved all of its goals. However, as change has gained momentum in Myanmar, a re-evaluation of the organization’s role shows that it does have its merits. The recent changes cannot be explained exclusively by the regime’s will to overcome economic and political sanctions imposed by the West.

By opposing radical regime change and choosing an approach that kept Burma engaged even while it was facing economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation by the West, ASEAN was able to build trust and broaden the regime’s strategic opportunities. Without ASEAN’s moderate policy and permanent efforts to integrate Burma in an institutional context, the natural reaction of the government to Western pressure would have been to turn even closer to China, eventually becoming a Chinese satellite slash rogue state similar to North Korea. The organization’s accommodation offered the regime a way to escape China’s grip without either completely disengaging from international politics or exposing itself to Western pressure. Under these conditions, Myanmar was more willing to make concessions to its ASEAN partners.

To be sure, China remains an important partner for Burma, but with ASEAN’s reassurance, Naypyidaw can afford to say no to Beijing. In 2011, in response to public protest, Thein Sein’s government called off a multi-billion Chinese-led dam project across the Irrawaddy River. What is another sign for a new responsiveness of the regime towards popular demands relies heavily on Myanmar’s constructive integration into ASEAN as a regional institutional architecture. Burma would hardly have chosen to affront China on such a profitable project if China was its only remaining international ally.

Apart from the possibility to increase their strategic leeway, the prospect of gaining further legitimacy internally and externally by chairing the organization in 2014 created a strong incentive for the government to continue and intensify the reform process. In this manner, Naypyidaw is able to give in to external demands without losing face. Just one month ahead of the ASEAN Summit in October 2011, the government released 220 political prisoners from detention – a move that indicates that Burma is ready to make concessions to escape its pariah status.

While ASEAN’s approach might not have worked without Western sanctions simultaneously in place, it is probably just as true that the U.S.’s and EU’s policy would not have worked without ASEAN’s complementary policy. By freezing relations with Burma and imposing sanctions, the West hit the regime hard, but it also lost the chance to influence the regime’s policy – in contrast, ASEAN was able to push the country in the direction it wanted by creating incentives for policy change. While the West provided the stick, ASEAN fed the carrot – an unintended division of labor, but one that worked. The Burma experience shows us that regional institutions can help creating an environment that makes pressure on illiberal regimes more effective by reassuring them strategically and creating positive incentives such as official functions that increase international and internal legitimacy.

by Kilian Spandler

Kilian Spandler is studying political science, sociology, and economics at Würzburg University.

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Reger, M., 2008: Das schwarze Schaf der Familie? Burma und die ‘ASEAN‘: Bilanz einer Dekade. In: Südostasien. Zeitschrift für Politik, Kultur, Dialog, 24[1], pp. 24-28.

1. Confusion in Beijing

On March 15^th, in a move that caught international attention, the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) ousted Bo Xilai, party chief of Chongqing province and member of the 25 member Politburo. Bo, until then a hopeful candidate for the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PSC) to be elected in October, was sacked shortly after his former ally and chief of Chongqing police, Wang Lijun, had apparently tried to defect to the U.S. and was subsequently arrested. However, the real and full circumstances that led to his removal remain unclear, as does Wang’s fate.

In a further sign of confusion, in later March Chinese ‘weibo’-microblogs, the least censored media in the People’s Republic, echoed with rumors about a failed military coup in Beijing that was said to be led by Zhou Yongkang, PSC member and head of the state military forces – and allegedly a supporter of Bo’s ambitions. There were reports of gunfire and military presence in Zhongnanhai, the district in Beijing that hosts the party’s and government’s headquarters. Speculation was fueled by Zhous absence from the public, although he reappeared on state television later holding official meetings.

It’s quite likely we will never know exactly what happened in Zhongnanhai these last days and weeks, since the official media have remained all but silent on the events and online references to the incidents have been blocked by state censorship. It seems unlikely that a coup has actually been attempted, and the regime as such is stable, as far as one can tell from the outside. Still, the rumors are evidence of growing internal rifts that are dividing the CPC and of the increasing nervousness of the factions with regard to the upcoming reconfiguration of the party’s power structure.

