Because democracy matters: Options for the EU and MERCOSUR to restrain authoritarian tendencies

• Ronald Trenchi (Uruguay) and Julia Baumann (Germany)
• 20. August 2020

The re-emergence of authoritarian practices in some LAC and European countries has triggered reactions by regional organisations to safeguard democracy within their member states. This article compares the approaches of MERCOSUR and the EU to the Venezuelan and Polish cases. It illustrates the necessity for a more active role and new instruments for regional organisations in opposing illiberal developments.

The recent rise in populist politics and authoritarian tendencies in the European Union (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) represents a threat to democratic principles and regional security. The risk inherent to these developments is primarily due to the anti-pluralist stance of most populists: rejecting the legitimacy of political opponents, they claim to be the only truthful representation of the people and, not infrequently, transform democratic foundations into façade institutions.^[i]

This raises the question for actors to revert this trend: Which role can regional organisations play in protecting democracy within their member states?

Following the limited success of prior engagement, the Common Market of South America (MERCOSUR) ^[ii], a regional trade bloc with four member states Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; as well as the European Union (EU) with its 28 member states, should take a more active stance in restraining illiberal tendencies

One of the key insights found in this article is that assuming a new role in protecting democratic principles is ultimately in the interest of the regional organisations’ credibility and legitimacy. However, this requires structural improvements of institutional capacity and more effective democracy enforcement mechanisms.

Regional Organisations and Democracy

Increasing scholarly conviction on the authority for regional organisations to defend democracy within their own borders has furthered discussions on the respective mechanisms at their disposal.^[iii] As prominent examples, MERCOSUR and the EU have illustrated their readiness to react to authoritarian tendencies inside member states, with Venezuela and Poland as recent and illustrative cases.

Figure 1: BTI Index – State of Political Transformation (2014-2018)

Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index.^[iv]

Venezuela: from Populist Rise to Authoritarian Turn

As Venezuela is currently facing an economic and humanitarian crisis, the reasons behind its authoritarian turn can be traced back to the late 1990s. Under the premise of “21st century socialism”, then-President Hugo Chávez promoted social welfare programmes, while similarly introducing several reforms that enabled him to exert pressure on democratic institutions.^[v]

When Chávez’s successor Nicolas Maduro won the 2013 presidential elections, the country’s political and socio-economic situation turned increasingly unstable. Mass protests were brutally dispersed, Venezuela’s government erased its last democratic vestiges through the creation of a newly constituent body, thereby nullifying the opposition-held legislative assembly and denoting an authoritarian turn.^[vi]

MERCOSUR’s Reaction 

Until 2015, MERCOSUR remained indifferent towards Venezuela’s increasing authoritarianism; many observers would argue that this was due to its member states’ preference for stable intergovernmental ties over the protection of democracy.^[vii] Change took place in 2016 when Argentina and Brazil shifted towards more conservative governments that were not ready to tolerate this degree of authoritarianism inside MERCOSUR thereafter.^[viii]

Following a period of fruitless dialogue with the Venezuelan government, they made use of their political weight withinthe organisation to trigger Article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in August 2017.^[ix]  As a result, Venezuela was expelled indefinitely from MERCOSUR until democracy is restored.^[x]

Why did it take so long for this action to be taken? The reasons rest with MERCOSUR’s consensus-based decision-making process, which allows for presidential diplomacy and political preferences to prevail over supranational agreements and leaves the Ushuaia Protocol as an imperfect, highly political mechanism for defending democracy.^[xi]It does not come as a surprise that as of now, save for its symbolic value, the sanctions against Venezuela do not seem to have had any major influence on the regime’s degree of authoritarianism.

As a result, although democracy is recognised as essential for MERCOSUR’s regional integration, the organisation proved itself unable to successfully engage in its defence, with their lack of prompt action challenging their credibility. A more determined commitment in safeguarding democracy is desirable and necessary but requires stronger institutions and enforcement mechanisms as a prerequisite.

Poland’s Constitutional Crisis     

Another country with populist tendencies is Poland. Once considered a success story of European integration, Poland has been recently experiencing a severe decline in its quality of democracy. In contrast to Venezuela, however, where the rejection of liberal-democratic principles is embedded in an ideologically framed left-wing populism, the rise of illiberal politics in Poland originates in the context of right-wing nationalism.

