In addition to this image of the “crisis region”, the image of Sub-Saharan Africa as a “region of opportunity” has also emerged in recent years. Sub-Saharan Africa’s enormous wealth of raw materials, the immense investments this region, the brisk economic growth and, last but not least, demographic development make it the continent of the future. In an attempt to secure a corresponding share of these prospects of success for themselves, the conscious perception of African actors at eye level is often missing – for example within the flourishing relationship between China and African countries. An appropriate and realistic picture of Sub-Saharan Africa, its inhabitants and its – not necessarily monetary – wealth is all too rarely conveyed in Europe. The relations between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa are seldom examined from an African perspective. This makes it difficult to get a realistic picture of living conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa in Germany.

Therefore, CISS’s Sub-Saharan African Regional Division would like to contribute with a call for articles and contributions to broaden the perspectives on this region in order to counter many a clichéd image of Sub-Saharan Africa. We want to stimulate a balanced discourse on international relations between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa and take a look at cross-regional issues from an alternate perspective.

For this we are looking for young people with a critical view, who give their own perspective of the challenges and problems of the region, but also of the opportunities and strengths as well as the possible future development of Sub-Saharan Africa. Possible topics are for example

– Conflict and Security Issues within Sub-Saharan Africa

– Democracy and Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa

– Development and the Future of Sub-Saharan Africa

– Enviromental Policiy Issues and Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa

– Foreign Relations within Sub-Saharan Africa or between Sub-Saharan Africa and the world

Own experiences and research can help to show a differentiated picture, which reflects, according to the diversity of this region, the different facets of the reality of life as well as the relations of Germany and Europe with Sub-Saharan Africa.

Further information can be found in this document.

In such a way, young people from Zimbabwe desperately speak about the future of the landlocked state in southern Africa – and about their own future in their homeland. Among the 16.5 million inhabitants mistrust towards the government continues to grow.

The British colony of Rhodesia, named after Cecil Rhodes, was founded in 1893. In 1911 it had been divided into northern Rhodesia (today’s Zambia) and southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe). On November 11, 1965 the unilateral declaration of independence as “Rhodesia” took place. It was not until April 18, 1980 that the state achieved internationally recognized independence as “Zimbabwe” with Canaan Banana as the president and Robert Mugabe as the Prime Minister. In 1987 Zimbabwe became a presidential republic with far-reaching powers of the “new” president Robert Mugabe, who since then has had sole power such as the control of the military.

For many years Zimbabwe was on a steady course of growth and regarded as a model for a successful and peaceful post-colonial development. The expansion of the health and education sectors and several government programs led to a steady improvement in social and economic indicators.

Towards the end of the 1990s, however, protests by the opposition and civil society against Robert Mugabe’s regime increased. The government brutally suppressed the questioning of Mugabe’s power and finally carried out the long-awaited “land reform” by force in 2000. As a result, some eleven million hectares of white farmers’ land were expropriated and officially distributed to about 300,000 small farmers. The farmers were to be compensated, but many were plundered and expelled instead or fled immediately. Many farms went to politicians of the ruling party without paying any compensation, although they had no interest in an adequate cultivation of the farmland. As a result, Zimbabwe suffered famine and malnutrition. This sudden and unexpected method had an extremely negative impact on the overall economic development of the country. Consequently, Zimbabwe is still dependent on food imports as it can no longer feed its population itself. By 2015, nearly 45 percent of the population was malnourished – one of the highest rates in the world.

Then again, there was Robert Mugabe’s increasing desire for ever greater control. In November 2017, the political crisis escalated when Robert Mugabe dismissed his Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa. On November 14, the military – until then the government’s sole means of oppressing the population – took power. For the first time, the soldiers demonstrated side by side with the population for Robert Mugabe’s resignation. The enormous pressure finally led to Mugabe’s resignation on November 21, after which the military appointed Emmerson Mnangagwa as interim president on November 24. He was confirmed as president in the presidential elections on July 30, 2018. However, those who had hoped for a non-partisan transitional government after the sensational demonstrations were disappointed when Emmerson Mnangagwa appointed certain members of the Mugabe regime to join his new cabinet

Although Emmerson Mnangagwa has already announced a few long overdue reforms, some of which have already been initiated, the population is still skeptical when it comes to the new president. These include, above all, the reforms of the civil service and the police, the limitation of the Indigenization Act and legislative adjustments to the new constitution of 2013 with more political freedoms. Within the population, no one can forget that he had been involved with the manipulation of elections and the repression of opposition members in the past. Despite the first signs of an administrative and economic opening of the state, a real opening towards more political freedom seems distant.

