Jasper Mührel – CISS https://ciss.eu Young Initiative on Foreign Affairs and International Relations (CISS) Sat, 09 Mar 2019 16:59:28 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.8.9 wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/cropped-android-chrome-512x512-2-32x32.png Jasper Mührel – CISS https://ciss.eu 32 32 Historic cooperation: France and Germany to share their presidencies in the UN Security Council 2019/03/09/france-and-germany-un/ Sat, 09 Mar 2019 16:40:49 +0000 ?p=13701 For the first time in the history of the United Nations (UN), two states share their presidencies in the Security Council. As France will take over the presidency from Equatorial Guinea in March and subsequently Germany in April, the two EU member states have decided to share the presidency’s responsibilities throughout the 8 weeks. The Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN, Christoph Heusgen, calls the partnership between the permanent member France and the recently elected non-permanent member Germany a “Jumelage”, referring to the French word for town twinning.

In times of spreading national isolation on a political and economic level, the new approach of a joint presidency takes a stand both for multilateralism and a common voice of the EU. With regard to the French-German history, which was once characterized by rivalry and wars that were one reason for the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, the “Jumelage” is widely perceived as a historic moment.

According to the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council and Art. 30 of the UN Charter, the role of the presidency includes: approving the agenda, calling and presiding over the meetings, representing the organ and issuing presidential statements and notes, which can pave the way for consensual decisions by the 15 members.

The cooperation is based on the Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration (Aachen Treaty), which was signed by President Macron and Chancellor Merkel in Aachen on the 56th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty on 22 January 2019. Chapter 2 stipulates a closer cooperation in the areas of defense, security and diplomacy.

The foreign ministers of France and Germany, Jean-Yves Le Drian and Heiko Maas, presented their common agenda for the next two months, focusing on the fight against terrorism and arms trade, the protection and empowerment of women in conflict situations, the strengthening of International Humanitarian Law, and support for peacekeeping operations, particularly in Mali and the Sahel region, where both France and Germany have deployed military forces within the framework of UN’s MINUSMA peacekeeping mission.

Despite the demonstrated unity, the composition of the UN Security Council recently lead to a controversy between the two states, when German vice-chancellor Olaf Scholz urged France to give up its seat to turn it into a common EU seat, which was immediately rejected by French officials. One reason for that controversy is the outdated and almost unchangeable structure of the UN Security Council. A restructuring of the organ would require an amendment to Chapter V of the UN Charter, which can be achieved only under the conditions stipulated by Art. 108 UN Charter, i.e. a ratification by two thirds of the members of the UN, including all permanent members of the Security Council. It seems rather unlikely that all five permanent members would approve an amendment that would weaken their own status, e.g. by waiving their veto power or by admitting more permanent members to the Council. However, the present composition – dating back to 1945 – does not reflect the current power structure of international politics, which is shaped also by other actors, such as Japan, Canada and Germany as well as newly industrialized countries like Brazil, Mexico, India, Indonesia or South Africa. Thus, the project not only of an EU seat, but an appropriate reform of the Security Council in general – as foreseen in the Treaty of Aachen – will remain one of the most complicated challenges for the “Jumelage” within the UN system.

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Accessio, quo vadis? The EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 2017/02/20/accessio-quo-vadis-2/ Mon, 20 Feb 2017 19:22:07 +0000 http://ciss.eu/?p=10711 The accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention of Human Right (ECHR) has been discussed among Europeans for decades. In December 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the Draft Accession Agreement undermined the autonomy of EU-law. Since then, negotiations have not been re-opened. This article makes the case for reinforcing the EU’s efforts to join the convention.

The EU and the European Convention on Human Rights

Since the Treaty of Lisbon became effective in 2009, the EU is formally obliged to access the ECHR according to Art. 6(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, after three years of continuous negotiations between the European Commission and the 47 ECHR contracting parties, the CJEU rejected the accession, ruling that the Draft Agreement was not compatible with EU law. The CJEU’s negative advisory opinion and its defensive judicial reasoning regarding the autonomy of the EU’s legal system was sharply criticized—which in some parts is justified, in others not.[1] Due to the legal complexity of questions in European law, this article does not discuss the CJEU’s opinion in detail. Instead, looking forward into the future, it analyses the advantages of an accession.