Since its electoral victory in October 2015, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) used its majority to reconstruct Poland’s political order. A series of newly adopted measures and reforms granted the government increasing control over public media and the judiciary system, in particular regarding the Constitutional Court and the National Judiciary Council.^[xii]

Figure 2: Nations in Transit Score – Poland (2014-2018) 

Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit.^[xiii]

The EU’s Response

In the EU, the controversial legislation was perceived as an unlawful interference in judicial independence and a risk to the separation of powers and the rule of law. Since the latter is a core value noted in the EU Treaties, the European Commission (EC) initiated a rule-of-law procedure against Poland in 2016.^[xiv] As the Polish government rejected the procedure as an illegitimate interference in domestic affairs, the EC followed up after a year of unsuccessful diplomatic attempts by recommending the invocation of Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty.^[xv] The procedure provides grounds for an EU reaction in the case of a serious breach of Union values and can ultimately lead to a suspension of certain membership rights.

However, as for now such a scenario seems rather unlikely since triggering Article 7 requires a unanimous vote by all member states – except for the country to be sanctioned – and Hungary already announced its veto.^[xvi] Given the risk of such a deadlock, a regulation proposed by the Commission in May this year suggested tying the EU budget to deficiencies regarding the rule of law in member states.^[xvii] Since Poland currently receives the highest percentage of cohesion funds, this may provide for some leverage, even if it entails a certain degree of political risk.^[xviii]

With the Polish government’s failure to address the Commission’s concerns^[xix] and the new law related to the Supreme Court taking effect, the EC opened an infringement procedure against Poland in early July 2018.^[xx] While this could lead to the reform being declared unconstitutional by the European Court of Justice, it remains questionable whether this could ultimately stop it.

How to Proceed

Despite the risk of causing a national backlash by getting involved in a member states’ constitutional matters, there is no alternative for the EU but to engage itself more prominently if it aims to uphold its core values. The need to readily intervene in cases of serious breach of Union law is not least a question of legitimacy and credibility for the EU itself.

Next to persistent diplomatic pressure, the present challenge requires the EU to consider new enforcement mechanisms. These might include the creation of an oversight institution to monitor the state of democracy inside the Union and the establishment of a discussion on a potential expulsion mechanism to serve as a powerful deterrent.^[xxi]The above-mentioned proposal of linking EU funds to the rule of law could be a step in this direction.

Space for Improvement

MERCOSUR and the EU’s previous reactions to authoritarian tendencies within their member states strengthened the notion of regional organisations’ responsibility in protecting democracy within its members, but also illustrated the need to improve their instruments to do so more successfully in the future. In both cases, consensus-based decision-making leaves formal enforcement mechanisms as ultimately highly political procedures, which are often ineffective when it comes to their implementation.

Unlike MERCOSUR, where action only materialised after Venezuela had turned autocratic, the EU started engaging with the PiS government once questionable legislative changes were identified as threats to the rule of law. Although critics would point to the ineffectiveness of the respective procedures, the continuity inherent to the lengthy processes of dialogue, criticism and response between the EC and the Polish government contributes to raising public awareness regarding the importance of democracy and its protection.

The Venezuelan case provides important lessons on the rapid rise and transformation of populist claims to an authoritarian regime in the absence of a strong regional response. Therefore, the EU should not wait any longer for a more pronounced standing regarding Poland’s backlash and should further consider establishing criteria and tools entailing the option to suspend membership. Even if this might further EU resentment and anti-liberal populist forces, the possibility of expulsion could provide some leverage vis-à-vis non-conforming governments and send a strong political signal. Admittedly, political isolation alone, as the example of Venezuela’s expulsion suggests, is not an automatism for restraining authoritarian tendencies, and it may limit the opportunities of dialogue and other forms of influence.

Thus, the EU needs to consider PiS’ anti-EU rhetoric in its compiling its strategy of action, as it has served as a legitimation strategy not only for the Polish government, but for populist Euro-sceptics across an increasing number of member states such as Hungary and Italy.

Comparatively, MERCOSUR has not faced the same level of resentment domestically. Rather, it was its ideological selectivity and inconsistency in enforcing democratic commitments that undermined its credibility. The EU’s stronger institutions and democratic criteria might therefore serve as an example for MERCOSUR in setting up its own democratic requirements for regional integration to enable faster and less politicised reactions.

As an ad hoc alternative, member states of both regional organisations could consider imposing bilateral sanctions on governments where the disrespect for democracy and human rights becomes unbearable, to signal that the adherence to previously agreed values is not exclusively an internal matter.

A New Role for Regional Organisations

Although it has previously not been part of their tool kit, there is an increasing role for regional organisations to engage in the protection of democracy inside their member states.