Although Zimbabwe was one of the economically strongest states in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1997, it is now in a massive economic crisis and one of the poorest states in the world. After 1998, the economic output fell by half within ten years. At the same time, the inflation rate, which had been largely below 30 percent in the 1990s, rose too many times. In 2001 the rate was in the three-digit range for the first time, by 2006 it had risen to 1,000 percent and in January 2008 it reached 100,000 percent. From December 2007 to January 2009, Zimbabwe experienced a devastating hyperinflation, which eventually rose to 231 million per cent in July 2008 – the last official figure. Such a high monthly devaluation translates into an average price increase of 11.1 percent per day. In response, the government tried to impose price maintenance. Instead of success, however, this in turn led to numerous business closures and long queues in front of the shops.

Even before January 29, 2009, foreign currencies such as the United States Dollar (USD) and the South African Rand (ZAR) were used as means of payment. But it was not until then that these currencies were officially accepted as means of payment. As a result, the Zimbabwe Dollar, which had long become meaningless, was suspended and later even officially eradicated.

Until November 2017, Zimbabwe stagnated both politically and economically. This was due to steadily rising prices, an ongoing liquidity crisis, a budget deficit of around 2.2 billion USD in 2017, uncovered banknotes of 4.4 billion USD and similar levels of foreign debt, underutilization of the industry by less than 50 percent and one of the world’s highest informal economic sectors (over 60 percent). The state lacks foreign currency, so that it can no longer guarantee the supply of its population’s essential needs with food, drinking water, medicinal products and petrol.

Due to the lack of banknotes, the central bank introduced promissory notes as a parallel currency in October 2016 with the aim of stabilizing the economy. In February 2019, these notes were replaced by the new currency – the RTGS Dollar. Although this was officially introduced at a ratio of 1:1 to the USD, in reality it constantly continues to lose value and has already been traded at a ratio of almost 5:1 (on the black market) in May 2019. While the foreign currency is still considered much more stable by the population, the new currency has not brought any stability. The prices of goods and services continue to rise, as a result of which there are fewer and fewer goods and, in particular, a shortage of medicinal products and petrol.

In January 2019, the generally very critical situation escalated into violent protests against the expensive gasoline, especially in the capital Harare and other major cities. The government reacted with torture, bodily harm and killings of insurgents executed by the military. At the same time, the government shut down the internet on the spurious ground that insurgents were using the internet to organize their activities. Also, outsiders were not able to follow the violent suppression of the protests and the killings any longer. After six days, however, the government was forced by foreign countries to release the internet again. Until today, no one knows what happened within the country during those six days. The government also failed to take into account the fact that it itself could no longer reach the population when Emmerson Mnangagwa tried to reassure the population and the protesters via Facebook and Twitter.

Overall, the Zimbabwean population faces a terrible déjà vu. People do not trust the new currency – a consequence of the mistrust towards the banks and the government. Although the situation is less violent at the moment than it was in January, the economic situation is much worse; and if it continues to deteriorate to such an extent, the likelihood of new violent protests is extremely high.

References

Alexander, Jocelyn; McGregor, JoAnn; Tendi, Miles-Blessing (2014): Politics, Patronage and the State. Harare: Weaver Press.

Bratton, Michael (2014): Power Politics in Zimbabwe. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Masunungure, Eldred; Shumba, Jabusile M. (eds.) (2012): Zimbabwe mired in Transition. Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM), Weaver Press: Harare.

Mlambo, Alois (2014): A History of Zimbabwe. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

Raftopoulous, Brian; Mlambo, Alois (eds.) (2009): Becoming Zimbabwe: A history from the pre-colonial period to 2008, Harare: Weaver Press.

Sachikonye, Lloyd (2011): When a state turns on its citizens. 60 years of institutionalized violence and political culture, Auckland Park: Jacana Media.

Schlee, Beatrice (2007): Zimbabwe: die Überlebenskünstler – eine Lektion in Sachen Machterhalt, in: Molt, Peter (eds.): Kulturen und Konflikte im Vergleich: Comparing Cultures and Conflicts. Festschrift für Theodor Hanf, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 562-576.

Tendi, Miles-Blessing (2016): State Intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe’s Presidential Succession, in: African Affairs, Vol. 115, pp. 1-22.

After the First World War, Cameroon was divided in 1919. France received a mandate to administer four fifths of the country and Great Britain obtained one to direct one fifth. After repeated revolts against the French colonial power, the French part gained its independence on January 1, 1960. Ahmadou Ahidjo was called up by the French government as Cameroon’s first president orienting his foreign policy primarily towards France. On October 1, 1961, the British part of Cameroon eventually gained its independence, too. But since the British occupiers refused to grant complete independence, the northern part of the British Mandate joined Nigeria, while the southern part decided to join the Republic of Cameroon.