2. The polarization of leadership

The division line within the party leadership is commonly drawn either between liberals and conservatives or ‘elitists’ and ‘populists’. While these classifications overlap to some extent, they are not identical. The elitist/populist distinction refers to the struggle for power between two groups of functionaries with differing personal backgrounds. The ‘elitists’ are mostly family members (or ‘princelings’, as they are commonly called) of veteran revolutionaries and former high-ranking party functionaries. These ‘princelings’ include figures such as the likely next president Xi Jinping, chief legislator Wu Bangguo and, until recently, Bo Xilai. The ‘populist’ coalition, currently led by president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao, is home to officials from less privileged families such as Li Keqiang, the likely new premier, and Wang Yang, party chief of Guangdong province.  See the following Table 1 for a styliyed overview proposed by Li (2012).

Table 1: Factional Identities of the Leading Candidates for the Next Politburo Standing Committee (click to enlarge).

Generally, the ‘elitists’ represent the interests of Chinese enterprises and pursue more liberal economic policies while the ‘populists’ emphasize social justice and advocate a strong role of the state . However, the alignments are not at all consistent: There are ‘elitists’ with a distinctively conservative agenda – Table 2 below, again as proposed  by Li (2012), provides a rough overview. Most prominently, the ‘princeling’ Bo has run a rather assertive self-promotion campaign and reintroduced ‘red’ revolutionary propaganda from the Mao era in his province. His leftist program of common prosperity guaranteed by an interventionist state came to be known as the ‘Chongqingmodel’. This approach is rivaled by Wang Yang’s liberal ‘Guangdongmodel’. While Wang is, by personal background, a ‘populist’, he has repeatedly pushed for far-reaching economic and political reforms. In his remarks at the National People’s Congress, premier and fellow ‘populist’ Wen joined in Wang’s call, once again advocating democratic reforms and warning against backward policies that might end in “such historical tragedies as the Cultural Revolution”[1], obviously alluding to Bo’s conservative policies.

Table 2: Policy Priorities and Preferences of the Leading PSC Candidates (click to enlarge).

This short insight reveals that things are more complex than they might appear at first glance. Depending on the political role one assigns to Bo, one can draw different conclusions from his dismissal. Take him as a high-profile ‘princeling’, and it represents a victory for the ‘populists’ and a defeat for the ‘elitists’. Take him as a conservative, and it’s a defeat for the populist agenda and a victory for liberal minded grandees. Against this backdrop, it is in fact quite hard to say which faction, if any, has gained ground in the nip-and-tuck for the new PSC.

3. Charisma, not patronage – a new source of legitimization for China’s leaders

Maybe it is most fruitful to not regard the Bo incident primarily as a struggle between players with differing personal backgrounds or political ideologies. These rivalries and differences have been fought before, even in the seemingly monolithic CPC, and they usually ended with some kind of compromise that did not allow for extreme solutions. What’s new is the increasing involvement of the public in questions of leadership. In other words, the question is not so much who wins the game but how the game itself begins to change.

David Pilling (2012) points out that, ever since Mao’s death, it was administrative experience and individual patronage that made party careers, not public support. Bo’s popularity and the media attention for his intensive campaigning pose a challenge to this meritocratic leadership paradigm. The party establishment, both populists and elitists, reacted to this challenge by removing Bo from the list of PSC candidates, but if the Bo experience proves to represent a general trend, they are not likely to stop it in the long term. The young, well-educated middle class are beginning to discover the power of social media and public debate to influence questions of policy and personnel decisions, and they won’t easily give up that power again. In Weberian terms, what we might see in Chinese politics is the growing importance of charismatic leadership alongside long-established bureaucratic and patriarchic structures. That is certainly not to say that we are to expect a shift towards all-out democratic elections or a multi-party system, but that public opinion will be increasingly considered in questions of leadership.