In this regard, the EU and MERCOSUR have not yet exploited their full potential. Their need to position themselves more actively in opposition to authoritarian tendencies is in the interest of their own credibility and legitimacy; this is particularly important in recent times as illiberalism is on the rise and calls democratic norms into question.

By enhancing their democratic commitment on a supranational level, both regions can send a strong signal to illiberal movements. Combined efforts in this sphere could shape society’s perception of democracy and contribute to the strengthening of a consensus surrounding democratic values.

To conclude, the comparative perspective taken here illustrates the importance of regional responses to rising authoritarianism inside member states. A successful engagement in safeguarding democratic standards in the future requires that regional organisations improve their protection procedures and overcome the intergovernmental ties which have previously restrained effective action.

References

^[i] Müller, J.-W. (2016) What Is Populism?. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 3-14.

^[ii] MERCOSUR is a South American organisation, originally created as free trade bloc in 1991, later amended by several political and social aspects.

^[iii] Closa Montero, C. et al. (2016) Regional Organisations and Mechanisms for Democracy Protection in Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union. Hamburg: EU-LAC Foundation Publications. https://eulacfoundation.org/en/system/files/Democracy_Protection_eng.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[iv] The BTI Index analyses the status of political and economic transformation in 129 developing and transition countries, Western Europe is not considered in the world average. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018) BTI Transformation Index. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://www.bti-project.org/en/data/rankings/status-index/ (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[v] Renwick, D. (2018) Venezuela in Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations (23 March 2018).  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis (accessed 15 July2018).

^[vi] Almagro, L. (2017) Denunciation of a Dictatorial Regime’s Consolidation in Venezuela. Washington: Organization of American States (25 September 2017). http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2017/CP38157REPORT.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[vii] Romero-Castillo, E. (2015) Venezuela y el comodín de la “no injerencia”. Deutsche Welle (3 December 2015). http://www.dw.com/es/venezuela-y-el-comod%C3%ADn-de-la-no-injerencia/a-18890668 (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[viii] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Brasil (2017) Comunicado de los países del MERCOSUR sobre Venezuela. Brasil: ltamaraty (5 July 2017). http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/es/notas-a-la-prensa/16766-comunicado-de-los-paises-del-mercosur-sobre-venezuela (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[ix] Mercosur (1998) Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre Compromiso Democrático. Ushuaia: Mercosur (24 July 1998). http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/2485/1/cmc_1998_protocolo_es_ushuaia.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[x] Mercosur (2017) Decisión sobre la suspensión de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela en el Mercosur. São Pablo: Mercosur (5 August 2017).http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/8469/1/decision-suspension-de-venezuela-del-mercosur_es.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xi] Malamud, A. (2013) Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences. EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2013/20: 8-9. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute (March 2013). http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/26336/RSCAS_2013_20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xii] The National Judiciary Council is a public body responsible for judicial appointments. Donner, S. et al. (2018) BTI Country Report Poland. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2018/pdf/BTI_2018_Poland.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xiii] Freedom House’s Nations in Transit assesses the state of democracy and democratic reforms. Wójcik, A. (2018) Nations in Transit 2018 – Country Report Poland. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NiT2018_Poland_0.pdf  (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xiv] European Commission (2016) Rule of Law in Poland: Commission Starts Dialogue. Brussels: European Commission (13 January 2016). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_WM-16-2030_en.pdf  (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xv] European Commission (2017) Commission Recommendation of 20.12.2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland  complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520. Brussels: European Commission (20 December 2017).http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=49107 (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xvi] Rettman, A. (2017) Hungary veto sets scene for EU battle on Poland. Brussels: EU Observer (21 December 2017). https://euobserver.com/justice/140385(accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xvii] European Commission (2018) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the European Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States. Brussels: European Commission (2 May 2018). https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/protection-union-budget-rule-law-may2018_en.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xviii] European Commission (2018) European Structural and Investment Funds: Country Data for: Poland. Brussels: European Commission (March 2018). https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/countries/PL (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xix] Euractiv (2018) EU urges ‘more progress’ from Poland by next month. Euractiv (15 May 2018).  https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-urges-more-progress-from-poland-by-next-month/ (accessed 15 July  2018).

^[xx] EU Commission (2018) Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court. Brussels: European Commission (2 July 2018). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4341_en.pdf (accessed 15 July 2018).

^[xxi] Müller, J.-W. (2015) Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States? European Law Journal, 21(2): 141–160.