Yet, Cameroon is still a divided state, the two parts – the former French part and the former northern British part – have never completely come together. While the francophone part is still oriented towards France, the anglophone part identifies with the Commonwealth. However, the anglophones and francophones are not homogeneous blocks either as interethnic conflicts exist within these groups. 80 percent of the Cameroonian population are French-speaking and only 20 percent English-speaking. Although not only French, but also English is recognized as the official language in Cameroon due to its past history, all official activities are done in French only. For example, all speeches of the current President Paul Biya are held in French, all laws are written in French, and all necessary administrative procedures must take place in French.

At present, Cameroon is in an exceptional situation. For a long time, the country had been a stable anchor in an unstable region – currently, it is dominated by two areas of conflict.

The approaching threat coming from Boko Haram

For years now, the northeastern part of Nigeria has been ruled by the terrorism of the Boko Haram organization, which claims to be fighting in the name of religion. For many years, Cameroon has been considered a refuge for Boko Haram, where the organization was tolerated by the Cameroon authorities in the sense of an unspoken mutual non-aggression pact. Since 2013, however, the organization has extended its attacks to the Cameroon itself.

In May 2014, the confrontations increased when Cameroon’s President Paul Biya formally declared war on the organization. On the border with Nigeria, attacks and military confrontations increased. At the beginning of 2015, more than 80 villagers from the Mokolo region were kidnapped and their villages completely destroyed by Boko Haram. In July of the same year, there was a suicide attack in Fotokol and within a week two more attacks took place in Maroua. The interior of the Cameroon – the capital of the Cameroonian region Extrême-Nord – thereby became a target of the attacks for the first time. By the end of 2015, at least 23 more suicide attacks had been carried out – most of them by children – resulting in more than 150 deaths.

Since then, the increasing recruitment of new members in Cameroon has been worrying. A particular problem is that the people are by no means forced by Boko Haram to participate in the organization. Rather, financial and social incentives or religious-ideological views lead to more and more people joining the terrorist organization. Young people without prospects get an opportunity for employment, income and social recognition – currently out of reach in everyday life in Cameroon.

Although the international perception of crisis is currently focusing on the conflict in the anglophone region of Cameroon, the Islamist terrorist organization Boko Haram continues its suicide attacks in the north of the country claiming numerous civilian victims. The attacks have led and continue to lead to increasing destabilization of the northern regions. In the medium term, the activities of the terrorist organization will determine Cameroon’s domestic and security policy. This poses an enormous challenge for the state, because the political and structural situation of Cameroon appears to be very uncertain – which makes the state even more susceptible to conflict. But are the abilities of Cameroon’s government and society sufficient to master this dual challenge?

The economic situation in Cameroon is worsening. Since about 80 percent of all consumer goods in the north are imported from Nigeria, border closures and other restrictions as a result of border attacks have a negative impact on trade. As a result, Cameroon is stagnating not only socially but also economically despite its wealth of resources.

The “Republic of Ambazonia”

Again and again, the inequality between the anglophone and the francophone parts of Cameroon has been the trigger for burgeoning conflicts within society. Other triggers and exacerbators of conflict are corruption and state failure, especially with regard to the education and health systems. However, these are not discussed further within the present article. Already after the reunification, the anglophone part began to strive for autonomy, which has intensified since 1990. As a result, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) was founded in 1995, advocating the separation of the English-speaking part from Cameroon and the establishment of an independent “Republic of Ambazonia”.

Due to the disdain and persistent neglect by the government, there are increased protests and dissatisfaction among the young anglophone population in particular. In 2005, English-speaking students protested at universities for better study conditions and against discrimination against English-speaking students. The lack of prospects for young people and their anger at inequality led to further protests in Douala, Yaoundé and other cities in western Cameroon in 2008.

In 2016, peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers took place in the English-speaking part demanding more recognition of the English language and culture. In response to this, the government sent the military which brutally suppressed these protests. At the beginning of 2017, the internet in the anglophone region had been blocked for over 90 days – an essential intervention in the everyday lives of many Cameroonians who depend on internet access for everyday activities such as money transfers. As a result, the separatists also took up arms. Since then, the government and the separatists – the so-called “Amba Boys” – have outbid each other in their acts of violence, which often affect the civilian population. Entire villages have already been burned down, thousands of people killed, and about 300,000 people have fled the country so far. The civilian population does not know how to behave: Those who support the school boycott as teachers are punished by the government whereas those who resume teaching are attacked by the separatists.