What impact would this trend towards popular legitimization of leadership have on China and the world? With respect to the Chinese citizens, it would be good news, as it would require more accountability and democratic legitimization on the part of the new generation of CPC leaders. For the world, it might mean a China that is more nationalistic, more assertive and less predictable than it already is in the eyes of Western observers. This is the dilemma one has to face when assessing recent developments in Beijing.

Time to set your priorities.

by Kilian Spandler

Kilian Spandler is studying political science, sociology, and economics at Würzburg University.

Source of tables

Table 1: Li, C., 2012, p. 139

Table 2: Li, C., 2012, p. 143.

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1. Introduction

In the wake of the proliferation of multilateral bodies the Asia Pacific has seen since the 1990ies, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was launched in 2005 by the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries as an annual meeting of regional leaders, heads of state and government, to discuss strategic, political and security matters in a broader framework. The APT process includes the ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) as well as China, Japan and South Korea.

From the beginning, questions of membership played a key role due to strategic considerations and competing models of regional community building. While China envisaged the EAS to be a truly East Asian forum and thus supported a more exclusive format based on the APT member states, Japan pushed for the inclusion of Australia, New Zealand and, later, India in accordance to its vision of a community drawing upon an “ASEAN Plus Six” model.

With the ASEAN states wary of Chinese dominance in the future regional architecture, and with Chinese leaders careful not to nourish their neighbors’ suspicions, Japan was able to push through the admittance of the three countries – at the cost of China’s temporary loss of interest in the forum. For the time being, the Chinese leadership seems to have identified the APT as the preferred framework to promote regionalism in Asia.

Against this backdrop, the accession of Russia and the U.S. might set off a new dynamic in the ever-advancing, but sometimes incoherently mushrooming process of institutionalizing multilateral politics in the region. It seems clear that the EAS only works as an effective body for regional dialogue if its membership is soundly balanced. This being said, what are the implications of Russia’s and the U.S.’ accession for the relevance of the summit in Asia’s regional architecture?

Any answer to this question has to consider two parameters. First: What are the new members’ stakes in Asian community building through the EAS? And second: How will the other member states respond to their accession?

Member states and canditates of the East Asia Summit

2. U.S. and Russian interests in Asian community building

Even during the 1990s, when some observers accused the United States of neglecting the region, America never ceased to be the prime power in the Asia Pacific, guaranteeing stability through a system of bilateral military alliances. Notably, under Barack Obama, the self-declared “first Pacific president”[1], the U.S. has tried to invigorate the multilateral dimension of its Asia strategy. The rationale here seems to be to engage China in a regional architecture and thus ease the impact of its rise while at the same time ensuring America’s own influence in the region. Consequently, the U.S. has come to actively support community building in the Asia Pacific. With the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) clearly lacking the drive to advance the integration process, America is wise to turn its attention to the EAS, where it can deal with all the major powers, including India, which is not a member of APEC.

Russia, much like the U.S. though earlier, has adopted an eastward-looking policy of fostering cooperation with its Asian neighbors. In fact, then-president Vladimir Putin was invited to join the first EAS in 2005 as a guest. The main pillar of Russia’s relations with Asia is its partnership with China. Sino-Russian ties have been strengthened in the last years, in spite of smoldering conflicts, particularly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which brings together the two giants with four Central Asian states and which has been dubbed the Anti-NATO by some observers. While the SCO is genuinely a forum for security cooperation, Russia’s interest in East Asian community building is likely to be mainly economic in nature. As the world’s largest oil exporting  nation, it wants to ensure access to Asian markets whose demand for energy is ever-increasing.