In Europe, fundamental rights are protected by three catalogues of fundamental rights which remain in a tense relationship: The national constitutions (in Germany the Grundgesetz), the supranational Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) of the European Union and the ECHR. The compliance of the contracting parties with the ECHR is monitored by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Since the 1970s, there is an ongoing discussion about combining the EU´s legal system with the ECHR by accession. This act would be well-grounded, since the consequences of an accession would be an external human rights monitoring of EU measures as well as coherence in fundamental rights protection all over Europe.

It is true that the ECHR´s provisions about human rights already influence the EU as general principles and a constitutional minimum standard. However, in the absence of ECHR membership, EU measures cannot be subject to the ECtHR´s external control regarding the convention´s human rights. Thus, a complainant cannot appeal directly against EU measures before the ECtHR. Conversely, she cannot appeal to ECHR rights before the CJEU. In addition, a violation of fundamental rights by EU measures can hardly be brought before the CJEU anyway, due to the Court´s narrow interpretation of individual concern in Art. 263 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Hence, from an individual´s perspective, fundamental rights protection against EU measures is hard to obtain. For example, a small farmer association from Spain was not able to take action against an EU direction abolishing an aid scheme at the CJEU.[2] Consequently, it was not possible to examine if the farmers’ freedom of ownership and occupation was violated. This shows there is a missing link in the EU´s system of fundamental rights protection.

These gaps would be filled if the EU accessed to the convention. As an international treaty, the ECHR would become a binding part of EU law so that EU measures have to comply with the convention. As a result, EU measures would be subject to the ECtHR´s jurisdiction. If the EU had been a contracting party to the ECHR in the example above, the Spanish small farmer association could have taken legal action against the EU direction before the ECtHR by individual application relying on its fundamental rights guaranteed under the ECHR.

Towards a more coherent human rights protection in Europe?

As contracting party to the ECHR, all EU institutions and bodies, agencies, offices and entities acting on behalf of the EU would be bound to the convention´s human rights provisions. This would enhance human rights protection in the EU´s various areas of competence such as in justice, privacy and migration. Moreover, as a consequence of provisions in the Draft Agreement, the courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg would have to cooperate in their rulings, which would prevent divergent judgements. All this would make fundamental and human rights protection in Europe more coherent.

However, despite the accession commitment in Art. 6(2) TEU, Brussels seems to take no further action although Commission president Juncker declared in April 2016 that the accession was a political priority for the Commission. Also the Commission’s 2017 Work Programme announces that it would continue pursuing its work on a solution and not rest until it was found.[3] The Council of Europe is also still open to negotiations. However, there have been no indications for a re-opening of the negotiations in Strasbourg so far. The reason for this may be that the EU is currently concerned with other important matters such as Brexit, the Russia-Ukraine conflict or its refugee policy. Further, the tense relationships to the ECHR contracting parties Russia and Turkey would make new negotiations difficult. Another reason could be the strict requirements for the accession delivered by the CJEU in its advisory opinion. A third negative advisory opinion after 1996 and 2014 would probably be the end of the decades-old project. But this fear is unfounded since there is no obligation to obtain the opinion of the CJEU according to Art. 218(11) TFEU. This of course does not mean to ignore the Court´s justified criticism in its 2014 advisory opinion.

Either way, the obligation to access the ECHR in Art. 6(2) TEU is in place and the harmonisation of the catalogues of fundamental rights would establish an external human rights monitoring. This would be a great achievement for every individual strengthening the EU´s credibility in Europe as well as in its international relations. Therefore, it´s time to go back to the drawing board.

 

[1] See the English discussion on Verfassungsblog, http://verfassungsblog.de/category/schwerpunkte/die-eu-als-mitglied-der-menschenrechts-konvention/ .

[2] CJEU case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the EU (July 25, 2002), ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=47107&pageIndex=0&doclang=DE&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1.

[3] See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-1487_en.htm.

© Picture: European Parliament  ]]>