In November 2018, when over 70 pupils were kidnapped by armed men in Bamenda, Paul Biya accused the separatists of this act and described their movement as a “terrorist gang” – the justification for even tougher actions against the protests. Fortunately, in the middle of November, all the abductees were free again. So far only the terrorist organization Boko Haram had resorted to such means. Does this result in a whole new dimension of the conflict between the government and the separatists?

However, not only the English-speaking population protests. There are also demonstrations in the francophone part of Cameroon against a possible secession. Beyond the structural conditions, the current political situation is particularly contributing to an increased crisis potential. President Paul Biya, who has ruled since 1982, leaves the population in complete uncertainty about his successor and the future of the country in terms of personnel and institutions.

The formerly comparatively stable Cameroon is currently in a difficult situation of increasing conflict, economic stagnation, and increasing political uncertainty. Cameroon is weakened by the constant threat of Boko Haram as well as recurrent conflicts of interest between the anglophone and French-speaking sections of the population since the state is incapable of using its variety as a strength.

References

Documentations of the BBC available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ct_SLnAGDuM.

Tull, Denis M. (2015): Kamerun und Boko Haram, SWP-Aktuell 76 August 2015, available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2015A76_tll.pdf.

Over one billion people live in these 49 states. Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest population growth in the world, which is even expected to double to around two billion by 2050. This development offers great potential, especially due to the strong growth of the young working population. But as the number of unemployed will increase to about one million as well, there might evolve an enormous problem. Concurrently, half of the people south of the Sahara are considered underemployed and work in the informal sector. As a result, there is often a lack of sufficiently qualified specialists on the ground. Sub-Saharan African countries must succeed in actually exploiting the economic benefits of the changed age structure. If this is not successful, population development will have a threatening downside. Ultimately, humanitarian and political disasters may lead to social unrest and growing migratory flows if the region fails to feed the growing population and provide them with medical care. Is population growth an enormous opportunity, however at the same time posing too many challenges for the region?

Above all, the considerable inequality between and within individual states repeatedly leads to conflicts. In particular, corruption at all political, economic and judicial levels exacerbates social inequalities, hampers investment and undermines confidence in governments. Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where poverty has increased since 1990 (with the exception of South Africa). More than two thirds of the people have less than USD 2 per day at their disposal and are thus – according to a World Bank definition – extremely poor. Although economic output grew significantly faster than the global economy during this period, averaging more than 5 percent in real terms between 2000 and 2015, the overall situation has never improved as much as it seemed. The development and the long period of growth were significantly influenced by rising commodity prices and increased direct investment from China – a country that over time has risen to become Sub-Saharan Africa’s most important trading partner. In the meantime, growth has declined sharply again, partly as a result of China’s stronger focus on domestic consumption. GDP per capita is made up of GDP growth on the one hand and population development on the other. Because the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is growing so rapidly, the successes in poverty reduction are relatively small. Population growth averaging 2.8 percent per year reduced economic growth to around 2.5 percent per year. As a result, prosperity – measured in GDP per capita – only increases if the economy grows faster than the population. The decline in labor poverty is too slow to keep pace with the steadily rising labor force. In order to make tangible progress in the fight against poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa needs annual growth of 6 to 7 percent.

When assessing these figures, however, it should be noted that more than a third of the farmers south of the Sahara produce their food and most of their livelihood goods entirely for themselves or their local communities. These subsistence services can hardly be recorded in the prosperity indicators commonly used today. Due to social change, however, pure subsistence production is in most cases no longer sufficient to secure people’s livelihoods. The widespread poverty and the increasingly deteriorating conditions for subsistence farming – such as the displacement of large enterprises, the overexploitation of resources, and the emergence of new dependencies – have a particularly negative impact on the food and health situation. More than a fifth of the people in the Sub-Saharan region are considered malnourished; the average life expectancy is only 54 years; almost 40 percent of the population still live without adequate water supplies; and almost 70 percent without adequate sanitation. Added to this are the serious effects of the immunodeficiency disease AIDS and other infectious diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis caused by the hot and humid climate. Poor hygiene, a poor health system as well as the deficient education of the population exacerbate these problems.