3. The Asian powers’ response to U.S. and Russia as new EAS members

a) China

How China will respond to the enlargement of the summit is unclear. It might seem a natural consequence of the U.S. entry into the summit that China will further shift its multilateral efforts from the EAS, where it is confronted with major competitors such as the U.S. and India, to the more exclusive APT where it can exercise leadership as the strongest member. In fact, quite the opposite may prove true: Asian regionalism is not a simple zero-sum game of who dominates what grouping or who can push through his idea of regional integration. To be sure, the U.S., China and Japan all favor one mechanism over the other (APEC, APT and EAS respectively) to pursue their respective interests. But actually, the functional focus of the fora is varying from free trade (APEC) to financial cooperation (APT) to strategic dialogue (EAS). Of all countries, China has a genuine interest in using multiple channels to spread the narrative of its peaceful rise and benign motives regarding its neighbors. It might also welcome the new EAS as a framework that allows its president to discuss strategic issues with his American counterpart without Taiwanese officials at the same table, as is the case in APEC. For these reasons, it is well possible that the EAS will receive renewed attention from Beijing – even though bilateral channels will most likely remain its preferred instrument for regional diplomacy.

b) Japan

Due to its close ties with the United States and its intensive trade, Japan has always been inclined to a more Pacific outlook in Asian regionalism. In Tokyo’s view, the move to include the U.S. can only serve the country’s interests by balancing China and by supporting Japanese claims in territorial disputes with its neighbors – although China, who competes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, has so far declined American proposals to discuss the conflict in multilateral frameworks. The fact that the U.S. now is a part of the EAS is likely to foster the impression in Tokyo that America supports Asian community building and thus buttresses Japanese efforts within the summit process.

As to Russia, the Japanese record is more mixed. Tokyo is benefiting from the ESPO pipeline system pumping oil to Japan, but so are South Korea and China. The strong competition between the Northeast Asian countries for Russian oil made it obvious to Japan that cooperation on energy security in the EAS has to include Moscow as the main supplier. On the other hand, tension remains high in the conflict over the Kuril Islands and, given Russia’s stubborn stance on the issue, it is unlikely that the EAS can serve as a place to effectively tackle it.

c) India

Similar considerations apply for India, whose “Look East” policy has led it to engage with its eastern neighbors and support the region’s integration process. New Delhi is anxious about Chinese activity in the Indian Ocean and it has during the last years stepped up its relations with the U.S., peaking in the 2007 nuclear deal. India hopes to further strengthen ties with the U.S. through the EAS, thus hedging against possible Chinese hegemonic ambitions. It shares the view of the ASEAN states that to guarantee stability, major powers like itself, Russia and the U.S. should have a stake in the region. Consequently, it has supported the extension of the summit.

d) ASEAN members

Of the established EAS members, the ten ASEAN states were among the strongest supporters of the enlargement. This comes as no surprise since the Southeast Asian nations are the ones most directly concerned with Chinese ascendancy. To balance growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, ASEAN states are trying to draw the United States into Asia’s security dialogue. At the same time, the organization wants to remain in the “driver’s seat” of East Asia’s community building process. In this respect, managing the EAS might prove a balancing act. Letting the U.S. join might prevent the Chinese from dominating the forum, but what will the Chinese response be? And will ASEAN continue to be the driving force of the EAS? Or will it lose influence amidst great power politics? The organization will have to play its part as a broker very well if it wants to remain the motor of Asian integration.

4. Conclusion

As this article has pointed out, all of the major players have a stake in community building. Still, in the face of continued suspicion, rivalry and nationalism, the task of creating an East Asian Community may seem overwhelming. Much depends on how China responds to the new framework. If ASEAN manages to mitigate Beijing’s suspicions, the EAS can serve as a building block for further cooperation. Still, one should not get one’s hopes up too high. Multilateralism in Asia does not work the way it does in the Western world, with strong formal institutions being rare. After all, the EAS may come to be little more than another talking shop. But in a region historically so prone to military conflict, getting all the relevant parties at a table to build mutual trust is not so bad. As the renowned scholar of Asian relations, Amitav Acharya, argues, the most important contribution of multilateralism to Asian security is norm proliferation. In this respect, the expansion of the EAS shows all relevant players commit themselves to Asian style multilateral dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes – a precious signal in times of rising tension in the Asia Pacific.

by Kilian Spandler

Kilian Spandler is studying political science, sociology and economics at Würzburg University.

Image Source

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/East_Asian_Community.PNG, accessed 09/30/2011.

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