For decades, the political landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa was characterized by dictatorial forms of government. Despite the democratization that has been evident since the end of the Cold War, the majority of states are governed more or less dictatorially. One fundamental dilemma is that elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are on the one hand without alternatives, but on the other hand they still frequently take place in a fragile political environment. Even in countries whose systems are considered to be relatively stable, it is not self-evident that votes take place peacefully and fairly, and that the results are generally accepted. So, are elections in Sub-Saharan Africa a curse or a blessing? The view that elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are merely a cover for authoritarian rule, and inevitably a source of instability and violence, often dominates. Particularly when elections are characterized by persistently low quality or permanently strong violence, there is a danger that they will be discredited by the population. The lack of integrity leads to an enormous loss of trust among the population and further social polarization when democratic institutions become an empty shell – increasing the potential for the outbreak of conflicts, such as in Cameroon and Zimbabwe. However, elections do not necessarily lead to violence, nor are deficient elections necessarily a façade. First of all, elections are largely without alternatives. As an indispensable element of democratic systems, elections alone do not constitute democracy, but they promote democratic values and peaceful conflict resolution. Whether elections actually have democratic substance depends on their quality – above all on the freedom of choice of the citizens and the legitimacy of state rule. Overall, the democratic quality in Sub-Saharan Africa has improved since the 1980s, although the changes are not (yet) sustainable.

Nowadays, almost all states hold multi-party elections. Nevertheless, in many cases the picture continues to be dominated by hybrid regimes that move in a grey area between democratic and autocratic rule. But how meaningful are elections really under these conditions? In general, they are relevant in all these cases. Above all, however, they are to be understood as a process and not merely as an event. Despite all justified criticism, there are clear indications of positive developments: Not only do elections in Sub-Saharan Africa take place more frequently and regularly than in the past, they are also much more fiercely contested. In addition, the continuity of elections is important, since their democratic quality can improve with each new ballot. Accordingly, the repeated holding of elections, even if they sometimes have deficits, has a democratizing effect in principle. Although this is not yet equivalent to consolidation, it contradicts the common assumption that elections with flaws inevitably undermine democratic quality – the opposite effect is at least possible.

Katharina Lange held her presentation about “Current conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa”. After giving a broad overview about the region of Sub-Saharan Africa and some of its peculiarities, she talked about resource conflicts, border conflicts and religious conflicts – all of which have a special role to play within this region.

After a short video introducing the topic of child soldiers, the participants of the seminar were given the opportunity to discuss this sensitive issue among themselves. Currently, around 250,000 children are engaged as soldiers in a violent conflict, of which a lot are situated in Sub-Saharan Africa. The awareness for the dire situation of child soldiers is fading, hence the discussion on the topic was more than vital.

Thereafter, the presentation comprised two focus conflicts in more detail. Firstly, the participants gained an insight into the violent riots between the anglophone and the francophone parts of the population in Cameroon. What had initially started as a peaceful demonstration in order to receive some respect for the anglophone culture and language in 2016, has escalated quickly. But this is not the only conflict the country has to face at the moment. A huge threat keeps coming from the terrorist organization Boko Haram whose suicide bombings have already crossed into Cameroon from its neighboring country Nigeria. Secondly, the presentation dealt with the current crisis in Zimbabwe. After a hyperinflation in 2008, the country’s economic as well as political situation stagnates leading to protests of the disappointed and malnourished population. In January 2019, the violence of the protests opposing the military intensified up to a shutdown of the internet lasting several days, in particular in the capital city Harare.

The seminar has been a very interesting and unique experience – for CISS, but especially for Katharina Lange herself. We are thankful for the invitation and are looking forward to further seminars in the future where we can provide input from the perspective of young initiators about foreign affairs and international relations.

In particular, the team reflected on the development of CISS’s Think Tank and held a discussion round gathering ideas and perspectives for new Impact Groups that could be founded within the course of this year. Not only young people who are already part of CISS are interested in engaging further, but CISS also invited new students interested in joining CISS. We are very thrilled to say that a certainly exciting year with many new ideas to be put into practice lies ahead of us.

Another crucial topic was the start of the preparation of the upcoming elections of the Executive Board which will probably take place at the second semiannual meeting in September 2019. The team has already started to discuss how to structure the next Executive Board and it has been exciting to see that many of CISS’s current team members have expressed interest in running for a position. To further prepare the team for this transition, the current Executive Board will gradually introduce interested team members to the various subjects and responsibilities of their work throughout the next five months.

The upcoming EU elections were another hot topic during the weekend. CISS decided to run a social media campaign to motivate young people to vote and inform them of reasons for doing so. We will post statements of CISS team members with their personal reasons for coting and encourage other young people to join the campaign. We hereby strongly encourage everyone to take place in the election process and we hope that everyone knows what a responsibility and honor it is to vote.

We also want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who actively took part in our successful semiannual meeting. It was a pleasure to spend the weekend together and to work productively on CISS’s development and towards our goals. We are looking forward to meeting again at our next semiannual meeting in September and to many CISS events in the meantime.